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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation contends that print culture – newspapers in particular – played a 
decisive role in launching the black civil rights movement and shaping the white response 
to it during the middle of the twentieth century. Focusing on South Carolina, this study is 
the first to use civil sphere theory and frame analysis to explore the role of cultural 
expression in the political struggle over black equality in the years immediately before 
and after World War II. It shows how African-American editors and other activists made 
strategic use of the society’s symbolic codes concerning justice, freedom, and liberty to 
elicit empathy from potential allies and break down opposition to political and social 
acceptance. At the same time, this dissertation examines how some whites employed an 
equally powerful “discourse of repression” to limit the black movement’s gains and help 
launch the modern conservative movement. By placing cultural symbolism and 
interpretive communication at the heart of civic life, this study reveals the inextricable 
link between mass media, public opinion, and formal political power. In doing so, it 
raises new questions about the received historical narrative of a fully emerged 
professionalized, independent, and nonpartisan daily press in the United States by the 
second half of the twentieth century. This dissertation reveals a deep connection between 
South Carolina’s white press and partisan politics in the state well into the 1970s. Yet it 
also shows how partisan journalists had begun to hide their activism from the public to 
maintain their status as independent sources of information and interpretation.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE CIVIL SPHERE 
In 1935, a young African-American journalist named John Henry McCray 
returned home from college determined to launch a newspaper and help build a civil 
rights movement in South Carolina. It was an audacious and seemingly quixotic goal. 
Mired in the depths of the depression and demoralized by forty years of violent white 
supremacist rule, black South Carolinians in the mid-1930s struggled each day merely to 
survive. Political and social activism appeared to be luxuries they could not afford.1 
Northern civil rights activists who visited during the Depression described the 
state’s African-American communities as listless and quiescent. They were “trapped in a 
morass” of economic exploitation and political hopelessness.2 The organizations that 
served as outlets for black civic life – churches, schools, and NAACP chapters – had 
grown either defeatist or moribund.3 The issue of white supremacy appeared to be settled. 
White politicians had grown so confident of this that they no
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I.A. Newby, Black Carolinians: A History of Blacks in South Carolina, 1895-1968 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1975), 201-267; Walter Edgar, South 
Carolina: A History (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 498-511; 
Edwin D. Hoffmann, “The Genesis of the Modern Movement for Equal Rights in South 
Carolina, 1930-1939,” Journal of Negro History, 44, 4, October 1959, 346-369; 
Theodore Hemmingway, “Beneath the Yoke of Bondage: A History of Black Folks in 
South Carolina, 1900-1940,” Ph.D. diss., University of South Carolina, 1976. 
2 Hoffmann, “The Genesis of the Modern Movement for Civil Rights in South Carolina,” 
347. 
3 Rev. Robert W. Bagnall, “Traveling through the Deep South,” The Crisis, April 1932, 
110-114. 
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 longer bothered to emphasize the issue when campaigning for office.4  
Within a dozen years, McCray’s newspaper, working with a small group of allies 
at the NAACP, had helped overturn this culture of accommodation, and a black 
community that had appeared to be politically somnolent embraced civic engagement. 
NAACP membership increased from 800 members in the mid-1930s to more than 14,000 
in 1948, with a centralized state conference of branches coordinating political activity 
across the organization’s 86 chapters.5  McCray and his allies launched a political 
organization, the Progressive Democratic Party, designed to challenge the all-white 
Democratic Party and give blacks a voice in state politics. The PDP is credited with 
boosting black voter registration from 3,500 in early 1944 to more than 50,000 by 1947.6 
At the center of this civic activism stood McCray’s newspaper, the Lighthouse & 
Informer, a radical voice that demanded black activism and ridiculed those African 
Americans who appeared to accept second-class status.  
 The new political movement won a string of victories in the courts and even at 
the ballot box across the 1940s. Black South Carolinians overturned the state’s system of 
unequal pay for black teachers in South Carolina, won the right for black voters to 
participate in Democratic Party primaries, influenced the outcome of a US Senate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Bryant Simon, “Race Relations: African American Organizing, Liberalism, and White 
Working-Class Politics in Post-War South Carolina,“ in Jumpin’ Jim Crow: Southern 
Politics from Civil War to Civil Rights, eds., Jane Dailey, Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, 
Bryant Simon (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 239-259; Bryant Simon, 
A Fabric of Defeat: The Politics of South Carolina Millhands, 1910-1940 (Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 220-225; Jack I Hayes, South Carolina 
and the New Deal. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 2001. 
5 Hoffmann, “The Genesis of the Modern Movement for Equal Rights in South 
Carolina,” 346. 
6 Hanes Walton, Jr., Black Political Parties: An Historical and Political Analysis (New 
York: Free Press, 1972), 74-75. 
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election, and filed the school desegregation suit that would lead to Brown v. Board of 
Education, the landmark Supreme Court case outlawing segregation in public schools. 
These successes served as a turning point in the political history of the state and the 
nation. As one historian put it, the NAACP activists who led the fight in South Carolina 
in the 1940s served as the “vanguard” of the massive civil rights struggle that would 
emerge across the South the following decade.7 
Historians have grappled with the question of why a black political movement 
planted in the inhospitable terrain of late 1930s South Carolina managed to take root and 
grow. Some have traced its origins to Roosevelt’s election when, as Patricia Sullivan has 
argued, New Deal activism “stirred the stagnant economic and political relationships” 
that had ruled the South since the turn of the century.8 Demographic, economic and social 
changes also played a role. The great migration accelerated in the 1930s, with more than 
400,000 blacks moving north during the decade. This increased the number of African 
American voters in key industrial states such as New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and 
Ohio. The rising black political clout in the New Deal era increased pressure on 
Roosevelt and the Democrats to begin to confront the party’s powerful southern wing on 
the issue of race. Additionally, industrialization and urbanization finally began to take 
hold in the South. With the arrival of the boll weevil and the collapse of the cotton crop 
in the late 1920s, African Americans in search of jobs began moving to cities. Literacy 
rates continued to increase, and the proximity of urban life facilitated political 
organization. Finally, the rise of fascism in Europe and the US entry into World War II 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Sullivan, Days of Hope, 128. 
8 Ibid, 3. 
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further destabilized the sedimented social, political, and economic structures in the 
South.9 
Yet social forces alone do not ensure political change. As sociologist Jeffrey C. 
Alexander points out, a social movement’s success also requires “leaders who provide 
these social forces with effective rhetoric and voice.”10 The battle over civil rights in 
South Carolina across the 1940s and 1950s was more than a litany of court cases and 
political campaigns. It was a cultural contest as well, with black activists and white 
segregationists struggling to define the meaning of citizenship and establish the 
boundaries of civic life. By tracing the discourse that flowed through print culture – 
books, magazines, and, most importantly, newspapers – this study examines the shifting 
cultural landscape that helped foster political change in South Carolina. As the historian 
Jill Lepore notes, “the rise of American democracy is bound up in reading and writing,” 
and the nation’s narrative always remains open to debate.11 The story of the black push 
for civil rights and the white response to it was political in nature, but understanding why 
change occurred at that particular moment requires a deeper inquiry than narrow political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Harvard Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National 
Issue: The Depression Decade (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 67; Nancy 
Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983); Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, “False Friends and 
Avowed Enemies: Southern African Americans and Party Allegiances in the 1920s,” in 
Jumpin’ Jim Crow: Southern Politics from Civil War to Civil Rights, eds., Jane Dailey, 
Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, Bryant Simon (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2000), 219-238; Sullivan, Days of Hope; Lau, Democracy Rising; Hayes, South Carolina 
and the New Deal; Robert A. Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of 
Sectionalism, 1941-1948 (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1974); 
John Kyle Day, “The Southern Manifesto: Making Opposition to the Civil Rights 
Movement” (PhD, Diss., University of Missouri, 2006), 4. 
10 Jeffrey C. Alexander, The Performance of Politics: Obama’s Victory and the 
Democratic Struggle for Power. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, 3. 
11 Jill Lepore, The Story of America: Essays on Origins (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2012), 3. 
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history can offer. With its focus on the role of print culture, this study asks how American 
democracy was debated, contested, and re-imagined in the years immediately before and 
after World War II, when the state’s black citizens began to rise up en masse, and white 
leadership struggled to respond. It searches for answers in one small, Deep South state. 
Yet the findings help illuminate the cultural struggle at the heart of all democratic life.  
By treating culture as an independent and autonomous force, this study highlights 
the inextricable link between the mass media, public opinion, and formal political power. 
In doing so, it relies on Alexander’s concept of the civil sphere, a social theory that 
reconsiders the nature of civil society. Across the 1940s and 50s, black and white leaders 
in South Carolina crafted narratives designed to shape the meaning of the civil rights 
struggle in the South. Both sides used the tools of mass communications and political 
symbolism to try to define their causes and link them to the traditions and ideals of the 
nation’s democratic origins. In doing so, both pursued a singular goal: to win the hearts 
and minds of potential allies within the larger democratic public. For it was this 
democratic public – what Alexander calls the “civil sphere” – that would determine the 
outcome of the African American battle for equal rights in South Carolina and the nation.  
Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere helps us understand the dynamics of 
political change in the mid-twentieth century, when rapid modernization began to connect 
local and national as never before.12 The spread of mass transportation and mass media 
early in the century had helped spawn a migration that altered the nation’s demographics 
and strengthened the political and cultural connections between North and South. By the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For detailed explanation of civil sphere theory, see: Jeffrey C. Alexander, The Civil 
Sphere (NY: Oxford University Press, 2006); Jeffrey C. Alexander, “Interpretation of The 
Civil Sphere,” The Sociological Quarterly 48 (2007): 641-659; Alexander, The 
Performance of Politics. 
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1940s, the isolation that had benefited the white South during the rise of Jim Crow had 
given way to a more interconnected society. Cultural and political shifts in one region 
were now more likely to exert influence in another. This study reveals the significant 
roles the black and white communities in South Carolina played in reshaping the politics 
of the nation across the second half of the twentieth century. In the late 1930s, black 
activists in the state began plotting the development of black civil sphere capable of 
delivering its own interpretation of public events. Their success would help launch the 
broader civil rights movement of the 1950s and early 1960s, a movement that overturned 
Jim Crow rule in the South. The white response to this movement – strongly influenced 
by South Carolina activists – would help fuel the growth of the modern conservative 
movement, a partisan political realignment that continues to dominate the nation’s civic 
life.  
Examining the civil rights struggle in South Carolina through the lens of 
Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere opens up new ways of understanding the role of 
culture in fostering political change. In democratic societies, members of the mass public 
construct narratives to help make sense of the world, and through these narratives they 
create what Alexander calls the “social solidarity” that comprises the democratic public. 
It is within this civil sphere that democratic communities determine membership; they 
decide who has the right to full citizenship and who does not. In Alexander’s view, the 
civil sphere is the one space where cultural expression and interpretive communication 
can overcome narrow self-interest in shaping how members of the society make meaning 
of their world. Those who have full membership in the solidarity of the civil sphere treat 
each other as equals, carry out political debate with mutual respect, and distribute power 
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based on the ability to persuade, not the strength to compel. In this sense, democracy is 
more than a mere form of government; it is, as John Dewey said, “a mode of associated 
living, of conjoint communicated experience.”13 
In Alexander’s theory of civic life, the democratic ideals of the nation live on 
through those who are members of the democratic public. Within this solidary civil 
sphere, citizens share a deep emotional connection to the values embedded in the culture 
of the society. Powerful symbolic codes that grew out of the nation’s founding documents 
convey these democratic ideals across society and help enhance a shared sense of 
community. Much like Gunnar Myrdal’s argument in An American Dilemma, his massive 
study of “the Negro question and American democracy,” Alexander’s civil sphere theory 
suggests the existence of an “American Creed,” a subtle but widely held belief that “the 
American way” is linked to such notions as “liberty,” “justice,” and “fair play.”14  
Yet Alexander emphasizes that the civil sphere can never be achieved in its ideal 
form. Members of the democratic public who comprise the civil sphere also participate in 
other, anti-civil spheres that surround and frequently invade the civil sphere. These 
spheres include the market, the state, and racial, ethnic, and gender affiliations. In other 
words, members of the civil sphere do no always act and think according to the ideals of 
the democratic nation. The cultural codes that appeal to the society’s democratic ideals 
have been used to depict out-groups as uncivil and threats to the democratic nation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Free Press, 1916, 1966), 87, as 
quoted in Alexander, The Civil Sphere, 37. 
14 First published in 1944, Myrdal’s massive two-volume study was funded by Ford 
Foundation and included the work of hundreds of scholars. See: Gunnar Myrdal, An 
American Dilemma: The Negro Question and American Democracy (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1944); See also: Walter Jackson, Gunnar Myrdal and America’s Conscience: 
Social Engineering & Racial Liberalism, 1938-1987 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina, 1990). 
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Throughout history, members of the democratic public have also used the civil sphere as 
a means of exclusion.15  
Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere places communications at the heart of civic 
life.  The mass media do more than merely transmit information to the public. Through 
acts of selection and emphasis, they convey interpretations of civic life that help define 
what “actually goes on” in society.16 These interpretations play a decisive role in shaping 
public opinion and promoting cultural and political change. In making these claims, 
Alexander links his notion of the civil sphere to the constructivist paradigm that has 
dominated media effects and communications studies for the past three decades.17 This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Alexander, “Interpretation of The Civil Sphere,” 641-659. 
16 Alexander, The Civil Sphere, 5. 
17 For an overview of media effects research, see: Dietram A. Schufele, “Framing as a 
Theory of Media Effects,” Journal of Communication, Winter, 1999, 103-118; On social 
construction of reality, see: Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social 
Construction of Reality (New York: Doubleday, 1966); Gaye Tuchman, Making News: A 
Study in the Social Construction of Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1978). On 
framing and frame analysis, see: Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the 
Organization of Experience (New York: Free Press, 1974); Todd Gitlin, The Whole 
World is Watching: Mass Media and the Making and Unmaking of the New Left 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 
“The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Science, 211, 4481, 453-458; 
William A Gamson & Andre Modigliani, “Media Discourse and Public Opinion on 
Nuclear Power. A Constructionist Approach,” American Journal of Sociology 95, (1989): 
1-37; William A. Gamson, Talking Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1993); Robert M. Entman. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” 
Journal of Communication 43, (April , 1993): 51-59; Kevin Caragee & Wim Roefs. “The 
Neglect of Power in Recent Framing Research,” Journal of Communication 54, 
(February, 2004): 214-23. For more on framing and social protest movements, see: 
William A. Gamson, Bruce A. Fireman, & Steven Rytina, Encounters with Unjust 
Authority (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press,1982); William A. Gamson, “Political Discourse 
and Collective Action,” International Journal of Social Movements, Conflicts and 
Change 1 (January, 1988): 219-244; David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, 
Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” International Social Movement 
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paradigm assumes mass media play a significant role in helping the public construct 
social reality. The media identify issues that comprise the public agenda, and through the 
process of framing, they help determine how the public thinks about those issues.16 
Journalists and other communicators routinely make subjective decisions about which 
dimensions and characteristics of an issue deserve greater public scrutiny; they decide 
which angles to emphasize and which to downplay or ignore altogether.17 Through this 
selection process, the mass media offer interpretive cues that identify problems and 
propose solutions. In this way, they play an influential role in cultural contests over 
meaning-making; their framing of public events can help produce what Alexander 
describes as civil rupture or civil repair.18     
Historians have documented the rise of the civil rights movement in South 
Carolina and the white backlash that it triggered.19 This study is the first, however, to use 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Research 1 (January, 1988): 197-218; Snow & Benford, “Master Frames and Cycles of 
Protest,” in Frontiers of Social Movement Theory, eds., Aldon Morris and Carol Mueller 
(New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1992); Benford & Snow, “Framing Processes 
and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 
(2000): 611-639; Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, eds., Frames of Protest: Social 
Movements and the Framing Perspective (Lanham Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).   
18 Alexander, The Civil Sphere, 3-9. 
19 For more on the black civil rights movement in South Carolina, see: Pater Lau, 
Democracy Rising: South Carolina and the Fight for Black Equality Since 1865 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2006); Wim Roefs, “Leading the Civil Rights 
Vanguard: John McCray and the Lighthouse & Informer, 1939-1954,” in Time Longer 
than Rope: A Century of African American Activism, 1850-1950, eds. Charles M. Payne 
and Adam Green (New York: New York University Press, 2009); Patricia Sullivan, Days 
of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1996); John Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day: The Generation before 
the Civil Rights Movement in the South (Alfred A. Knopf, 1994); I.A. Newby, Black 
Carolinians: A History of Blacks in South Carolina from 1865-1968 (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1973); Edwin D. Hoffman, “The Genesis of the 
Modern Movement for Civil Rights in South Carolina,” The Journal of Negro History 44 
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civil sphere theory to explore the cultural struggle at the heart of that political contest. By 
focusing on the role of cultural symbolism and interpretive communication, this study 
sheds new light on what Alexander calls “the cultural structure at the heart of democratic 
life.”20 It shows how an out-group can make strategic use of the society’s symbolic codes 
concerning justice, freedom, and liberty to elicit empathy from potential allies within a 
dominant group and break down opposition to political and social acceptance. At the 
same time, however, this study examines how opponents can employ an equally powerful 
“discourse of repression” to limit the out-group’s gains.21 South Carolina’s civil rights 
leaders won support in the 1940s by linking their struggle for equality to the most sacred 
traditions of the nation’s democratic heritage – what one black activist called “things of 
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the heart, things eternal.”22 Stunned by the black movement’s early success, white leaders 
struggled during the following decade to devise a new interpretation of segregation that 
would resonate in the shifting cultural landscape of the larger nation. In the early 1960s, 
however, the state’s white leaders – particularly two white journalists – played a central 
role in the evolution of a new “color-blind” rhetoric that depicted blacks as uncivilized 
and anti-democratic and helped build a new political movement that would dominate 
national politics for the remainder of the twentieth century. 
Additionally, this study breaks new ground in communication research by linking 
Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere to the concept of frame analysis. Alexander’s 
theory emphasizes the role of communicative institutions, particularly the mass media, in 
in shaping public opinion. Within the civil sphere, political actors compete to persuade 
citizens to embrace particular interpretive frameworks and accept their version of social 
reality. Frame analysis allows us to examine this meaning-making process in specific 
detail. By combing civil sphere and framing, this study helps explain the powerful role 
print culture played in the effort by civil rights activists to challenge the dominant 
cultural and political norm in the middle of the twentieth century. 
This study also raises new questions about journalism history and the generally 
accepted view that a professionalized, independent, and nonpartisan daily press had 
emerged in the United States by the second half of the twentieth century. This narrative 
of journalism history contends that the overwhelming majority of mainstream news 
outlets embraced the “monitorial” role, which emphasized a strict separation between 
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journalism and partisan political activism.23 Yet the role of South Carolina’s white press 
in resisting black equality contradicts this widely held view of how this 
professionalization process unfolded. Specifically, this study reveals a deep connection 
between press and partisan politics in the state well into the 1970s. Yet it also shows how 
partisan journalists had begun to hide their activism from the public to maintain their 
status as independent sources of information and interpretation. The evidence from South 
Carolina suggests the professionalization narrative that has grown so prominent in 
journalism history deserves closer scrutiny. 
This study focuses on a social movement that emerged in the middle of the 
century, but its origins date back to 1903, when the scholar and activist W.E.B Du Bois 
published The Souls of Black Folks, an ambitious collection of essays that sought to 
explain “the strange meaning of being black here in the dawning of the twentieth 
century.”24 As Du Bois wrote that line, white southerners were in the midst of a 
successful propaganda campaign that demonized African Americans as uncivilized and 
incapable of participating in the democratic process. As historians have noted, white 
Democrats rigged elections, yet blamed the increase in voter fraud on the presence of 
blacks in southern politics. They lynched and massacred, but convinced northern whites 
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that blacks were the root cause of the rising violence in the South. This “blame-the-
victim” strategy came at a time when the United States was getting its first taste of 
empire. The phrase “white man’s burden” had begun to resonate with the nation’s 
political class after imperialist military campaigns placed the US government in control 
of brown-skinned populations in Cuba and the Philippines. The white southern campaign 
against black equality also received a boost from the rising pseudo-science of social 
Darwinism, which fueled the fear that inferior races would undermine and destroy 
western civilization.25  
The forces of white reaction in the South led a counter-revolution that imposed a 
strict racial caste system and denied southern blacks equal participation in the civil 
sphere. Southern whites achieved these goals with both tacit and explicit support of white 
northern public opinion. Three decades after the Civil War, whites in the North had 
grown weary of what they called “the Negro problem,” and the nation’s government 
ceded to white southerners the power to manage race relations in their region. As the 
progressive journalist Ray Stannard Baker noted despondently in 1908: The place of 
blacks has been settled, “and the less they are talked about the better.” Added historian 
Charles Beard, “Agitation of the Negro question had become bad form in the North.”26 
This shift in northern opinion had been codified in 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson, the US 
Supreme Court ruling that gave racial segregation a constitutional seal of approval. 
Writing for the majority, Justice John H. Brown said, “If one race be inferior to the other 
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socially, the United States constitution cannot put them upon the same plane.”27 Free 
from federal interference, white supremacist Democrats employed all means necessary, 
including a violent campaign of terrorism, to dislodge black Americans from southern 
politics and civic life.28  
By the New Deal era of the 1930s, however, when John McCray returned to 
South Carolina and began his civil rights work, cracks began to appear in the edifice of 
white solidarity on the question of race. Pressured by white liberal activists and black 
civil rights groups, the Roosevelt administration slowly began to defy the southern 
segregationist wing of the Democratic Party and take action in the interest of African 
Americans. These early steps were tiny and timid: Aid programs like the Works Progress 
Administration (WPA) offered relief to black communities; the president created an 
informal “black cabinet” to brief him on African American issues; and the First Lady, 
Eleanor Roosevelt, began appearing in public with black leaders. By the late 1930s, the 
NAACP’s legal assault on Jim Crow began to chip away at the white supremacist 
ideology that undergirded the Plessy ruling.29 In Gaines v. Canada in 1938, the US 
Supreme Court ordered the state of Missouri to either create a “separate but equal” law 
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school for blacks or admit Lloyd Gains to the University of Missouri law school.30 A 
decade later, in Sweatt v. Painter, the court ruled that the black law school in Texas was 
inferior and that forcing Heman Sweatt to attend it would violate his constitutional right 
to equal protection under the law.31 The doctrine of “separate of equal” – the legal 
cornerstone of Jim Crow rule – was coming under siege. The shifting view in the 
Northern civil sphere would embolden civil rights activists in the South.  
Across the 1940s and 1950s, the white and black press in South Carolina would 
play influential roles in the struggle – both in the cultural contest over meaning-making 
and as direct participants in the state’s partisan politics. In the African American 
community, where a strategy of accommodation remained prevalent, a radical newspaper 
proposed a new path forward that required a different conception of what citizenship 
entailed. John McCray’s newspaper is significant in the history of the African-American 
press because of its location: The Lighthouse and Informer was one of the first to deliver 
a militant call for confrontation in the heart of the Deep South. In the Southwest, Roscoe 
Dungee’s Oklahoma Black Dispatch was one of the most radical black newspapers in the 
country during the early 1940s.32 And in the upper South, Louis E. Austin’s Carolina 
Times in Durham, North Carolina, challenged its readers to confront white supremacy.33 
But in the Deep South states stretching from Louisiana to the Atlantic coast, where the 
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threat of violence was constant, black voices were more cautious.34 McCray’s   
Lighthouse and Informer served as the tip of a political spear that included an aggressive 
NAACP presence in the state and a black political party determined to participate in the 
political process. 
 In response, white newspaper editors, often in collusion with influential political 
leaders, struggled to redefine the meaning of white supremacy and white democracy in 
the face of this new challenge. They would continue to pursue what one historian had 
called the  “central theme of southern history” – the effort to keep the South as a “white 
man’s country.”35 Yet the nation had changed since their forbears had fought the 
successful battle over white supremacy at the turn of the twentieth century. Now, they 
sought to tell a new story about white rule in the South that would restore its legal and 
intellectual credibility within the nation’s larger democratic narrative. 
 Charleston’s News and Courier occupied an influential seat at the center of the 
state’s white political world. In the 1940s, editor William Watts Ball was a throwback to 
the nineteenth century who participated openly in partisan politics. Yet the News and 
Courier’s political activism in the early 1960s, conducted mostly in secret, complicates 
the consensus scholarly view that a professionalized, independent, and nonpartisan press 
had spread even to the more rural South by then. The News and Courier’s editor, Thomas 
R. Waring Jr., and its chief political correspondent, William D. Workman, Jr., would play 
leading roles in crafting the legal strategy of interposition that would undergird the white 
South’s campaign of massive resistance to enforced integration in mid-1950s. When that 
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strategy began to fail, the two journalists turned their attention to partisan politics and 
would play integral roles in the rise of a conservative Republican Party in the South.   
This study traces the origins of the South Carolina civil rights movement to early 
years of the twentieth century, a time often described as the “nadir” of African American 
history.36 The Plessy ruling and Booker T. Washington’s acceptance of white political 
supremacy in the South had appeared to relieve white northerners of moral or 
constitutional obligations to intervene on behalf of African American equality. With 
notions of racial inferiority holding sway, blacks were mostly excluded from civic life 
and generally ignored. This isolation created an opportunity, however. As Alexander 
notes, out-groups that are excluded from mainstream society can use their isolation to 
create a counterpublic, a separate space that allows the out-group to communicate freely. 
Within the counterpublic, out-groups can share their own narratives, develop group 
consciousness, and begin to organize a plan of resistance.37 
In Chapter Two, this study shows how W.E.B Du Bois and the NAACP helped 
create a black counterpublic in the North with their communications efforts in the second 
decade of the century. At the same time, the great migration increased black populations 
living in proximity in northern cities, which created an audience for emerging black 
newspapers. The vigorous black press – particularly the Chicago Defender – delivered 
interpretations of white injustice that served to unite the new black counterpublic. 
Operating “under the veil” of segregation, the NAACP and the black press communicated 
a message of uplift and defiance that helped to create a robust and aggressive black civil 
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society. Although never foreordained, the majority of this emerging black counterpublic 
eventually supported a strategy of integration and assimilation into the larger American 
society. Marcus Garvey and other popular black leaders of the era had called for a 
separatist, black nationalist strategy.38 Under the NAACP’s leadership, however, the 
black counterpublic embraced the democratic ideals of the dominant white society and 
used those ideals to argue for inclusion in the nation’s civil sphere. 
 Du Bois’ writing in the NAACP’s monthly magazine, The Crisis, would attract a 
handful of black followers in South Carolina during World War I. Yet at that time, the 
black counterpublic in the North was not strong enough to rally northern public opinion 
in support of the fledgling civil rights effort in the state. White supremacists were able to 
crush the movement through the use of violence and economic retribution, without fear of 
northern intervention. By the mid-1930s, when young John McCray returned to South 
Carolina from college, the black counterpublic in the North had grown stronger. Though 
still an out-group, it had won more empathetic white allies and had begun to influence the 
federal government and other institutions of power, particularly the white press. Yet in 
1937, when McCray sought to launch a new civil rights movement in South Carolina, 
cultural ghosts from the past haunted his efforts. He would commit an act of 
accommodationism that would undermine his credibility in the small but growing black 
counterpublic in the state. Three years later, he would join forces with NAACP activists 
and turn his newspaper into “a fighting organ” that would be used to fuel the growth of a 
black counterpublic capable of challenging white supremacy in South Carolina.   
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 Chapter Three uses frame analysis to detail the effort by McCray and his allies at 
the Lighthouse and Informer to unite and mobilize that emerging black counterpublic in 
the 1940s. The legacy of Washington’s accommodationism remained strong in the state, 
and the fear of white retribution was pervasive. McCray and his allies employed what 
William Gamson has called a “collective action frame” to unite the black community 
behind a strategy of direct confrontation with white supremacy.39 The Lighthouse and 
Informer employed the notion of “autonomous freedom, ” a concept that linked political 
activism to personal growth and self-fulfillment.40 The newspaper claimed citizenship 
could never be won through negotiation but must be earned through struggle with white 
supremacy. The Lighthouse and Informer ridiculed black leaders who persisted in calling 
for accommodation with white rule and demanded the black community embrace the 
protest strategy. 
 During this period, the growing black civil society in the North influenced the 
fight for civil rights in South Carolina. The movement’s rhetoric helped attract a key 
white ally, US District Judge J. Waites Waring of Charleston. Once a member in good 
standing of the state’s white Democratic Party, Waring’s rulings in favor of the NAACP 
and civil rights would be instrumental in bolstering the movement in South Carolina. At 
the same time, public opinion in the North had tempered southern white support of state-
sanctioned violence. In 1947, the state’s young governor, J. Strom Thurmond, would 
represent this change by calling in the FBI to investigate and indict white cabdrivers 
accused of lynching a black man near Greenville. The all-white jury eventually acquitted 
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the men, but Thurmond’s rhetoric denouncing lynch law and his call for federal 
intervention to combat it signaled a radical change in the attitude of white leadership in 
South Carolina. Southern whites – even the famously segregationist Strom Thurmond – 
were increasingly concerned about public opinion in the North.  
Chapter Four traces the dominant ideology of the white press in the state and 
examines its treatment of the rising civil rights movement. Led by William Watts Ball, 
the editor of the Charleston News and Courier, the state’s major newspapers embraced an 
aristocratic form of conservatism that had its origins in the state’s planter-class elites who 
had helped overthrow Reconstruction in the 1870s. Ball had been editor of both the 
Greenville News and The State in Columbia before settling at the News and Courier in 
1927. Like the old elites, Ball was obsessed with the notion of hierarchy in society; he 
believed all classes had their “place,” with aristocratic elites in charge and working class 
whites near the bottom, just one step above the former slaves. Ball had opposed the rise 
the reform movements led first by “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman and later by Cole Blease 
because they empowered working-class whites and had displaced the planter-class 
leadership in the state. Ball was a white supremacist, but he disliked politicians who 
demonized African Americans to unite working-class white voters. Ball believed blacks 
were clearly inferior to whites and thus posed no real threat to white rule. Taking Ball’s 
lead, the major white newspapers mostly ignored the earlier stirrings of the civil rights 
movement in South Carolina, a decision that provided McCray and his allies more time to 
unite the black counterpublic and gather resources before facing a concerted white 
backlash.    
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Ball’s paternalistic view of race relations dominated the editorial pages of the 
state’s major newspapers well into the 1940s. The News and Courier and The State 
viewed local blacks as unworthy of serious attention. Therefore, they mostly ignored the 
local civil rights movement across the early 1940s. Ball focused his anger on 
Washington, where he believed New Deal policies were destroying the economy and 
undermining the natural hierarchy of American democracy. The editor’s paternalistic 
views faded, however, when it became clear that the local civil rights movement had 
strong support in the North. In 1948, when President Harry Truman became the first 
president since Reconstruction to propose civil rights legislation, Ball helped persuade 
Thurmond to join the Dixiecrat revolt against the national Democratic Party and run for 
president against  Truman. Formally called the States’ Rights Party, the Dixiecrats tried 
to link their campaign to the Tenth Amendment and the constitution’s prohibition against 
an intrusive federal government. By election day, however, the party’s rhetoric 
bemoaning “mongrelization” and “racial purity” had further undermined the image of 
white segregationists in the northern civil sphere. 
In Chapter Five, South Carolina’s most prestigious politician emerges to deliver a 
new narrative, one that downplays white supremacy and promises both states’ rights and 
good race relations. In 1950, following the failure of the Dixiecrat campaign, James F. 
Byrnes – a former US representative, senator, Supreme Court justice, and secretary of 
state – came out of retirement to win the governorship of South Carolina. He unveiled an 
expensive school equalization plan designed to serve two purposes. Byrnes wanted to 
strengthen the argument in favor of Plessy’s “separate but equal doctrine” and undermine 
the NAACP’s legal effort to challenge school segregation in court. At the same time, he 
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hoped to shape northern public opinion by presenting a new narrative of southern white 
reasonableness and generosity in its treatment of African Americans. In doing so, he 
hoped to restore support for the South in the northern civil sphere. The elder statesman 
had been around Washington for decades, and he crafted his message carefully to appeal 
both to white southerners and his former colleagues on Capitol Hill. Even the lone liberal 
editor in South Carolina praised Byrnes as a voice of moderation and reason. But Byrnes 
was a politician from an earlier era; he had no experience dealing with a committed black 
political movement in South Carolina. A month before Byrnes’ inauguration, the NAACP 
had filed suit on behalf of plaintiffs in Clarendon County who claimed segregated schools 
were unconstitutional and should be outlawed in America. Byrnes assumed local African 
Americans would drop the case in return for his promise to spend tax dollars to upgrade 
black schools. Yet	  the	  black	  counterpublic	  in	  South	  Carolina	  was	  now	  united	  and	  engaged,	  with	  growing	  national	  support;	  it	  was	  unwilling	  to	  accept	  such	  half	  measures.	  McCray’s Lighthouse and Informer called the equalization plan a frantic 
effort “undertaken in desperation” to fool Northerners. He assured African Americans in 
South Carolina that they would win the Clarendon County case, which would eventually 
reach the Supreme Court as one of five cases merged under the name of Brown v. Board 
of Education of Topeka, Kansas.  
The final three chapters focus primarily on two influential white journalists and 
their prominent roles in shaping political strategy in the post-Brown years in South 
Carolina. The black counterpublic that W.E.B Du Bois and the NAACP had helped 
launch at the turn of twentieth century had grown dramatically during and immediately 
following World War II. The black community’s interpretations of public events now 
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received widespread attention in parts of the larger white society. By the mid-1950s, the 
northern white media had discovered the civil rights story in the South, and their 
depictions of the Emmett Till murder and other acts of southern violence and 
intransigence began to fuel public outrage. Buoyed by this new support from the North, 
the civil rights movement grew bolder in the South. Faced with this new reality, the 
editor of the Charleston News and Courier, Thomas R. Waring, Jr., and its chief capital 
correspondent, William D. Workman, Jr., would help formulate and implement the white 
response. In addition to covering the news and commenting on it, they would work 
behind the scenes to help shape the white community’s “massive resistance” to the 
Brown ruling and to the larger push for black equality. They would help craft the 
“interposition” strategy to block integration of state schools, help establish the white 
citizens’ council movement in South Carolina, and launch a campaign to break through 
the so-called “paper curtain” that they believed prevented northerners from hearing the 
white southern point of view.  
By the late 1950s, when those efforts appeared to be failing to halt black progress 
toward full equality, Waring and Workman would play central roles in building a new 
political home for white racial conservatives in a revamped Republican Party. Waring’s 
friendship with a northern journalist would lay the groundwork for this new political 
strategy. William F. Buckley Jr.’s family owned a home in Camden, South Carolina, and 
he and Waring had become friends during Buckley’s visits to the state. In the pages of 
National Review, Buckley would experiment with arguments designed to unite southern 
segregationists like Waring with the magazine’s antistatist and anticommunist readership. 
Buckley’s initial attempt angered his conservative allies by boldly supporting a white 
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supremacist view that African Americans were intellectually inferior and incapable of 
participating in civic life. Like the Dixiecrat campaign a decade earlier, Buckley’s 
argument fell outside the shifting norms of civil debate in northern civil sphere of late 
1950s America. 
 Buckley and National Review would soften the argument to downplay racial 
inferiority and emphasize states’ rights, individual liberty, and economic conservatism. 
With Waring, Workman, and their South Carolina allies playing a key role, the 
conservative movement would emerge as a significant political force in 1960, when 
Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater challenged the Republican Party’s presumptive 
presidential nominee, Vice President Richard Nixon. Under Goldwater, the conservative 
movement would unite racial and economic conservatives by developing a  “color-blind” 
ethos that claimed that race should no longer be an issue in US politics. Workman’s book 
in defense of the South and segregation complicated this effort. Yet his run for the US 
Senate in 1962 attracted northern allies who shared his view that the black campaign for 
equality would undermine American democracy. William Loeb, editor of New 
Hampshire’s largest newspaper, the Union-Leader, would praise Workman’s effort and 
declare his support for converting the GOP into a “white man’s party.”41 Loeb’s comment 
fell outside the new “color-blind” ethos of the conservative movement, but it suggests the 
dominant role the racial issue played in the evolution of the Republican Party in the early 
1960s. By 1980, the party’s presidential candidate, Ronald Reagan, would make states’ 
rights a central theme of his campaign, and the conservative movement launched by 
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Buckley, Goldwater, and the South Carolinians would come to dominate US politics in 
the final two decades of the twentieth century. 
Though geographically small, South Carolina has always played an outsized role 
in the racial history of the nation. It many ways it has served as ground zero for the most 
contentious and vexing issue of American democracy. From the debate over slavery at 
the constitutional convention, through the emergence of John C. Calhoun and the theory 
of nullification, the first shots at Fort Sumter, the rejection of Reconstruction, and, 
finally, the rise and fall of Jim Crow, the Palmetto State has taken the lead in the battle to 
stand still. No state has tried harder to rebel against the arrival of the modern world. And 
in each of these confrontations, South Carolina newspapers played significant roles, from 
the fire-eaters at the Charleston Mercury who preached secession in 1861 through John 
McCray’s fight against black accommodationism and Thomas Waring’s embrace of 
Goldwater Republicanism at the News and Courier. The history of journalism and print 
culture in South Carolina is inseparable from the state’s politics. That South Carolina 
would be the first Deep South state in the twentieth century to experience such a robust 
civil rights movement speaks volumes about the courage and tenacity of the state’s 
African American population. That such a movement would find success suggests South 
Carolina is a perfect venue for the study of the civil sphere, mass media, and the role of 
cultural forces in facilitating political change.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE RISE OF A BLACK COUNTERPUBLIC 
John Henry McCray’s career as a civil rights leader in South Carolina appeared to 
be over less than two years after it had begun. McCray’s newspaper, the Lighthouse and 
Informer, would eventually play a significant role in building and sustaining viable black 
protest in the state. The movement McCray helped create would challenge the racial 
status quo in South Carolina and effect political decision-making in the state and the 
nation across the 1950s and 1960s. Yet one of McCray’s first public acts as a community 
leader appeared to be a groveling act of accommodation to white supremacist rule.  
 McCray had returned to Charleston in 1935 after graduating from college in 
Alabama, where he got his first taste of political activism. In a series of remembrances 
written late in his life, McCray recounted the story of a Talladega College professor who 
led a small group of frightened black students on a sit-in at a local soda fountain. The 
black professor demanded service for the group at tables that had been reserved for 
whites only. When the waiter refused, the professor pulled a thick stack of bills from his 
wallet and said, “Serve this, dammit!” Much to their surprise, the white manager 
complied, and the brief sit-in ended without incident.42 
 Nonetheless, McCray complained about the apathy of Talladega students. The 
fledgling young journalist wrote angry editorials chastising their lack of commitment to 
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the cause of black equality.43 He was especially outraged by their seeming 
indifference to the Scottsboro case, the racially charged conviction of nine African 
Americans accused of raping two white runaways in northern Alabama in 1931.44  “We 
may not possess the financial or political influence to save the lives of the boys,” McCray 
wrote, “but we can offer our resentment to the manner in which many of the local and 
neighboring whites regard them.”45 
McCray liked to cite his childhood growing up in a nearly all-black village near 
Charleston as the source of his political commitment. Founded during Reconstruction, 
Lincolnville was created by congressman Richard Harvey Cain, an African Methodist 
Episcopal minister who wanted to create a haven for freed blacks in the South Carolina 
Lowcountry.46 McCray and his family moved to the town in 1916, and both of his parents 
eventually served in leadership roles – his father as the town’s top law enforcement 
officer, his mother on the city council. McCray grew up seeing black people in positions 
of authority, both in Lincolnville and at the Avery Institute, the black high school in 
Charleston where he graduated as valedictorian. He often claimed that his childhood in 
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what he called “black-ruled” Lincolnville instilled in him the sense of black pride and 
assertiveness that allowed him to challenge white supremacy.47 
After college, McCray took a full-time job in Charleston at a black-owned 
insurance company, but he kept a hand in journalism and newspapering, working part-
time at the Charleston Messenger, a black weekly. His aggressive reporting caught the 
eye of a local NAACP official who recruited McCray to help revive the civil rights 
organization’s moribund Charleston branch. One of his first acts as branch president – the 
creation of a defense fund to support a black man accused of killing a white police officer 
– drew mixed reaction from a cautious African American community. Some feared he 
was, in McCray’s words, “stirring up race trouble,” but the young activist believed the 
police had framed the suspect and that it was time for blacks in Charleston to confront 
local white authority.48 
By 1937, McCray had launched his own weekly newspaper, the Charleston 
Lighthouse. Through his journalism and his NAACP work, the 27-year-old activist had 
established himself as a strong new voice in Charleston’s black community, one that 
appeared determined to fight the racial status quo. Yet McCray’s next act stunned the 
NAACP leadership. He committed what appeared to be a groveling act of 
accommodation to white supremacist rule.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 John McCray, “The Way It Was,” Charleston Chronicle, Feb. 20, 1982, JHM Papers, 
Box 2, Folder 16; John McCray oral history interview with Patricia Sullivan, February 
18, 1985. Transcript in author’s possession.  
 
48 John Henry McCray, “The Way It Was,” Charleston Chronicle, Feb. 16, 1982, JHM 
Papers, Box 2, Folder 16. 
	  29	  
In April of 1937, McCray wrote a letter to Charleston’s leading white newspaper 
announcing his position on one of the NAACP’s chief priorities: winning congressional 
approval of a federal anti-lynching law. The NAACP had been pushing for legislation 
that would empower the federal government to investigate and prosecute lynching since 
the organization’s founding in 1909. Board chairman Louis Wright believed such 
legislation was central to the “fundamental citizenship struggle in the South.”49 By 1937, 
NAACP leaders had secured President Roosevelt’s support for the Costigan-Wagner anti-
lynching bill, and they believed they finally had a chance to overcome the barrier 
imposed by powerful white southern Democrats in the Senate. Yet in his letter, McCray 
criticized the “caustic methods” of the national NAACP. The young editor maintained 
that lynching would fade away on its own and black South Carolinians were “content to 
wait” for that to happen naturally. He said Charleston’s African-American community 
wanted to “promote the basic principles of friendship” with whites. “Hence, we are not 
involved in the goings-on beyond the Mason-Dixon line,” he wrote.50  To make matters 
worse, McCray published his editorial as a letter to the editor of Charleston’s News and 
Courier, a zealous supporter of white supremacy. The paper’s famously conservative 
editor, William Watts Ball, had emerged as a leading critic of Roosevelt’s New Deal 
policies in part because he believed they would undermine Jim Crow control over 
African Americans. Ball frequently accused the NAACP and other “outside agitators” of 
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stirring up racial problems in the state; McCray’s letter appeared to support Ball’s 
claim.51  
The backlash was immediate. NAACP Executive Director Walter White 
repudiated McCray, and angry members of the local NAACP branch convened a special 
meeting to vote McCray out as president. Less than two years after his return to South 
Carolina, McCray’s reputation as a civil rights activist was in tatters. Among the state’s 
small, close-knit group of black activists, he was marked as an accommodator, a man 
who wanted to appease white supremacy, not confront it. Louise Purvis Bell, a member 
of the Charleston branch’s executive committee, delivered the harshest verdict. In her 
view, McCray was an “Uncle Tom and a traitor.”52  
McCray never fully explained his decision to oppose the NAACP’s campaign in 
favor of the anti-lynching law. In an oral history interview conducted in 1985, he 
dismissed the controversy without going into details. The editor claimed his critics in the 
local NAACP “had been sitting on their hip pockets doing nothing” and before his return 
to Charleston.53 By the time of that interview, McCray wanted to be remembered as a 
fearless fighter for civil rights who had always challenged white supremacy, but in 1937 
the young activist had clearly embraced a classic accommodationist strategy. McCray 
wanted to focus on black voting rights in Charleston, not federal law in Washington, and 
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he believed the obsequious tone of his letter would put whites at ease and help persuade 
them to ease restrictions on voter registration.54 He tried to ameliorate white concerns 
about black activism, to assure white supremacists that local black leaders wanted 
gradual reform without confrontation. With his letter, McCray signaled his desire to 
negotiate with white leaders over the pace of change in the Jim Crow South – a strategy 
he would ridicule just three years later, when his newspaper joined forces with NAACP 
activists to launch an aggressive and successful civil rights campaign.  
The controversy surrounding McCray’s act of accommodation was hardly unique 
in the black community in the Deep South at the time. The debate over how to respond to 
white oppression had vexed and divided African Americans since the end of 
Reconstruction. Booker T. Washington had been dead for 25 years when McCray 
launched his newspaper, but the strategy of accommodationism that Washington 
articulated in his famous Atlanta speech of 1895 remained influential among black elites 
across much of the Deep South. Washington proposed an accommodation with white 
supremacy to try to avoid an open war between the races that he knew his people could 
not win. He encouraged blacks to give up their rights to full citizenship and focus instead 
on economic development and racial uplift.  To avoid conflict with whites, Washington 
remained vague about accommodation’s ultimate goal. But for African Americans the 
strategy was clear: give up the immediate struggle for social and political equality, but 
obtain those rights over time through economic advancement.55 Over the next three 
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decades, black Americans, North and South, debated the merits of Washington and his 
proposals for negotiating the Jim Crow South. The contours of that debate were never 
simple and clear-cut: accommodationists sometimes called for confrontation, and 
protesters occasionally practiced accommodation. In the late 1930s, however, most black 
southerners still accepted one basic premise of the accommodationist strategy: The white 
leadership in the South had the power and the will to use violent force against blacks with 
little fear of a northern backlash. A direct confrontation with white supremacists would 
be suicidal. 
At times, the debate over accommodation and its use during the early years of Jim 
Crow has been simplified as a battle between two camps: Washington and his powerful 
Tuskegee Machine on one side, W.E.B Du Bois and the fledgling NAACP on the other.56 
With his 1895 “Atlanta compromise,” Washington came to represent accommodation and 
acceptance of white supremacy and Jim Crow rule. Du Bois, with his scathing attacks on 
Washington’s leadership, stood for protest and confrontation in the battle for full 
equality. In this interpretation of black history, the “Washingtonian accommodators” 
dominated during the early years of Jim Crow, but by Washington’s death in 1915, 
accommodationism had faded. The “Du Boisian protesters” took firm control of the black 
freedom movement and launched a slow but steady campaign of confrontation that 
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culminated in the civil rights victories of the 1960s.57 Historian Michael Rudolph West 
describes the popular storyline this way: “after Washington, a break with the past, 
followed by forty years flowing of ‘the river of black struggle,’ rolling along inexorably 
toward Montgomery and Martin King.”58 
 Historians have shown that black protest against Jim Crow rule never ceased 
during the first three decades of the twentieth century, and at times was far more robust 
and more organized than had been previously depicted.59 Yet the prevailing narrative of 
the African American freedom struggle dispenses too easily with the impact and legacy 
of Washington and accommodationism. The strategy would undermine efforts to unite 
southern black communities for decades after Washington’s death in 1915. And at the 
turn of the century, the accommodationist argument would send an insidious message of 
acquiescence and defeat into the northern civil sphere, where white Americans were once 
again considering the plight of African Americans in the South.  To combat the rise of 
Jim Crow, African Americans needed support from white allies within the nation’s larger 
democratic public. Washington’s apparent acceptance of the main tenants of Jim Crow 
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law – segregation and disfranchisement – stunted the effort to generate that support. 
Washington’s language of accommodation suggested blacks in the South accepted the 
Jim Crow arrangements in the South, thus alleviating white Northerners from moral and 
constitutional obligations to intervene on their behalf. 
As a minority comprising roughly ten percent of the nation’s population, African 
Americans needed support from the majority population to win inclusion into mainstream 
society. In the antebellum period, black and white voices of the abolitionist press in the 
North had agitated against slavery. The abolitionist movement had mostly failed in its 
effort to generate widespread moral opposition to slavery among white northerners. But 
by the 1850s, majority opinion in the North had grown to resent the southern slave 
economy. The fear of slavery’s expansion had spawned a sectional political party in the 
North that was dedicated to halting the growing political and economic power of the 
southern slaveholder. Under the motto of “Free Soil, Free Labor, Free men,” the 
Republicans rallied white public opinion to support a war against the Southern 
slaveholders, and in its aftermath, a Republican Congress afforded African Americans 
full citizenship rights. For a brief time, blacks were allowed to participate fully in 
national civic life.60 
 In the North, however, African Americans remained a small and dispersed 
minority. They lacked powerful communicative and political institutions – widely read 
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newspapers and magazines and strong party organizations – required to create a robust 
black civil sphere. Without these institutions, they struggled to develop strong group 
consciousness and disseminate their interpretations of public events, particularly 
concerning the chaos in the South. Without a developed civil sphere capable of fostering 
political engagement, blacks in the North had little means to exert influence in the 
dominant white society. In the South, African Americans comprised a much greater 
percentage of the population and they asserted their rights in a democratic civil sphere. 
Yet it was a democratic system maintained by the Union Army, one that was constantly 
under siege from southerners committed to restoring white rule in the region. When 
Reconstruction ended, and the last federal troops pulled out of the South in 1876, African 
Americans in the South lost their northern protector. Without the threat of federal force, 
blacks now depended solely on northern public opinion to restrain the southern white 
majority.  
Washington’s 1895 “Atlanta compromise” address came in the midst of a 
counter-revolution launched by radical white supremacists determined to claim 
undisputed political power in the South. Led by men such as James K. Vardaman in 
Mississippi, Joseph Aycock in North Carolina, and “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman in South 
Carolina, these “reformers” represented small farmers and working-class whites who had 
suffered the most during a national economic downturn in the 1880s. As a young militia 
leader, Tillman had helped former planter and Confederate general Wade Hampton take 
power in South Carolina in the bloody and contested election of 1876. Although a white 
supremacist, Hampton had taken a more paternalistic approach to the former slaves. After 
taking office, he allowed African Americans to continue to vote and to hold some 
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government appointments. By 1890, Tillman had turned on Hampton and led the effort to 
seize power from the state’s planter-class elites. In his campaign for governor, Tillman 
demonized blacks as an inferior and violent race incapable of assimilating into a civilized 
and democratic society. He blamed blacks for rising crime rates in the cities, for 
increased fraud at the polls, and for harboring an uncontrollable lust for white women. In 
the guise of protecting the honor of southern womanhood, Tillman and other radical 
white supremacists across the South launched a campaign of violence against blacks that 
turned public lynching into a common spectacle.61  
With his Atlanta speech in 1895 and his acclaimed autobiography, Up from 
Slavery, published six years later, Washington articulated a strategy that captivated white 
America and, in the beginning, appeared to many blacks to be the best available course of 
action, given the dire circumstances. Washington shaped his compromise to appeal to 
three constituencies – southern white elites, Northern white industrialists, and African 
Americans. He wooed the planter-class elites with soothing language promising black 
acquiescence to the ways of the white South. He encouraged fellow African Americans to 
accept the traditions and “customs” of the South, including its “prejudices.” On the 
question of black resistance, Washington said black southerners should understand “that 
the agitation of questions of social equality is the extremist folly.”62 In later speeches, 
Washington went further, urging African Americans to worry less about white oppression 
and more about their own improvement. “I fear that the Negro race lays too much stress 
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on its grievances and not enough on its opportunities,” he said, opening up a line of 
conservative criticism that echoes to this day.63 The paternalistic white elites in the South 
embraced Washington’s vision of a compliant black population eager to focus on 
economic growth rather than politics, but Tillman and the radical Democrats remained 
unimpressed. They considered African Americans an existential threat to white rule in the 
South, and they remained committed to the strategy of political and social exclusion. 
 In the North, Washington aimed his appeal at the conservative leaders of 
industry, not the liberal intellectuals and abolitionist organizers who had been the 
Negro’s allies during slavery and Reconstruction. In the New South, Washington said, 
industry would find a compliant black labor force eager to prove its value in the 
workplace. Washington’s philosophy of industrial education would generate skilled black 
workers who had been taught to care more about paychecks than politics. His vision of 
racial uplift called for southern blacks to measure their self-worth based on economic 
gain, not social advancement. In short, Washington’s proposed compromise asked blacks 
to accept a second-class level of citizenship in return for protection from white violence 
and an opportunity to prosper economically. Under this plan, Northern elites would fund 
Washington’s industrial education program in the South, and – in a key selling point for 
white northerners weary of “the Negro problem” – the North would be relieved of any 
moral or constitutional obligation to intervene in southern race relations. 
It has been nearly a century since Washington’s death, yet his impact on African 
American history continues to stir scholarly debate. Woodward described Washington as 
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“the leader of white opinion” and the man who established the “modus vivendi” of race 
relations in the New South.64 Washington’s biographer, Louis R. Harlan, depicted the 
former slave as a “genuine black leader” who began with good intentions but who 
evolved into an opportunist who grew obsessed with power. Washington tailored his 
message of accommodation and racial uplift to fit the mood of white America at the turn 
of the century, Harlan argued, yet at its core Washington’s philosophy was little more 
than a “bag of clichés.” To study Washington as an intellectual missed the point: “Power 
was his game,” Harlan wrote, “and he used his ideas simply as instruments to gain 
power.”65 In his 2009 book, however, Robert J. Norrell argues that that earlier historians 
overstated Washington’s popularity with southern whites and underestimated the daily 
threats he and fellow black southerners faced. They ignored the realities of Washington’s 
place and time, and they placed too much value on the efficacy of protest as the sole 
means of confronting injustice. In Norrell’s view, this naturally led them to canonize Du 
Bois as the moral center of African American intellectual life and Washington as the 
quisling leader who sold his soul for a few shiny coins from his white masters.66 
Washington’s effort to protect his people from overwhelming white violence may 
have been understandable, but his acceptance of second-class citizenship in the South 
reinforced one of white supremacy’s central arguments. In their propaganda campaign, 
Tillman and the radical white Democrats had depicted blacks as intellectually incapable 
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of performing their duties as citizens. Because they were so easily manipulated, Tillman 
said, black involvement in the political process would always lead to fraud and 
corruption. Washington’s call for blacks to renounce politics and accept second-class 
citizenship seemed to support this worldview. For whites in the North, Washington’s 
acceptance of southern “customs” allayed moral and constitutional questions concerning 
the disfranchisement and segregation of blacks in the South. Even though Washington 
privately opposed segregation and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson, his 
public acquiescence hampered efforts to generate sympathy and opposition in the 
Northern civil sphere. The accommodationist stance undermined the arguments of Du 
Bois and other intellectuals who believed the rise of Jim Crow violated the nation’s 
democratic ideals, and it made it much harder for them to attract white allies they needed 
to mount an effective protest campaign.  
Du Bois had initially supported Washington’s 1895 “Atlanta compromise.” The 
young professor sent Washington a note of congratulations and later praised 
Washington’s accommodationist strategy in the New York Age. Washington’s proposal 
could be “the basis of a real settlement between whites and blacks in the South,” Du Bois 
wrote, “if the South opened to the Negroes the doors of economic opportunity and the 
Negroes co-operated with the white South in political sympathy.”67 As Washington’s 
popularity and power grew, however, Du Bois grew more concerned. By 1901, 
Washington had become what Harlan called “the most powerful black minority-group 
boss of his time.”68 From his base at his Tuskegee Institute, Washington used his 
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newfound fundraising prowess to develop a political network – the Tuskegee Machine – 
to empower his supporters and to punish those who dissented. He used his wellspring of 
white financial donations “to buy black newspapers and bend their editorials to his 
viewpoint, to control college professors and presidents … to infiltrate the leading church 
denominations and fraternal orders.”69 
Described as a “poet and a prophet” who wrote with “brooding passion and 
brilliant pen,” Du Bois used his literary skills and access to print culture to launch a 
campaign to counter Washington’s growing strength as the dominant black voice in the 
nation’s civil sphere.70 In a review of Up From Slavery, Washington’s popular 
autobiography, Du Bois noted that Washington’s call for political accommodation and 
industrial education were not original ideas but had been widely debated among southern 
blacks over the past decade. More importantly, Du Bois pointed out that despite his 
newfound fame among whites, Washington did not hold a monopoly on leadership in the 
black community. Following in the footsteps of Frederick Douglass, who died the same 
year Washington mas his Atlanta speech, black editors William Monroe Trotter and Ida 
B. Wells had been using newspapers and other forms of print culture to deliver clarion 
calls for protest against second-class citizenship. 
In 1903, Du Bois followed up with his masterpiece, The Souls of Black Folks, a 
series of probing essays that would help define the African-American experience in 
twentieth century America. Du Bois’ biographer, David Levering Lewis, described the 
book’s publication as an “epochal” event in African-American history, and the NAACP 
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activist James Weldon Johnson claimed the work had a greater impact on the “Negro race 
than any other single book published since Uncle Tom’s Cabin.”71 Through his lyrical 
prose, Du Bois explored “the strange meaning of being black” in America, correctly 
predicting that “the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line.” In 
his opening essay, “Of Spiritual Strivings,” Du Bois lifted “the veil” shrouding the inner 
recesses of black life so that white Americans might understand “what it feels like to be a 
problem.” Black Americans who live within that veil, Du Bois argued, experienced a 
cultural and psychological “two-ness.” They were “an American, a Negro; two souls, two 
thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged 
strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.”72 
It was in his third essay – “Of Mr. Booker T. Washington and Others” – that Du 
Bois resumed his criticism of Washington and his strategy of accommodationism. He 
would elaborate on the points he had first made in his review in The Dial. The 
paternalistic white southerners with whom Washington sought to compromise – the 
remnants of the old planter-class aristocracy – had lost political control, Du Bois 
contended. They were being replaced by a new generation of radical white Democrats 
who were less interested in accommodation with blacks than in their perpetual 
subjugation. Du Bois watched violence against black southerners increase while 
Washington’s public rhetoric of accommodation and acceptance remained unchanged.  
By demanding black submission during this time of “intensified prejudice,” Du Bois 
wrote, Washington was encouraging white repression: “In the history of nearly all other 
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races and peoples, the doctrine preached at such crises has been that manly self-respect is 
worth more than lands and houses, and that a people who voluntarily surrender such 
respect, or cease striving for it, are not worth civilizing.”73 
Washington’s increasingly bitter and sarcastic dismissal of liberal arts education 
infuriated Du Bois. Washington maintained that blacks should be educated in industrial 
schools that taught practical skills, not colleges and universities offering Latin and 
literature. Du Bois seethed as Washington made jokes about the overeducated Negro who 
enjoyed opera but couldn’t work a plow. For Du Bois, Lewis wrote, “higher education 
was not merely a passport to social and professional standing but the master key to 
collective empowerment as well.” Du Bois understood the power of economic 
advancement in the daily lives of black Americans. Yet when Washington claimed that 
“higher degrees were a cover for distinguished indolence,” Du Bois accused the 
Tuskegee principal of doing grave damage to the future of his race.74  
Du Bois argued that Washington’s political acquiescence and disdain for liberal 
arts education would set back African American progress and lock in white supremacy 
rule for decades to come. Washington’s doctrine, Du Bois wrote, allowed whites in the 
North and South to “shift the burden of the Negro problem to the Negro’s shoulders and 
stand aside as critical and rather pessimistic spectators.”75 Two years later, in 1905, he 
helped found the Niagara Movement, a group of black professionals determined to 
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counter Washington’s influence. By the end of the decade, the Niagara Movement had 
joined forces with white progressives in the North to form the bi-racial NAACP. 
Founded during a series of meetings in 1909 and 1910, the NAACP sought to 
rally support for the equal treatment of all races under the law. Through the creation of 
local branches supported by dues-paying members, the NAACP would eventually 
develop a grassroots movement that was strong enough to challenge the nation’s system 
of legal discrimination.76 Yet as sociologist Jeffrey Alexander contends, the NAACP’s 
greatest successes during its early years were “primarily communicative.”77 Though 
white progressives dominated the founding executive committee, it was Du Bois who 
served as the voice of the new civil rights organization. Through the pages of The Crisis, 
the group’s monthly magazine, Du Bois established the interpretive lens through which 
the NAACP would report on public events. He emphasized the contradictions at the heart 
of the American democratic experiment, with legalized discrimination existing in a nation 
that proclaimed its commitment to equality and justice for all people. Du Bois defined 
black efforts to overcome this discrimination as a necessary and patriotic act of 
citizenship that would restore the country’s damaged civic ideal. In launching the 
magazine’s editorial section, he promised the NAACP would try to protect “the rights of 
men, irrespective of color or race, for the highest ideals of American democracy.” In his 
first editorial, Du Bois declared the NAACP’s intent to highlight and explore “those facts 
and arguments which show the danger of race prejudice.”78  
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The Crisis and the NAACP’s communicative efforts played a significant role in 
helping to create what Alexander calls a black counterpublic during the early twentieth 
century. Although nominally citizens, blacks occupied a subordinate position in 
American society. Dominated by whites, they lived under Jim Crow oppression in the 
South, and they were rarely allowed to climb beyond the lowest economic rungs in the 
North. They were mostly ignored in the nation’s newspapers and magazines. African 
Americans were members of an out-group that existed on the fringes of civic life. Yet 
Alexander maintains that domination that can spread the seeds of civic reform. Out-
groups that are denied access to the civil and noncivil spheres around them end up 
creating a counterpublic of their own. In doing so, they mirror the civil sphere of the 
dominant society, which allows them to communicate internally and gather resources that 
can later be used to engage the surrounding civil sphere.   
Since the first black newspaper, Freedom’s Journal, was published in 1827, 
African Americans had sought to speak for themselves. Yet with more than 90 percent of 
their intended audience living in the South, northern black newspapers and pamphlets had 
struggled to find black readers. It was not until the beginning of the great migration that a 
robust black counterpublic could develop. Since the Civil War, the industrial revolution 
had been luring workers from the fields to the cities, creating the giant urban centers of 
the North. Yet blacks had been mostly excluded from these northern factory jobs. In 
1914, the start of World War I halted European immigration to the United States, creating 
a shortage of industrial workers in the North. Suddenly in demand, southern blacks 
flocked to industrial boomtowns such as Detroit, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and New York. 
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Abandoning the wide expanses of the rural South, they now lived in close quarters in 
teeming urban neighborhoods.  
Their arrival came at a time when newspapers and magazines were flourishing 
throughout the country. The industrial growth that had created the great cities of the 
North had increased the demand for advertising and generated a booming media industry. 
By 1920, the United States had surpassed Europe in the number of periodicals 
published.79 Under these promising circumstances, the black press emerged more fully in 
the North, with Robert Abbott’s weekly Chicago Defender leading the way. Started on a 
shoestring budget in 1905, the Defender grew and prospered across the following decade. 
But like the rest of the black press, it did so in the shadow of the white society.80 Mostly 
ignored by white readers, black newspapers and magazines carried their interpretations of 
public events to the growing black counterpublic in the North. By repeatedly highlighting 
discrimination and demanding justice, Alexander argues, the black press helped crystalize 
black public opinion in the North and create a robust and vital counterpublic capable of 
asserting its democratic rights in the nation’s civil sphere. With his sharp eye and fluid 
writing skills, Du Bois turned The Crisis into an influential source of analysis within the 
new black counterpublic. Closely read by black editors as well as black grassroots 
activists, The Crisis served as a leading voice for black inclusion in the American civil 
sphere. 
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The success of the black counterpublic came in two distinct steps. Initially, it 
helped African Americans in the North perceive of themselves as part of a community 
that was capable of fighting for its interests. In the 1920s, the cultural movement that 
came to known as the Harlem Renaissance helped facilitate this transition. During this 
period, the African American press heralded the rise of the New Negro. No longer 
shuffling and submissive, the New Negro had shed the cultural chains of his slave history 
and looked to the future with a sense of hope and possibility. A cultural outpouring of 
novels, poetry, music, and art challenged the white culture’s notions of beauty and 
celebrated aspects of black life that had been vilified by the dominant society. In doing 
so, Harlem Renaissance artists and activists won allies among white intellectuals who 
were attracted to their fresh interpretations of art, culture, and society.81  This new 
alliance with white cultural leaders allowed black intellectuals to disseminate their 
interpretation of events into a small but influential corner of the white civil sphere. 
The black counterpublic exerted its greatest power once it had grown large 
enough to warrant attention from the larger white society. Although such attention would 
inevitably prompt a backlash from white authorities, it allowed the black press to project 
its interpretation of civic life back into the larger white society. By highlighting the 
discriminatory acts that violated the nation’s democratic ideal, the black counterpublic 
managed to elicit empathy from liberal whites who believed in the those ideas. (will add 
examples) Such empathy persuaded some of these influential whites that the fight to 
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overcome racial discrimination was essential to the preservation of American democracy. 
Liberal whites began to realize that the fight over civil rights was their fight too. As 
Alexander contends, the rise of a counterpublic that could reflect the larger values of the 
dominant society and win allies was an essential step in the process of building a success 
civil rights movement.  
The rise of a black counterpublic in the North would play a significant role in the 
creation of a civil rights movement in South Carolina, but the process would be slow and 
arduous, with several false starts along the way. Du Bois’ skill as a powerful essayist 
would help the fledgling NAACP spread into the South during the years before the US 
entry into World War I. By 1915, The Crisis had made it way into the hands of attorney 
Butler W. Nance, a leading black activist in Columbia, South Carolina. Nance and a 
handful of black community leaders had established the Capital Civic League, an 
organization devoted to the fight for African-American rights in South Carolina. 
Describing himself as a “long-time subscriber” to The Crisis, Nance wrote Du Bois a 
letter in June 1915 expressing his interests in having the Capital Civic League become a 
branch of the NAACP. “There are several things that could be done,” Nance wrote, “if 
you would not be afraid to operate in the South.” 82 
The NAACP’s move into the Deep South during World War I was a turning point 
for the African American freedom struggle. By the end of 1916, more than a quarter 
million African Americans had left the South for jobs in the North. Yet as James Weldon 
Johnson noted at the time, the great migration created new possibilities for those who 
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stayed behind.83 For the first time in decades, whites in the South were forced to 
acknowledge the value of the black work force. And as Johnson argued in a 1917 speech 
at the St. Paul’s Christian Methodist Episcopal church in Savannah, Georgia, the cracks 
in the status quo created by the wartime disruption offered “the Negro race the change to 
register its first protest against its treatment in the South.”84 
Johnson’s emergence as the NAACP’s new field director in December 1916 
signaled a new effort to organize in the Deep South. Across the first six months of 1917, 
Johnson traveled from Richmond, Virginia, to Tampa, Florida, and organized more than a 
dozen local branches. The organization’s so-called “Southern Empire” gave the civil 
rights group what Du Bois called “a real first line of defense facing the enemy at proper 
range.”85 Black South Carolinians joined in this surge of activism. In Columbia, lawyer 
and publisher Nathaniel J. Frederick and activists Rebecca Hull Walton and Rachel Hull 
Montieth joined Nance to press local authorities to expand black voting rights. A 
longtime Republican, Frederick published the Southern Indicator in the 1910s and later 
launched the Palmetto Leader. Both papers encouraged blacks to seek the right to vote 
and waged campaigns to halt lynching, yet they treaded carefully to avoid a white 
backlash. In Charleston, the new NAACP branch fought a successful campaign to 
demand the hiring of black teachers at the Avery Institute, the city’s high school for black 
students. When John McCray was valedictorian of Avery in the late 1920s, he studied 
under black educators such as Pearly Simmons, a man who helped fuel McCray’s 
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political aspirations.86 If he had attended Avery ten years earlier, McCray would have 
been taught by white teachers only. 
Four years after Nance had written to the editor of The Crisis and asked to join the 
NAACP, the civil rights organization had formed active branches in every corner of 
South Carolina, from Charleston on the coast to the capital city of Columbia and the 
nearby Black Belt farming town of Orangeburg in the Midlands, up through the Piedmont 
cities of Greenville and Spartanburg and across the tobacco-growing rural areas along the 
Pee Dee River in the northeastern corner.  Nance had written the letter that helped launch 
this surge in black civil rights work in June 1915, the same year that Booker T. 
Washington died. Historians have been tempted to overstate the importance of this 
coincidence. Washington’s death, one noted, “marked the symbolic passing of his 
accommodationist philosophy.”87 Yet this implies that the accommodationist strategy 
died along with its most famous proponent, a fact not borne out by South Carolina 
history. This view of the African American freedom struggle suggests the need to 
appease whites was a choice made solely black Carolinians, not a demand imposed on 
them by a stronger foe. The culture of accommodation that McCray and his allies would 
fight so valiantly in the 1940s persisted because of the very real threat of white violence 
and oppression, not because of any commitment to a political or philosophical theory. As 
Du Bois had noted earlier in the century, “Whenever we submit to humiliation and 
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oppression it is because of superior brute force; and even when bending to the inevitable 
we bend with unabated protest.”88  
During the early years of World War I, Nance and his colleagues had battled that 
culture of accommodation, with mixed results. In his letter to Du Bois, Nance had 
included a copy of the Capital Civic League’s latest “Address to the People of South 
Carolina.” The statement called for the creation of an “organized movement” to fight for 
African American equality, and it criticized “the weak-kneed ministers who claim the 
church is no place to talk civil rights.”89 This was clearly a shot at the best-known black 
leader in South Carolina, Rev. Richard Carroll of Columbia, a protégé of Washington’s 
who had pursued the accommodationist strategy in the state. Carroll urged black 
Carolinians to forego politics and accept their inferior status in society. “The negro will 
never be a ruling or dominant race,” Carroll told the Charleston News and Courier in 
1905. “The people who think will always rule, (not) the people who sing, as do the 
negroes.” Of Tillman and the white supremacists who had taken control of the state in the 
1890s, Carroll said: “Their patience has been great. Their tolerance has been marvelous. 
We have made many friends among them, and what we need to do is strive to make their 
friendship stronger and more abiding.” To accomplish this, Carroll said African 
Americans should “focus on their own short-comings instead of advising whites about 
theirs.” Carroll preached a message of racial uplift, but one that emphasized white 
superiority in the strict hierarchy of southern society. “The white man must stay in his 
place,” Carroll said. “When he uplifts himself, he will be followed by the negro at a 
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respectful distance, but when he lowers himself to the plane of the negro, then the negro 
will get out of his place and trouble will be brewed.” 90 
Like Washington, Carroll’s soothing message of appeasement attracted strong 
support from white leaders, particularly from the Gonzalez brothers, founders of The 
State newspaper in Columbia. Created for the specific political purpose of opposing 
Tillman and his allies in South Carolina, The State advocated a type of white supremacy 
associated with the state’s planter-class elites. Like Carroll, the newspaper placed a great 
emphasis on hierarchy and the “place” of whites and blacks in southern society. The 
newspaper supported black aspirations for uplift, as long as they did not interfere with 
white rule or create racial turmoil. Editor William E. Gonzales embraced Carroll and 
backed him financially and editorially well into the 1920s. Carroll held an annual 
conference on race relations in South Carolina where Gonzales and other white leaders 
often spoke, although Tillman never accepted his many invitations to appear at the event. 
In March of 1909, Booker T. Washington toured South Carolina, with Carroll among the 
black dignitaries at his side. Washington visited twelve cities and made several whistle 
stop speeches in between to spread his vision of both racial uplift and peaceful co-
existence with white supremacy. The State wrote glowingly of Washington’s tour and 
encouraged whites to go hear him speak.91 For white South Carolinians, Carroll and his 
followers represented the best of the black community, and as the nation prepared to 
enter World War I, they accepted the servile tone of Carroll’s public pronouncements as 
widespread black acceptance of the racial status quo in this state. 
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Yet Carroll, the state’s most famous accommodator, would also come to 
symbolize black ambivalence toward the strategy. Much like McCray in the late 1930s, 
Carroll would surprise his white supporters and his black critics with a sudden shift in 
strategy during the war. His earlier obsequiousness had approached the level of parody, 
but Carroll had been biding his time looking for an opening to push for black rights. He 
believed the war and the increase in black migration from the state had created that 
opening. It was time for black Carolinians to “to come into their own,” Carroll argued. 
He used his access to The State newspaper to press publicly for better schools, better 
wages, and better protection under the law. Lawmakers meet “year after year to make 
laws for the uplift and salvation of white people” while ignoring the needs of blacks, 
Carroll wrote in the newspaper. He also demanded that whites stop vilifying African 
Americans and engineering racial conflicts to rally voters each election cycle – a 
criticism aimed at Cole Blease, the former governor and frequent political candidate who 
often defended lynching as a means of controlling the black race.92  
With Carroll’s Baptist ministry now on board, the black civil rights struggle 
gained momentum during the war years. In Columbia, Nance and his colleagues joined 
the national NAACP in denouncing D.W. Griffith’s notorious film, The Birth of a Nation. 
Based on Thomas Dixon’s novel, The Clansman, Griffith’s film depicted Reconstruction 
as a period of corruption, plunder and chaos fueled by black lawlessness. Griffith’s 
spectacular production used the new medium of motion pictures to further the white 
supremacist propaganda campaign against black citizenship. As a powerful 
communicative institution, the growing feature film industry would play a significant role 
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in delivering interpretations and influencing public opinion across the twentieth century. 
Thus the fight over Birth of a Nation was an important confrontation in the long battle for 
African American inclusion within the nation’s civil sphere. The film fed popular 
stereotypes of blacks as both child-like buffoons and violent sexual predators. And by 
portraying black lawmakers as the pawns of nefarious white carpetbaggers, Griffith’s 
movie furthered the southern white argument that blacks were intellectually incapable of 
participating in civic life. In South Carolina, the new NAACP chapter organized protests 
against a screening of The Birth of a Nation in Columbia, arguing that the movie 
promoted “racial antagonism” at a time when brave African American soldiers were 
“giving their all for worldwide democracy.”93 
The campaign against The Birth of a Nation was part of a surge in black political 
activism during the war. Another Columbia black civic group, the Lincoln Memorial 
Association, urged lawmakers to prosecute lynching and appoint African American 
superintendents to manage black school districts. And in Charleston, the NAACP 
protested the Navy’s effort to fill jobs at an on-base clothing factory with “white women 
only.” As a result, the Navy eventually hired 250 black women.94 Black Charlestonians 
also launched their successful effort to replace white teachers with blacks at Avery 
Institute, the city’s lone African-American high school. As the war came to an end, and 
as black soldiers returned to the state, leaders planned to step up the fight for equality. In 
a ceremony at Benedict College in Columbia, local physician S.F. Haygood said black 
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soldiers had fought bravely and valiantly for democracy abroad, and now, “We want 
democracy at home.”95  
The spreading black activism shocked a white supremacist leadership more used 
to the timid ways of the accommodationists. A rising young politician named James F. 
Byrnes had taken note of Du Bois’ essays in The Crisis. Born to a poor Catholic family in 
Charleston, Byrnes had scrambled up by his bootstraps to earn a law degree and become 
a protégé of South Carolina’s dominant politician, “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman. In 1919, 
Byrnes represented South Carolina’s second district in Congress. Later, he would serve in 
the Senate, on the Supreme Court, and as Truman’s secretary of state, and he would be 
seen as a more moderate Southern voice during the civil rights struggle to come. On an 
August day in 1919, however, he took the floor of the US Congress and delivered what 
his biographer has called “one of the most inflammatory speeches on race ever read into 
the Congressional Record.”96 It was near the end of a hot summer of racial violence in 
small towns and large cities across the nation. In Charleston, white sailors stationed at the 
nearby Navy Yard brawled with some black youths. The sailors eventually returned with 
guns. Two African Americans were killed and seventeen people of both races were 
injured. Byrnes claimed the black press, led by De Bois’ Crisis, had radicalized black 
veterans returning form the war and helped incite the spreading violence. He demanded 
that the editor be charged with treason. “If … charging the government with lynching, 
disfranchising its citizens, encouraging ignorance, and stealing from its citizens, does not 
constitute a violation of the espionage act,” Byrnes said, “it is difficult to conceive 
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language sufficiently abusive to constitute a violation.” The congressman concluded with 
a stark warning for black Americans: if they did not like post-war America, they were 
welcome to leave. In fact, he vowed to support forced deportations of racial leaders.97 
Byrnes’ strong words on the House floor were part of a national effort to taint 
civil rights work with the Red Scare of rising Communism in 1919. He made the 
connection explicit, accusing Du Bois and the rest of the black press of instigating 
violence in an attempt to create a “little Russia” in the South. Black leaders in South 
Carolina countered Byrnes’ version of events with compelling stories of the bravery and 
heroism exhibited by African Americans who fought for freedom and democracy in 
Europe. To win this battle of narratives, however, African Americans needed the help of 
allies within the nation’s larger mainstream culture. They needed the support of 
empathetic opinion leaders who could help spread their message and sway public 
opinion. Without such access, black voices were overwhelmed by the arguments put 
forward by their enemies. White supremacists in South Carolina were once again free to 
crush the African American movement without fear of northern intervention. They could 
use the threat of overwhelming violence and economic retribution to deter black political 
organization and, most importantly, prevent its spread from the small core of NAACP 
activists in the cities to the larger African American population in the countryside.  
It was a tactic the white leadership had used before. Two decades earlier, white 
Democrats led by Tillman had used violence to suppress black political aspirations and 
impose Jim Crow rule. In 1898, when a prominent white Republican, Robert “Red” 
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Tolbert, attempted to register black voters in Greenwood County to support his 
congressional run, angry whites responded with a campaign of terror. Dozens of blacks 
were slaughtered, and hundreds more fled the county. The state’s governor, William 
Ellerbee, refused to prosecute those who carried out the violence, and in Washington the 
McKinley administration rejected Tolbert’s request for federal intervention.98 
Historians note that the so-called Phoenix massacre – named after the small community 
where the violence began – had both racial and economic motivations. Triggered by the 
effort to register black voters, the white anger also had roots in labor competition 
between white and black sharecroppers in Greenwood County. The massacre not only 
denied blacks the vote but also forced many off the land, allowing white farmers to rent 
farm land at a lower rate in the county. The Phoenix slaughter also established a 
precedent that would hold firm across the first three decades of Jim Crow rule. Black 
Carolinians understood that neither state nor national authorities would step in to protect 
them from extralegal violence. It is no surprise, then, that the black community in the 
state adopted the strategy of accommodation. Rural blacks, who comprised the 
overwhelming majority of the state’s African American population, remained dependent 
on white landowners for their livelihood.  
The threat of lynching remained constant for black South Carolinians across the 
1920s. The estimates vary, but studies suggest as many as 14 African Americans were 
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killed by white mobs between 1919 and 1927.99 Five of those murders are believed to 
have occurred in 1921, when white Democrats were eager to halt the civil rights activism 
that had emerged during the war. White politicians such as former governor and US 
Senator Cole Blease signaled their support for the use of mob violence to control the 
black population during the first three decades of Jim Crow rule. While serving as 
governor, Blease urged white men in South Carolina to guard against “the black ape and 
baboon” who lurks in the dark waiting for the chance to rape a white woman. Lynch 
mobs were necessary, Blease argued. Rather than violate the law, they helped maintain it 
in South Carolina. “Whenever the constitution of my state steps between me and the 
defense of the virtue of a white woman, then I say to hell with the constitution!” Blease 
told the national governor’s conference in 1912.  After receiving reports of some 
lynchings, Blease would celebrate publicly with what northern newspapers called a 
“bizarre death dance.” 100  
The black press in the North demanded authorities take action against the South 
Carolina governor. But the northern white press did little more than note the 
outrageousness of Blease’s actions, and the federal government showed no interest in 
intervening.101 Without the prospect of northern support, African Americans who 
remained in South Carolina had two choices: leave the state, which many did, or find 
ways to accommodate white supremacy and learn to live with the racial status quo.  
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In the early 1920s, the fledgling black civil rights movement in South Carolina 
had not been strong enough to withstand the white counterattack. And the black northern 
counterpublic, while steadily growing, had been unable to rally widespread opposition to 
the uncivil acts of Cole Blease and James Byrnes. Free to act without fear of northern 
pressure, Byrnes helped delegitimize black activists as communists and un-American, 
and Blease appeared to sanction mob violence and economic retribution. With most black 
South Carolinians living in rural areas and working as sharecroppers, white landowners 
exerted near total control over their economic lives. The Depression arrived early in rural 
South Carolina when a global decline in cotton prices and the spread of the Boll Weevil 
combined to destroy the farm economy. Many white farmers gave up and took jobs in 
textile mills and other factories near the cities. Denied those options, black farmers 
struggled to feed their families while living under the ever-present threat of white 
retribution. 
In 1935, when John McCray graduated from college, the surge in black activism 
that marked the early 1920s had long passed. He returned to his home state to find a 
desolate political landscape. The black demand for equality that had gained traction 
during World War I had been replaced by the familiar call for accommodation and racial 
uplift. The NAACP existed as “little more than a paper organization,” with branches in 
Charleston, Columbia, and Greenville, but none in the rural counties where most African 
Americans lived.102 After touring the state, one national NAACP official reported that 
South Carolina’s black community was listless and disengaged: “The traditional 
organizations of the Negro community, their churches, colleges, civic welfare leagues … 
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were generally quiescent.”103 The one newspaper that had tried to maintain the push for 
civil rights, the Palmetto Leader a Republican Party newspaper published by attorney 
Nathaniel Frederick, had begun to soften its political coverage in the early 1930s in hopes 
of holding onto at least some white advertising. With Frederick’s death in 1938, the paper 
abandoned politics all together.104  
  Beneath that stark political surface, however, there were rumblings of change. 
The Depression and Roosevelt’s New Deal policies had shifted the political landscape  
ever so slightly, creating an opening for the black counterpublic to exert influence in 
electoral politics. Abandoned by the Republican Party during the 1920s, black voters in 
the North embraced Roosevelt and his New Deal. In the 1934 mid-term elections, the 
Democratic Party openly campaigned for African American voters in key northern states, 
and in 1936, African American voters across the nation helped sweep Roosevelt to re-
election.105 The black counterpublic’s communicative strength had begun to attract more 
white support in the North. And the emergence of the black vote within the Democratic 
coalition empowered white liberals who were eager to confront the party’s southern 
segregationist wing on the issue of civil rights. With his wife, Eleanor, taking the lead, 
Roosevelt took timid steps to reach out to the African American community. When 
Roosevelt openly condemned mob rule and “lynch law” in a national radio address in 
1934, he angered his southern white Democratic allies, but his comments, mild as they 
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were, sent a signal of support to liberals in the North and, most importantly, to black 
activists in the South.   
In South Carolina, a tiny vanguard of civil rights activists received the message.  
The moribund NAACP network in the state slowly flickered back to life. Prodded by a 
plumber’s aide from the tiny village of Cheraw, the state’s branches voted to form a state 
conference of branches to coordinate activities statewide.106 In the state capital, Modjeska 
Monteith Simkins joined forces with the Reverend James Hinton to rouse a sleepy 
political organization. They launched a furious battle to force the Works Progress 
Administration and other New Deal agencies to employ more black Carolinians.107 
When McCray began publishing his first newspaper, South Carolina’s black 
community was at a turning point. The spirit of protest had re-emerged, yet it still had to 
compete with a powerful culture of accommodation that dominated black political 
thought in the state. For the movement to expand to the countryside and rally support 
among a majority of African Americans in the state, the NAACP needed to persuade the 
mass of black South Carolinians of the efficacy of protest. Otherwise, the emerging 
activism of the late 1930s would fade in the same way as its predecessor had in the year 
after World War I. To avoid that fate, NAACP leaders in the state realized the need to 
build a broad-based opposition movement that united the African American community. 
  With the help of McCray’s newspaper, they would build a robust counterpublic in 
the South. Denied access to the mainstream white society in South Carolina, African 
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Americans would turn inward to confront the debate over accommodation and eventually 
embrace a culture of protest that demanded the full rights of citizenship. By standing up 
to white oppression, a vibrant and united black counterpublic in South Carolina would 
embrace and publicly appeal to the ideals of liberty and justice that undergird American 
democracy. To unite the community, however, the NAACP needed a communications 
tool – and McCray’s newspaper would step up to play that critical role in the fight.   
While McCray never explained his shift from tactical accommodation to full 
protest, his later columns and oral history interviews suggest the arrival of Osceola E. 
McKaine played a significant role in the transformation. A charismatic World War I 
veteran from Sumter, South Carolina, McKaine had organized black soldiers to oppose 
racism in the military while serving in France and Belgium.108 After the war, he spent 
two years in Harlem editing a political magazine and trying to launch a civil rights 
organization. Frustrated by what he saw as a lack of black militancy, McKaine returned 
to Belgium in 1922 and spent the next two decades managing a successful nightclub. Far 
from his childhood home in the Jim Crow South, McKaine enjoyed the racial liberalism 
of the European continent. Belgians treated him as a respected businessman, and his staff 
included numerous white employees. In 1940, however, World War II reached the Low 
Countries. McKaine fled Belgium just ahead of Hitler’s invading armies and returned 
home to Sumter.109 
  Depressed by what he found in his native South Carolina, McKaine resumed the 
civil rights work he had abandoned in 1922.  He revived the town’s NAACP branch and 
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worked to organize a statewide campaign around the issue of black teacher pay. Under 
the doctrine of “separate but equal,” black teachers should have received the same 
salaries as their white counterparts. The NAACP had made the issue a priority in the late 
1930s and had won concessions from other Deep South states. As usual, South Carolina 
was a holdout.110  In 1940, white teachers in South Carolina averaged $939 in annual 
salary; black teachers made less than half of that at $388 a year.111 Angered by those 
numbers, McKaine struggled to organize support to challenge the inequity in court. The 
effort brought him to Columbia, South Carolina’s capital city, where he developed a 
close relationship with Modjeska Monteith Simkins, the NAACP activist. Simkins had 
grown up in a prominent black family in Columbia. Her mother had helped establish the 
city’s first NAACP chapter in 1917.112  She married Andrew Simkins, a successful 
businessman and banker who served the black community. By 1940, Modjeska Simkins 
could devote herself to NAACP protest work without immediate fear of financial 
retribution. In McKaine, she found the perfect ally. Simkins later described a discussion 
the two had on the back porch of her Columbia home. Over a cool drink, the two activists 
made a pact: They would challenge the forces of white supremacy directly in South 
Carolina and they vowed to “destroy” anyone in the black community who tried to stop 
them.113 
To overcome the culture of accommodation in South Carolina’s black 
community, McKaine and Simkins believed the NAACP needed what they called “a 
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fighting organ” – a newspaper that was committed to the cause. They wanted a 
newspaper that would work directly with the NAACP and fully embrace black protest.114 
The two hatched a plan to have McCray merge his Charleston Lighthouse with the 
smaller Sumter Informer and move the new operation to the state’s capital city. McCray 
had grown to respect McKaine’s hard-charging style – “fiercely a race man,” he called 
him – and the young editor agreed to the merger.115 By late 1941, the new Lighthouse and 
Informer was operating on Washington Street, in the heart of Columbia’s black business 
district.116 It would become the leading weapon in the NAACP’s effort to reshape black 
politics in South Carolina. They would use it to create a united black counterpublic 
capable of launching a direct assault on the forces of white supremacy in the state.
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CHAPTER 3 
BEATING DOWN THE FEAR 
John McCray called them the “I Killits.” These were members of the black 
community who McCray and his allies believed were working with white supremacists to 
try to “kill” the civil rights struggle. “The ‘I Killits’ are low-down skunks,” McCray 
wrote in “The Need for Changing,” his weekly column in the Lighthouse and Informer.117 
In McCray’s view, these “vultures” undermined black civil rights efforts in return for a 
few scraps from the white man’s table. “They try to line up on the side of the already 
well-capable whites, and where possible, hand to these whites ammunition with which to 
blast away at us,” he wrote.  An “I Killit” believed “the white man will win, and if he is 
at his side some mercy will come to him, and he’ll have a little niche a bit higher than the 
rest of his people.”  
McCray was writing in August 1948. Black South Carolinians were preparing to 
vote in a Democratic Party primary – the only primary that mattered in South Carolina – 
for the first time since the 1870s. At the same time, the state’s young governor, J. Strom 
Thurmond, was running for president as a leader of the “Dixiecrats,” a group of white 
southern Democrats who bolted the national party over its support for black civil rights. 
As editor of the Lighthouse and Informer, the state’s leading black newspaper, McCray
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 had helped lead the fight to overturn the whites-only primary in South 
Carolina.118 He routinely excoriated Thurmond and other white supremacist leaders in his 
weekly column. But they weren’t the source of his anger this time. Instead, McCray 
focused his rage on members of his own race. In his column, McCray compared the “I 
Killits” to another group within the black community: the “I Dunnits”: 
The ‘I Dunnits’ mean well at heart. They are just weakling fatalists who tremble 
at the mere suggestion of battling for our rights. They tell you about ‘trouble’ if 
you think about fighting for what you believe and if this should fail, they run into 
a hole and hide while the battle rages. But as soon as the victory parade forms, 
they dash out and fight like the devil to take over the whole business and acclaim 
the credit.119 
           The man who drew McCray’s wrath and triggered the “I Killit” column was 
another black editor, a lifelong nemesis of McCray’s named Davis Lee. Lee was a 
conservative who did battle with the civil rights movement in the South throughout his 
career.120 He had edited the Savannah Journal in Georgia in the late 1930s, then moved 
north to take over the Newark Telegraph.121 In the summer of 1948, Lee accused black 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Lau, Democracy Rising; Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt; Jack I. Hayes, South 
Carolina and the New Deal (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001); 
Sullivan, Days of Hope; Hoffman, “The Genesis of the Modern Movement for Civil 
Rights in South Carolina”; Roefs, “Leading the Civil Rights Vanguard in South 
Carolina.” 
119 McCray, Lighthouse and Informer, August 22, 1948, 4. 
120 Hemmingway. “Black Press in South Carolina.” 
121 Lee later returned to South Carolina and edited the Orangeburg Herald in the 1950s 
and 60s. 
	  66	  
civil rights activists of ruining the business climate in the South. He claimed black and 
white southerners had gotten along well before outside agitators began stirring up trouble. 
When Thurmond hailed Lee as the true voice of black southerners, McCray’s Lighthouse 
and Informer fired back: “If Governor Thurmond and the Dixiecrats wish to impress 
southern Negroes with the thinking of Negroes they would do well to quote some other 
person, one for whom there is respect and esteem among Negroes. Lee has neither.”122 
 McCray’s attack on Davis Lee and his broadside against the “I Killits” and the “I 
Dunnits” were not anomalies. The Lighthouse and Informer conducted an ongoing assault 
on conservative forces within the black community – not just outliers like Davis Lee, but 
more respected black leaders as well. Led by McCray and his chief colleagues, Osceola 
E. McKaine and Modjeska Monteith Simkins, the newspaper demanded black 
assertiveness and ridiculed accommodation, opportunism, and apathy. It highlighted the 
injustices of a Jim Crow South that privileged whiteness but saved its greatest outrage for 
black South Carolinians who refused to fight back. With their editorial stance, McCray 
and his colleagues joined the debate that had animated the black community since the rise 
of white supremacy and Jim Crow. In the ongoing struggle between accommodation and 
protest, McCray and his NAACP colleagues used their newspaper to rally support for 
direct confrontation and undermine the argument for cautious negotiation.   
 The black civil rights movement flourished in 1940s South Carolina. The 
Lighthouse and Informer worked hand-in-hand with the NAACP, and by 1944 the 
newspaper had become the movement’s “unofficial propaganda engine and McCray its 
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chief propagandist.”123 During the decade the NAACP’s membership grew dramatically 
and the civil rights organization won two critical court cases in the state: a battle over 
equal pay for black teachers, followed by the abolition of the state’s all-white Democratic 
Party primary. The organization also helped launch Briggs v. Elliott, the Clarendon 
County, South Carolina, case that was eventually wrapped into Brown v. Board of 
Education, the landmark Supreme Court ruling outlawing school segregation.124  
 Before they could launch such a campaign, NAACP activists had to persuade a 
wary African American public that the time was right to confront white supremacy 
directly. McCray referred to this effort as “beating down the fear” in the black 
community.125 Yet the newspaper’s push for a campaign of protest was not uncontested. 
Conservative black leaders in the state believed confrontation would trigger a violent 
backlash, and they had historical evidence to support their view.126 McCray and his allies 
had to overcome this culture of accommodation before they could unite the community 
behind a strategy of confrontation with white supremacy in South Carolina. As the Davis 
Lee incident showed, white southerners were eager to make use of the divisions within 
the African American community to bolster their claims that the Jim Crow system 
benefited both races in the South – that social segregation and the elimination of most 
blacks from politics was a necessary act that strengthened rather than undermined 
American democracy.  
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 In South Carolina, McCray and his NAACP allies established the tools necessary 
to communicate a message of resistance throughout the African American community. 
The activists understood the need for a powerful newspaper – what they called a “fighting 
organ” – to spread their interpretation of how black Carolinians should define themselves 
in the face of white oppression.127 They wanted blacks to perceive themselves as worthy 
of full citizenship and capable of demanding it. To achieve that, they needed to overcome 
the persistent calls for accommodation and acquiescence. McCray and the NAACP 
wanted their community to embrace a collective narrative that depicted African 
Americans in South Carolina as courageous fighters for freedom willing to stand up to a 
more powerful foe. Through this collective narrative, they would create a black 
counterpublic that could arouse the dormant ideals of the democratic nation and win 
critical allies within the larger public. 
 It is this power to interpret events and use those interpretations to gain empathy 
and support that is central to Jeffrey Alexander’s theory of democratic life. Narratives 
have the power to shape public opinion, and public opinion can, occasionally, lead to 
social chance. In this sense, Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere follows the 
constructivist model that has dominated media effects and mass communications research 
since the late 1970s. How a communicator “frames” an event can shape the way the 
public makes meaning of it. In this way, print culture and other communicative 
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institutions help produce what Berger and Luckmann called “the social construction of 
reality.”128  
This study of McCray’s newspaper and its effort to create a vibrant black 
counterpublic in early 1940s South Carolina breaks new ground in communication 
research by linking Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere to the concept of frame 
analysis. Alexander’s theory emphasizes the role of communicative institutions, 
particularly the mass media, in in shaping public opinion and influencing decision-
making within the civil sphere. Frame analysis allows us to examine this meaning-
making process in more specific detail. The link between civil sphere theory and framing 
is embedded in the notion of a socially constructed reality in which political actors 
compete to persuade citizens to embrace their particularly interpretive framework. By 
combing civil sphere and framing, this study helps explain the powerful role mass media 
play in the effort by protest groups to challenge a dominant cultural or political norm. 
In South Carolina, McCray’s Lighthouse and Informer employed what sociologist 
William Gamson has identified as a “collective action frame” to confront and eventually 
overwhelm the argument in favor of accommodation within the black community. In 
doing so, the newspaper encouraged black southerners to embrace a definition of freedom 
and full citizenship that historian Richard H. King has described as “autonomous” 
freedom. Under this concept of freedom, political participation is more than merely a 
means to end, a way to bargain collectively for the best available deal from society. 
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Political action is instead a path to self-transformation and self-realization. As King wrote 
in his book Civil Rights and the Idea of Freedom, autonomous freedom derives from such 
characteristics as self-determination, pride, and self-respect. In this sense, political action 
is less about “the achievement of tangible gains” and more of what King calls a “religious 
conversion or therapeutic transformation” – the breaking free from “an old sense of self 
and from relationships of oppression and dependency.”129 Black conservative 
accommodationists in 1940s South Carolina argued in practical terms; they accepted 
politics as merely the art of the possible. McCray and his colleagues framed the debate to 
emphasize the power of political action to restore black pride and self-respect. 
Sociologists, political theorists, and communications scholars have cited the power of 
media frames to “construct social reality” for the public through the selection and 
emphasis of certain facts and narratives.130 Social movement scholars have suggested 
some political actors are able to create alternative versions of social reality – to “break” a 
status quo frame and redefine a social problem. If media frames help the public construct 
social reality, then perhaps activists can generate counter-frames that redefine that reality 
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and propose new solutions for solving social conflicts.131  In prose laced with anger, 
sarcasm, and occasional bitterness, McCray and his colleagues used the pages of the 
Lighthouse and Informer to help break the frame of African American acquiescence and 
accommodation in the Jim Crow South and communicate a message of agency and 
activism to black Carolinians.132  
 The concepts of frame analysis and frame contests offer insights into the success 
the Lighthouse and Informer in shaping public opinion in the black community and 
creating a united black counterpublic in South Carolina in the early 1940s. In his study of 
face-to-face communication, sociologist Ervin Goffman said individuals use what he 
called a “primary framework” to process new information quickly and place it into 
context.133 Gaye Tuchman was one of the first scholars to use frame analysis in the study 
of journalism. She argued that journalists use framing as a type of shortcut to help readers 
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and viewers interpret events beyond their everyday experience. Through this framing 
process, Tuchman said journalists and their audiences create a shared sense of how the 
world works and thus help create a socially constructed reality.134 In his examination of 
media coverage of the student anti-war movement of the 1960s, Todd Gitlin delivered a 
widely cited definition of media framing: the process involves “principals of selection, 
emphasis and presentation composed of tacit little theories about what exists, what 
happens, and what matters.” For Gitlin, these “tacit little theories,” delivered over and 
over in the media, help create social reality.135  
 Gitlin’s book, The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media and the Making and 
Unmaking of the New Left, served as a bridge between the use of framing theory in media 
studies and in the exploration of social movements. In his study of the anti-war 
movement, Gitlin focused almost entirely on media frames.  In 1982, William Gamson 
and his colleagues shifted the study of frame analysis from the media to the political 
actors. They tried to understand how social movements challenge widely accepted 
societal frames.136 How do these movements “break” a status quo frame and help 
construct a new one? In Gamson’s view, a frame identifies a problem and prescribes a 
solution. For political actors and social movement leaders, the goal is to redefine a 
societal problem and offer a viable alternative solution, one that mobilizes people to act. 
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Social movement theorists have identified these mobilizing solutions as collective action 
frames.137 
Gamson believes a successful collective action frame must include three 
components working simultaneously: identity, injustice, and agency. The message must 
identify an aggrieved group with shared concerns, convince the group it is the victim of 
an unjust act, and persuade the group it can change its circumstances – that the fight is 
worth the effort. For Gamson, agency is a critical component. He defined it as the 
“consciousness that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through collective 
action.”138 McCray and his newspaper wanted to use the debate over black teacher pay to 
persuade African Americans to move from acquiescence to action – to become agents in 
their own history. In doing so, McCray and his NAACP allies created a united black 
counterpublic capable of delivering its interpretation of life under Jim Crow rule into the 
nation’s larger civil sphere. 
The first big showdown in the newspaper’s campaign to demolish the culture of 
accommodation and unite the black community behind a strategy of protest came in the 
battle over equal pay for black teachers. Conservative black leaders framed the issue in 
accommodationist terms: they warned black teachers against the dangers of overreaching. 
The teachers should negotiate with the white board of education and cut the best deal 
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they could, even if it meant accepting something less than equal pay.139 McCray and his 
colleagues presented a starkly different message. The Lighthouse and Informer framed 
the fight for the equalization of teacher salaries as a test of black self-respect. The 
newspaper’s frame posed a simple question: Were African Americans ready to assume 
the rights and responsibilities of full citizenship?  
The fight over teacher pay equalization in South Carolina triggered a classic 
frame contest within the black community. The debate pitted the NAACP and its allies 
against the leaders of the Palmetto State Teachers’ Association, the black teachers 
organization. Headed by John P. Burgess, a high school principal and a well-known 
leader in the state’s black community, the PTSA opposed the NAACP’s plan to sue the 
state board of education. The group sought a negotiated settlement instead. The debate 
played out in the public and private spheres in South Carolina – in black newspapers, 
group meetings, neighborhood gatherings and private conversations. At one meeting of 
the PSTA membership in Columbia’s Township Auditorium, Burgess stood before more 
than a thousand black educators and told them that “they are crazy little fools” if they 
believed the board of education would pay them the same as white teachers. The PSTA 
president said the teachers should be smart and negotiate for something less than equality. 
Otherwise, they risked being fired. Furthermore, Burgess told the group’s rank-and-file to 
ignore “that ol’ crazy newspaper” – the Lighthouse and Informer – which was urging 
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teachers to sue the school board.140 For many of the black teachers, Burgess’ argument 
rang true. In the early 1940s in South Carolina, the forces calling for patience and 
negotiation over direct confrontation had a clear advantage. For the black community in 
the Jim Crow South, the threat of financial and physical retribution was real and 
omnipresent. Most families had relatives or friends who had felt the wrath of white anger 
firsthand.141 Some PSTA members believed mere membership in the NAACP could be a 
firing offense.142 On the other side, advocates of confrontation had few success stories 
with which to buttress their argument.  
 In 1943, the leadership of PTSA ignored NAACP complaints and sent a letter to 
the white state board of education requesting a pay increase for its members. Much like 
McCray’s accommodationist letter back in 1937, the teachers’ association tried to soothe 
the concerns of the state’s white supremacists. Writing to the state board of education, the 
PTSA said: “We have come to you, a powerful, influential and authoritative group, 
begging you to help another group that is not so powerful.” The language was similar to 
the tone used so often by Booker T. Washington and his South Carolina protégé, Richard 
Carroll, during the early years of Jim Crow. In 1895, Washington had written a famous 
letter to South Carolina Sen. “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman, a man best known for his support 
of lynching, that requested support for black schools: “I am but an humble member of an 
unfortunate race; you are a member of the greatest legislative body on earth, and a 
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member of the great, intelligent Caucasian race.” Historian Leon Litwack has described 
the letter as “a classic example of accommodationism.”143 Nearly half a century later, the 
PSTA leadership appeared to mimic Washington’s approach. 
  Modjeska Simkins responded with a devastating counterpunch published as an 
editorial under the headline “Negro Teachers Called To Arms.” In the Lighhouse and 
Informer, Simkins described the PSTA’s letter as a “stench bomb” that embarrassed 
“self-respecting Negroes in all walks of life.”  She called the PSTA’s effort to negotiate 
“nauseating,” and she sent a clear message to the rank and file of the black teachers 
group:  
Vow to strike forever from the … ranks of the PSTA any cringing, groveling 
creature who is so distorted in his thinking, and so moronic in his power of 
expression that he removes the Negro teachers of this state from the ranks of the 
freeborn and places them in the category of whimpering slaves … Resolve now 
that you will acquit yourselves as American citizens and not as sniveling, 
crawling nonentities.  Believe me, that BEGGING will not improve your 
economic condition, or any other condition for that matter.”144 
The confrontational tone of Simkins’ editorial reflected the bitterness of the frame 
contest over strategy. “Swear vengeance against your ‘misleaders,’” Simkins urged the 
black teachers. “Single out your delegates from your county and demand proof of how 
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each stood.”145 Simkins framed the debate clearly to pick a fight with the group’s leaders, 
to create a stark contrast between her will to fight and their desire to negotiate. As she 
noted in a later interview, she understood their fear and caution. The PSTA leaders were 
well known in the community and were vulnerable to white retribution. “(They) didn’t 
want the whites to know that they would sit in a meeting and allow black teachers to sue 
the state of South Carolina,” she said years later.146 However, she was not interested in 
preserving unity or showing the PSTA leadership any compassion; she wanted to 
persuade black Carolinians to go into battle – and to shame those too afraid to fight. 
Simkins wanted to convince them of their agency to confront an unjust system. 
Gamson believes the agency component of a collective action frame must be tied 
closely to efficacy. The frame must empower people as agents in their own history, but 
also “deny the immutability of some undesirable situation.”147 In the Lighthouse and 
Informer, Simkins framed the goal of the battle over teacher pay carefully to avoid a 
debate over winning or losing the court case. Instead, she said black South Carolinians 
had a choice: they could assert their rights like “American citizens,” or they could retreat 
like “whimpering slaves.”  The agency comes not necessarily from winning the lawsuit, 
but from simply filing it in the first place. In this sense, she is redefining “citizenship” in 
a way that is consistent with Richard H. King’s concept of “autonomous freedom.” In 
tracing the “repertory of freedom” as articulated throughout the civil rights movement, 
King identifies “autonomous freedom” as a kind of self-realization – a rejection of the 
old, oppressed self and a declaration of personal freedom. Those who embrace 
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autonomous freedom are willing to stand up and demand their rights, even if they expect 
to face retribution for doing so. In this sense, politics is not the art of the possible; 
instead, it is a path to self-respect through the assertion of your rights. To fight for those 
rights – whether you win every battle or not – is a way of declaring yourself a citizen.148 
McCray made the same case in a 1947 column that looked back on the teacher fight. He 
described a white “Democrat” who counseled him to be “less conspicuous” in making 
political demands. “The question about being nice and quiet, just because white folks 
ask,” McCray wrote, “is that it never pays dividends”149 – perhaps a lesson he learned 
from his earlier accommodationist days. 
The Simkins editorial reflected the bitterness of the battle between the 
accommodationists and the protestors. To reframe the issue and force a choice by the 
community, the Lighthouse and Informer had to draw sharp distinctions between 
negotiation and confrontation. As McCray knew from personal experience, most black 
Carolinians vacillated in their support for direct confrontation. Was this the right time, or 
were African Americans risking a major white backlash? The tone of the debate also 
engendered criticism. The paper came under fire from those who believed African 
Americans should remain unified and from those who thought it unseemly to air their 
debate in public for whites to see and hear. Later in 1943, McKaine addressed the 
question of unity in the newspaper’s signature combative tone: “If, to have unity, we 
must continue to follow and support a leadership which has, without effective protest or 
action, permitted the Negroes of this state to become the most illiterate group within the 
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nation … if to have unity we must continue to support and follow such leadership then 
the price is too high.”150 
Despite the bitterness, the NAACP activists prevailed and managed to gain 
support for their lawsuit. The first black plaintiff, a young teacher from Charleston, got 
cold feet and dropped her case.151 But a second teacher replaced her, and in February 
1944, a young NAACP lawyer named Thurgood Marshall argued the first teacher-pay 
case against the Charleston board of education in the federal courthouse in Charleston. 
Marshall had expected to lose in Charleston and perhaps win the case on appeal. But 
much to his surprise, a judge named J. Waites Waring – the son of a Charleston 
aristocratic family and at that time a member in good standing of the Democratic Party – 
sided with the NAACP and ordered the school board to equalize the pay.152 
Waring’s ruling in the teacher-pay case was the first step in his evolution from 
white supremacist Democratic to full-throated supporter of black equality in the South. A 
loyal supporter of white supremacy and the racial status quo across the 1930s, Waring 
was an ally of US Senator “Cotton” Ed Smith, a demagogue who broke with Roosevelt in 
part over the race issue. Smith rallied his supporters across rural South Carolina with his 
oft-told story of how he walked out of the 1936 Democratic National Convention in 
“Philadelphy” when a black minister began to deliver the invocation. “When the blue-
gummed Senagambian started talking, I started walking,” Smith would say to the 
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cheering crowds.153 In 1938, Smith was one of several southern senators the White House 
targeted for defeat in Democratic primaries, but with Waring serving as his Charleston 
campaign manager, Smith defied the New Dealers and won re-election in a landslide. 
Smith rewarded Waring for his loyalty by helping to clear the way for Waring’s 
appointment to the federal judgeship in 1941. 
After the teacher-pay ruling in 1943, Waring’s social life underwent a radical 
change that would help sever his ties with white Charleston – and perhaps help nudge 
forward his new commitment to civil rights. For more than 32 years, Waring had been 
married to Annie Gammell, the daughter of a respected Charleston family and a familiar 
face at the city’s annual society balls in the fashionable neighborhood south of Broad 
Street. By late 1945, however, rumors began to spread about the Waring’s marriage. 
Sometime earlier that year, Waring had met and fallen in love with Elizabeth Hoffmann, 
the wife of a wealthy Connecticut textile manufacturer who had a winter home south of 
Broad. Divorce was still illegal in South Carolina at the time, but Waring was apparently 
determined to end the marriage. The judge sent his wife to stay with his sister in Florida 
while she established residency and filed for divorce there. To make matters more 
tantalizing for the Charleston gossip mill, Judge Waring would be his new wife’s third 
husband. Originally from Detroit, Elizabeth Avery had divorced her first husband, 
attorney Wilson Mills, to marry Hoffmann. Elizabeth Waring was an intelligent and 
charming person, and Waring’s male friends in Charleston would later say they 
understood why he initially fell in love with her. However, as one former law partner put 
it, “She was also a Yankee, and she had those characteristics. Those women just don’t 
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seem to have the same manner as southern women have. They are a little more 
aggressive.”154 
It was true that Elizabeth Waring read much more widely and deeply than the 
judge’s former wife. And on the issue of race, the new Mrs. Waring and her husband 
began to explore points of view beyond the narrow confines of the Charleston News and 
Courier and other southern news media. They were particularly moved by the findings 
published in An American Dilemma, Gunnar Myrdal’s investigation into “the Negro 
problem and American democracy.” Funded by the Carnegie Foundation and published 
in 1944, Myrdal’s massive two-volume study depicted in painstaking detail the degree of 
black misery in America. The book sought to answer one perplexing question: How could 
a country built on such liberal ideals as freedom and equality allow the wholesale 
oppression of one-tenth of its citizens? Myrdal provided an optimistic answer. He 
believed northern whites were unaware of the depth of white oppression in the South, and 
he believed they would reject racism and white supremacy once they fully understood its 
vile impact on the nation’s democratic life.155 Myrdal believed northern public opinion 
would play a crucial role in the coming fight over black civil rights. Many decades later, 
as he developed the theory of the civil sphere in his efforts to understand and explain 
social change in American democracy, Jeffrey Alexander would support Myrdal’s 
contention. 
As the Warings expanded their reading about race relations, they grew 
increasingly disturbed. “I couldn’t take it at first, I used to say it wasn’t true, it couldn’t 
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be,” Judge Waring later told Collier’s magazine. “I would put the books down, so 
troubled I couldn’t look at them.”156 Waring’s shift in allegiance provided dramatic 
evidence of change within the nation’s civil sphere; the African American movement was 
now gaining empathy and winning allies in the North and the South too.157 
Waring’s ruling in the teacher pay case surprised white leaders in South Carolina, 
most of whom had had failed to notice that cracks that had begun to undermine their 
community’s solidarity on the race issue. In 1920, when black activism mobilized in the 
state, white supremacists could crush the movement with little fear of its impact on 
northern public opinion. By 1943, with the nation now embroiled in another world war, 
and with northern white Democrats working harder to lure black voters, the cultural 
milieu had changed. The arguments that Du Bois and his colleagues had delivered with 
such passion two decades earlier had won few converts in the larger white audience back 
then. The black counterpublic was not as strong and could be easily ignored by white 
northerners. In the 1940s, however, these same arguments began to resonate in the 
mainstream public, and this shift in the cultural landscape began to effect political 
decision-making. The black press and its powerful “Double V” campaign made the link 
between fascism abroad and racial oppression at home at least somewhat harder for 
whites to ignore. Black activists like labor leader A. Phillip Randolph could point out this 
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hypocrisy and force the Democratic president to take his arguments seriously.158 White 
supremacists continued to claim that blacks were happy under Jim Crow, and that outside 
agitators, many of them with Communist Party ties, were the source of any discontent. 
With the emergence of the Cold War, the argument concerning Communists would gain 
traction in the late 1940s and 50s. But the notion that African Americans were content 
with their status in the South, and that white violence, while unfortunate, was necessary 
to maintain a democratic way of life, was growing increasingly difficult to sell.  
One Southern white leader who grasped this change and tried to take advantage of 
it was, surprisingly, J. Strom Thurmond. After fighting in Europe during the war, 
Thurmond returned to his home in Edgefield, South Carolina, and and for governor. 
Thurmond campaigned in 1946 as a New Deal reformer and a moderate on the racial 
issue. In neighboring Georgia that year, Gene Talmadge made defense of white 
supremacy his primary issue, but in South Carolina Thurmond focused on economic 
progress and downplayed race. He supported segregation, obviously, but in his campaign 
speeches he championed a prosperous and industrialized South that would benefit both 
races. In his inaugural address, he even proposed increased spending on African 
American schools to help prepare the race to thrive in the new economy.159  In this sense, 
Thurmond was an early proponent of a new interpretation of Jim Crow, one that softened 
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its harsher edges of white supremacy and presented it as a way to move toward a better 
future for both races.160 
Waring’s ruling on teacher pay provided the sort of tangible victory McCray and 
his NAACP allies needed to convince wary blacks that change was possible in South 
Carolina, that the 1940s movement would not be a sad replay of the 1920s. In rural parts 
of the state, however, African Americans believed white supremacists retained their most 
powerful weapon – the ability to use violence without fear of retribution. And events 
appeared to support their fears. In 1946, a war veteran named Isaac Woodard was blinded 
by Batesburg police officers who beat him after Woodard got into minor dispute with a 
white bus driver. And in 1947, a group of white taxi drivers broke into the nearby Pickens 
County jail and lynched Willie Earl, a black man accused of murdering another white cab 
driver. The Woodard case drew national attention, but it ended the way most violence 
against blacks had always ended – without any action from local authorities. The Willie 
Earl case was different, however, and it signaled a significant change in northern and 
southern culture. 
Thurmond would become the segregationist presidential candidate of 1948 and a 
leader of “massive resistance” to civil rights in the mid-1950s. With the Earl lynching, 
Thurmond had an opportunity to employ the tactics of his predecessors, Tillman and 
Blease. They had often criticized mob violence as unfortunate, but complained that the 
black quest for racial equality had violated southern mores and thus triggered the 
violence. Through these statements, they signaled the government’s approval of white 
violence to contain black aspirations, even though the lawmakers claimed to oppose those 
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who took the law in their own hands. In 1947, Thurmond did just the opposite. He not 
only criticized the lynching as unacceptable, but the governor committed the heretical act 
of calling in the federal government -- the FBI -- to investigate the case and bring charges 
against the white criminals. The trial attracted press from across the world – the famed 
British journalist Rebecca West described the trial as “The Greenville Opera” in The New 
Yorker – and even though the all-white jury refused to convict, the governor’s firm 
support for federal prosecution confirmed that changes were afoot. Thurmond was no 
liberal on race relations. But the governor seemed to understand that overwhelming, 
state-sanctioned violence would no longer be accepted by national public opinion.161 
The victory in the teacher pay case and the national attention paid to the Isaac 
Woodard and Willie Earl cases emboldened African Americans to join the NAACP’s 
fight for political and civil rights in South Carolina. By 1948, the number of dues-paying 
members in the state had exceeded 14,000, up from only about 800 a decade earlier. 
McCray had been arguing in favor of black political involvement since the late 1930s.162 
He repeatedly emphasized the potential political clout of a black community that 
comprised “46 percent of the population, a majority in 22 of the 46 counties” and in four 
of six Congressional districts in South Carolina.163 If blacks could get to the ballot box, 
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they could exercise enormous political power. Of course, white Carolinians could do the 
math as well, and most were determined to keep blacks out.  
The New Deal era had triggered a shift in American politics. During the 
Depression, Roosevelt’s New Deal economic policies attracted support from black 
Americans. In 1936, the national Democratic Party actively solicited northern black votes 
for the first time in a presidential race, and tens of thousands of African Americans cast 
their ballots for FDR that November.164 Southern blacks embraced Roosevelt and the 
New Deal as well, despite the racially discriminatory way most New Deal programs were 
implemented.165 A headline in the New York Times in August captured the political sea 
change: “Negro Vote Jumps in South Carolina – Rush to Register is Ascribed by Official 
to Desire to Support Roosevelt.”166 Technically, southern blacks could vote in general 
elections, although whites used legal and extralegal means to block turnout. But blacks in 
the South were banned entirely from participating in the Democratic Party. Since the turn 
of the century, southern Democrats had barred blacks from joining the party and 
participating in its primaries. In the one-party rule of the Solid South, with only nominal 
Republican opposition, the Democratic primary was the main event; winning the primary 
was tantamount to winning the office.  To participate fully in politics, blacks had to gain 
entrance to the Democratic Party. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Sullivan, Days of Hope, 143-144. 
165 Ibid; Karen Ferguson, Black Politics in New Deal Atlanta (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2002). 
166 “Negro Vote Jumps…,” The New York Times, August 22, 1936, as cited in Hoffman, 
“The Genesis of the Modern Movement for Civil Rights in South Carolina,” 364. 
 
	  87	  
In the late 1930s, the NAACP’s legal arm launched an assault on the all-white 
primary.  It filed suit in Texas charging that that state’s primary system violated the 
Fifteenth Amendment to the constitution guaranteeing African Americans the right to 
vote. The state of Texas argued that primaries were the private concerns of each political 
party and not a part of the state’s statutory election law. But on April 3, 1944, the US 
Supreme Court surprised the South by siding with the NAACP. In Smith v. Allwright,167 
the court said the party primary played a significant role in the electoral process and thus 
represented a delegation of official state power and must be governed by the 
constitution.168 It was a landmark victory for the emerging civil rights movement. But for 
John McCray and his fellow activists, the fight to enter South Carolina Democratic Party 
politics had just begun.   
   A few days after the Smith v. Allwright ruling, McCray sat in the balcony of the 
South Carolina Statehouse and watched in horror as state lawmakers moved to 
circumvent the court order. In what came to be known as the “extraordinary session,” 
Governor Olin Johnston told the lawmakers: “White supremacy will be maintained in our 
primaries. Let the chips fall where they may.”169 The legislature threw out all state laws 
concerning political parties and ordered the parties to establish their own rules and 
regulations governing their primaries. Since the state would have no connection with 
political parties, party elections would become the private concerns of independent 
organizations and would not fall under constitutional scrutiny. 
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 To mount a legal challenge to the new primary system in South Carolina, the 
NAACP needed to find a black voter who had registered in the Democratic Party but had 
been denied a vote in the party’s primary. This was harder to do than it sounded. White 
Democrats controlled the process and they moved the party’s registration books around 
surreptitiously. It was like a shell game: a registration book would open at a local store, 
but when a black voter approached, the book would abruptly close, only to reopen the 
next day at a different location. The stalling technique worked in 1944 and ensured 
another election year with an all-white Democratic primary.  
Rather than accept that outcome and wait patiently for the legal process to unfold, 
McCray responded with a bold move. He and Osceola McKaine used the pages of the 
Lighthouse and Informer to launch a black political organization, one designed to 
empower the African American community and challenge the white Democrats. Initially 
called the South Carolina Colored Democratic Party, McCray and McKaine changed the 
name to the Progressive Democratic Party in late April 1944 and opened the doors to 
white members. But it is clear that McCray saw the party as a way to motivate black 
activism and to generate a sense of agency in the African-American community.  The 
party would stay in operation, he wrote, “so long as it shall be necessary to have group 
action in the matter of group rights and privileges.”170  
To the dismay of some national Democrats, McCray carried out his pledge to 
challenge the state’s white slate of delegates at the party’s national convention in Chicago 
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that summer.  As Patricia Sullivan has argued, the Democratic Party was at a crossroads 
on racial issues in 1944. Roosevelt was caught between growing black support in the 
North and an increasingly wary white supremacist wing in the South. It was an alliance 
that could not hold, and McCray wanted southern blacks to help break it apart. If South 
Carolina’s black slate of delegates is not seated, he said, “there will be devil to pay.” 
McCray predicted northern blacks would abandon Roosevelt and perhaps swing the 
election to the Republicans if the Democrats refused to seat his delegation. To no one’s 
surprise, the national Democratic Party’s credentials committee disqualified McCray’s 
PDP slate on a technicality and the white South Carolina Democrats were seated. But 
McCray used the high-profile moment in Chicago to help organize black activism back 
home. The PDP nominated Osceola McKaine to run for the Senate in the fall and turned 
his campaign into a recruitment drive to motivate blacks across the state to join both the 
NAACP and the PDP.171  
With the Lighthouse and Informer’s full editorial support, McKaine campaigned 
in nearly every county in the state in 1944, and he used this platform to challenge black 
South Carolinians to join the battle for political rights. In doing so, he again framed the 
issue to emphasize the concept of “autonomous freedom.” The battle will be a “painful, 
bitter struggle,” he said at one stop. But if black men and women reject the idea of being 
a “ruled” group, they “must be willing to make every sacrifice necessary to obtain the 
right to vote.”172 In McKaine’s narrative, black agency would come not from winning a 
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tangible victory in the election, but simply from joining the fight for equal rights. In this 
sense, the PDP’s senatorial campaign succeeded. By the end of the fall, the party claimed 
to have 45,000 members. However, the final election results showed the PDP with only 
5,000 votes. An outraged McCray charged that white election officials prevented many 
blacks from voting and failed to count the ballots of those who did. He reached out to 
Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP for help. McCray knew the PDP had no chance of 
winning the election, but he feared that giving in to the fraud without a fight would 
undermine the momentum and sense of agency McKaine’s campaign had generated in the 
black community. As McCray explained in a letter to Marshall: “We have had a hell of a 
job beating down the fear in these people, in getting their trust and hopes and don’t intend 
to see them come down with their ballot … to be robbed, intimidated and frustrated.”173  
Marshall filed a complaint with the US Justice Department and McKaine 
contested the election in the US Senate, but neither body took action. Nonetheless, the 
PDP had succeeded in carrying out McCray’s primary goals: to move the black 
community to act and to deliver to the state and the nation a consistent and unified 
interpretation of how mistreatment of southern blacks undermined and contradicted the 
ideals of the larger American democracy. A man of no small ego, McCray later described 
the creation of the PDP as “brazen, daring and smart … a single act of terrorism for white 
supremacists in a state where by sheer numbers blacks” held enormous political potential. 
The new party, McCray said, “was controlled by blacks, by selected people who wanted 
no ‘under the table’ payoffs nor … pats on the shoulder. That kind of operation scares the 
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daylights out of racist supremacists. It also baffles those blacks who thrive on sell 
outs.”174 
 In the next election year, 1946, McCray and his colleagues tried again to get a 
black voter enrolled in the Democratic Party and thus launch a new legal challenge 
against the all-white primary. The activists had failed to overcome the trickery of the 
white Democrats throughout the spring of 1946 and were growing desperate. Finally, an 
unlikely hero emerged. As McCray tells the story, he and three other NAACP activists 
were standing outside a small store in Columbia’s ninth ward. They had seen whites 
enrolling in the store, but every time a black voter entered the woman behind the counter 
claimed the enrollment book was not there. As McCray and his colleagues were about to 
leave, a cab driver named George Elmore drove up. McCray described Elmore as a “pest” 
who “bugged” everybody with his endless chatter and general nosiness. They barely 
spoke to him, but soon Elmore learned what they were up to. He asked if he could try to 
enroll. McCray described the group’s response as,  “Sure, good riddance and relief!” A 
light-skinned Negro, Elmore walked into the store and, to the amazement of McCray and 
his colleagues, the woman pulled out the registration book and let him sign up. As soon 
as she saw his address, however, she realized he was a Negro. By then, she had grown 
weary of the process as well. She told Elmore to “tell the rest of them damn niggers they 
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can come in and register too.” With Elmore, the NAACP had its plaintiff in a new legal 
assault on the party’s all-white primary.175 
Thurgood Marshall returned to South Carolina to argue the case in federal court in 
Columbia in the summer of 1947. Once again, US District Judge J. Waites Waring of 
Charleston presided. And if his ruling in the teacher equalization case surprised white 
South Carolinians, his judgment in the primary suit sent them into shock. “It is time for 
South Carolina to rejoin the Union,” the judge wrote in his decision. “Racial 
discrimination cannot exist in the machinery that selects offices and lawmakers.”176 By 
August of 1948, Waring had overturned two Democratic Party appeals and the all-white 
primary was finally dead in South Carolina. McCray hailed the rulings in an editorial 
headlined “The White Primary Goes Out.” But he put South Carolina blacks on notice, as 
well:  
The next step is to make certain that the victory is not half a loaf, an empty one. 
To be certain, feverish efforts will be made to deny this new privilege … The 
success of this effort will depend on the inclination of Negroes to tolerate or reject 
it … The clarion call against the primary … was ‘all or none.’ And this, 
henceforth, is the watchword. No membership in the party is complete without all 
the rights attending that membership. Only through such a stand can the court’s 
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ruling be made practical. Only in this fashion can it be said that ‘government of 
all the people by the few of one people’ has perished from the earth.177 
McCray’s Lighthouse and Informer challenged the black community in 1940s 
South Carolina with a powerful collective action frame that helped overcome a culture of 
accommodation and usher in the modern civil rights movement. By uniting African 
Americans behind a strategy of protest, the newspaper helped create a robust black 
counterpublic that disseminated powerful denunciations of racial discrimination and 
injustice. These interpretations of civic life in the South helped attract valuable white 
allies, including a federal district judge whose rulings undermined white political 
dominance in the state and drew national attention to the civil rights struggle in South 
Carolina. The ability to sway public opinion in the North and win empathetic allies would 
propel the movement forward and eventually force the white South to launch new 
campaigns to resist black inclusion in the civil sphere. 
During the early 1940s, as the black movement grew in South Carolina, the state’s 
white press mostly ignored it. They doubted local African Americans had the intelligence 
or the courage to confront white rule in a serious way. For McCray and his allies, 
however, the era of protest politics was just beginning. By 1948, white South Carolinians 
could no longer ignore this fact, and they began to engage in a serious debate about how 
to respond.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE WHITE PRESS AND THE DIXIECRATS 
Across the 1940s, South Carolina’s white newspapers competed for circulation 
and influence – the State and the Columbia Record in the state capital of Columbia; the 
News and Courier and the Charleston Evening Post in the historic port city; the 
Greenville News and the Spartanburg papers, the Herald and the Journal, in the foothills 
of the north; and the Florence Morning News in the tobacco-growing northeast region 
along the Pee Dee River. They relied heavily on the Associated Press and United Press to 
follow major events, and on many days their lead news stories were identical. The 
differences came on the editorial page, specifically in the unsigned editorials, where each 
paper tried to distinguish itself through its editorial voice.178 Publishers competed to hire 
editors who could deliver compelling commentary, who could be “lively” and 
“argumentative” to attract readers.179 Much as modern television networks rely on star 
pundits, the newspapers depended on their editorialists to brand their publications and 
build circulation. 
In the early years of the decade, the white editorialists took note of the civil rights 
movement in the state, but most treated it as a minor annoyance, not an existential threat 
to white political power. In the first year of World War II, they raised concerns about a 
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War Department plan to make it easier for soldiers to vote because they feared it 
would increase black registration in the state.180 They were mildly surprised in 1943 
when Judge J. Waites Waring used sharp language in demanding the state equalize pay 
for black teachers in the state, but the editors supported the concept of the “separate but 
equal” doctrine. The next year, when the US Supreme Court ruled in Smith v. Allwright 
that state Democratic parties could no longer exclude primary voters based solely on race, 
they expressed greater concern, but were confident that whites would retain control of the 
party.181 When John McCray used his black newspaper to form the Progressive 
Democratic Party and challenge the seating of the state’s white delegates at the 1944 
Democratic National Convention, the Columbia Record dismissed the PDP, saying its 
leaders  “talked too much.”182 
 Despite evidence to the contrary, the white press appeared convinced that the 
majority of the state’s black community remained politically content and that white 
dominance was not under serious threat. Yet led by McCray’s Lighthouse and Informer 
and his NAACP allies, the once quiescent black community in South Carolina had 
coalesced into a vibrant counterpublic capable of disseminating their own interpretation 
of civic life. They had dispensed with the accommodationist strategy and begun to assert 
their rights as full citizens of American democracy. This change began in the early 1940s, 
but white editors would mostly ignore it until late in the decade. As one member of 
McCray’s political organization said in writing to a white journalist in 1948: “The type of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 For more on the importance of the soldier voting debate, see: Robert A. Garson, The 
Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, 1941-1948 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
Press University, 1974), 38. 
181 Smith v. Allwright. 
182 “Mayberry says Negro Move is Doomed,” Columbia Record, May 27, 1944, 4A. 
	  96	  
Negro I represent you have never met. You have never talked with – you have only a 
superficial knowledge of.”183 And this appeared to be true, based on how African 
Americans were portrayed in the white press. 
During the 1940s, black South Carolinians appeared in white newspapers as 
suspects in crime stories and as the butt of jokes based on disparaging stereotypes. The 
editorial page of the state’s largest newspaper, The State in Columbia, published a regular 
cartoon series called Hambone that portrayed an elderly “Sambo” character who 
dispensed pearls of wisdom in deep dialect. In one example, Hambone is shown whittling 
on a piece of wood as he says: “Doctuhs en Lawyuhs en Preachuhs, dey de onlies’ one’s 
gets paid fuh tryin’ – win er lose!”  In Charleston, the News and Courier frequently ran 
short editorials making fun of the supposedly loose morals of the black community. 
When the state’s General Assembly considered legalizing divorce, for example, the News 
and Courier suggested the new law would be a boon for black attorneys. “Divorce will 
rapidly come to be fashionable among the colored people,” the newspaper said. 
“Attorneys of their race will soon appear in all counties.”184 
In the early 1940s, McCray and his NAACP allies benefited from the lack of 
interest paid by the state’s white press. They were granted space to gather resources and 
build a viable black counterpublic without the daily newspapers rallying white 
opposition. White politicians occasionally vilified African Americans and raised the 
specter of a black political and social threat. In 1943, for example, Governor R.M. 
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Jeffries ordered an investigation of so-called “Eleanor Clubs” in the state. Encouraged by 
First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, these black workers were allegedly plotting such 
subversive acts as entering white homes through the front door. “Perhaps this movement 
is connected with plans of the Communists to foment a ‘black revolution’ in the South,” 
one Charleston resident wrote to the governor.185 
White editors downplayed such threats. Despite the evidence of rising black 
political assertiveness in the state, the largest white newspapers depicted black South 
Carolinians as docile and relatively harmless – perhaps easily swayed by “outside 
agitators,” but posing no existential threat to the status quo. By 1947, however, it became 
clear that the black push for inclusion in the nation’s civil sphere had gained support in 
the North. When President Truman proposed the first civil rights reform measure since 
Reconstruction, the leading white newspapers in South Carolina would react in shock. 
They would join with white politicians to debate the proper region’s response, and in 
doing saw would come to realize that the old arguments that conflated white supremacy 
and racial separation with “American democracy” had lost their ability to persuade in the 
shifting public opinion of the northern civil sphere. By the end the decade, after the failed 
Dixiecrat presidential campaign of South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond, they 
would begin the search for new ways of defending white political rule in the South. 
In the 1940s, the white press in South Carolina was dominated by a particular 
brand of conservatism, one exemplified by a paternalistic and dismissive view of African 
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Americans in the South. Led by the News and Courier in Charleston and The State in 
Columbia, the South Carolina press favored the aristocratic notions that had been 
preached by the state’s old planter-class elite. In short, they believed in a hierarchical 
society in which all classes knew their “place.” They believed the so-called “Negro 
question” had been settled and that southern blacks accepted their particular place on 
society’s bottom rung. Northern agitators occasionally stirred up trouble, they contended, 
but blacks in South Carolina were mostly an affable lot who were content with the status 
quo. 
By 1948, however, the white editors realized what they now confronted. Black 
activists like Charleston’s A.J. Clement did not sound like someone who accepted 
second-class citizenship. In his letter to a News and Courier journalist, Clement sounded 
like an American patriot appealing to the most sacred values embedded in the nation’s 
democratic heritage. “The things that the modern Negro wants are things of the heart – 
they are things eternal,” Clement wrote. “Mankind has always sought them and in his 
seeking he will not be denied. For Right and Justice, Fair play, and Understanding – in 
the long run – always win out.”186  
The state’s white press and white politicians struggled to develop a new narrative 
that could justify the continuation of the old ways in South Carolina. For the past half-
century, the leading white editorialists at the state’s major newspapers had bemoaned the 
rise of the white working class as a political power in the state. They had embraced a 
particular type of conservatism that often worried as much about class as it did race. 
Ironically, the planter-class elites who first espoused this ideology had lost their great 
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political struggle against Ben Tillman, Cole Blease and other “reformers” at the turn of 
the century, yet in the 1940s their worldview was thriving on the editorial pages of the 
state’s largest newspapers.   
These so-called Bourbon conservatives – led by former Confederate generals 
Wade Hampton and Matthew Butler – had ruled the state since taking power in the 
fraudulent election of 1876.187 With the help of Tillman and other young militia leaders, 
the former Confederates ousted a Republican government that had come to power with 
the support of African American votes. In the parlance of the times, Hampton and his 
supporters had “redeemed” South Carolina from the horrors of Reconstruction.188  The 
Bourbons supported economic growth, particularly the push for more industry in the 
South, but they were most concerned about social order. As historian Joel Williamson has 
noted, planter class conservatives were obsessed with place. In their view, the nightmare 
of Reconstruction had allowed the lower orders – blacks and working-class whites – to 
abandon their proper place in society and join elite whites in participating in politics and 
governance.  
After taking power in 1876, the Hampton and the white Democrats sought to 
overturn the changes wrought by Reconstruction and restore a strictly regimented society 
in which everyone knew their place. It was a system that empowered elite landowners at 
the top and kept poorer whites near the bottom, just one step ahead of the former slaves. 
Unlike Tillman, Blease, and the radical reformers who would later impose the violent 
tyranny of Jim Crow, planter-class aristocrats believed they had nothing to fear from the 
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freed blacks. They simply thought blacks were an inferior race and, like poor whites, 
needed guidance and protection provided by the better class.189 Even after federal troops 
had been withdrawn from South Carolina, Hampton’s government solicited African 
American votes, although Tillman and other militia leaders made sure only a handful of 
blacks would actually cast their ballots.190  
By 1890, Tillman and his allies had grown weary of Hampton’s paternalistic 
leadership. Tillman’s base of support came from the small farmers who had always 
resented Hampton and the big landowners. They had formed an uneasy alliance in 
opposition to the Republicans and Reconstruction, but that partnership was coming to an 
end. The national economic downturn of the 1880s had been especially severe for small 
farmers in the South, and agrarian uprisings had destabilized the political status quo 
across the region. In neighboring Georgia, for example, the Populist Party had brought 
together white yeoman farmers and African Americans in a brief but powerful bi-racial 
coalition.191 In North Carolina, so-called fusionist candidates ran with the support of 
white Republicans and African American votes. For Tillman, the growth of bi-racial 
coalitions posed an unacceptable threat to white rule. He supported the “Mississippi 
Plan,” a strategy that would disenfranchise African Americans in the South and use all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Williamson, Joel. The Crucible of Race – Black-White Relations in the American 
South Since Emancipation. (Oxford University Press, 1984), 79-85. 
190 Kantrowitz, Ben Tillman, 80-95. 
191 C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel (New York: McMillian, 1938; 
Galaxy Books, 1963). 
	  101	  
means necessary – including violence – to limit black advancement and ensure they 
remained on society’s lowest rung.192  
 In 1890, Tillman rallied the state’s small farmers to challenge the Bourbon 
conservatives for control of the state’s Democratic Party. He would ride his “agrarian 
reform” and white supremacy movement to the governor’s mansion and eventually a seat 
in the US Senate. Later, Blease would add the state’s growing number of so-called “lint 
heads” – textile mill workers – to the Tillman coalition and also win races for governor 
and senator.  
During the rise of Tillman and Blease, the state’s dominant newspaper – 
Charleston’s News and Courier – sided with Hampton and the planter-class Bourbons. In 
the post-bellum years, editor Francis “Captain” Dawson had turned the Low Country 
newspaper into a journalistic powerhouse. Although born and raised in England, Dawson 
had fallen in love with the Confederacy and had moved to South Carolina in 1861 to join 
the cause. After the war, he had worked at the Charleston Mercury under the former fire-
breathing secessionist, Robert Barnwell Rhett. In 1867, Dawson and a partner purchased 
the struggling Charleston News. They added the faltering Courier in 1873 and created the 
News and Courier. Though based in Charleston’s historic district, the “old lady of Broad 
Street” grew statewide under Dawson’s able leadership. In 1880, the editor created a 
bureau in the state capital of Columbia bureau and staffed it with an ambitious young 
journalist named Narciso Gener Gonzalez. N.G., as he was called, was the son of an 
aristocratic woman from the Lowcountry who had surprised her family by marrying a 
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dashing Cuban ex-patriot who had fled his homeland after joining a failed revolt against 
Spanish control. 
During his first run for governor, in 1888, Tillman claimed Dawson and News and 
Courier wielded too much power in South Carolina. A small “ring” of rich planters rule 
that state, Tillman said, “and that ring is on Dawson’s little finger.” The News and 
Courier responded in kind, calling Tillman’s supporters “red necks” who “carry pistols in 
their pockets, expectorate on the floor, have no toothbrushes, and comb their hair with 
their fingers.” Tillman lost that battle, and Dawson died one year later, but their clash 
during that 1888 campaign set the tone for the long conflict to come between the state’s 
aristocratic elites and working-class farmers and mill workers.  
In 1890, Tillman defeated Hampton’s candidate, Alexander Haskell, and claimed 
the Democratic Party nomination, ending the Bourbon reign in the statehouse.193 
Infuriated by Tillman’s victory, Narciso Gonzales decided the News and Courier needed 
more help in the battle against the reformers. He and one of his brothers, Ambrose, raised 
$30,000 to launch a new daily in Columbia. On February 18, 1891, The State rolled off 
the press and joined the battle against what the paper described as “Tillmanism.” For the 
next thirteen years, N.G. hammered away at Tillman’s leadership. During that time, 
Tillman did little to carry out his proposed economic reforms on behalf of the state’s 
small farmers, but he did oversee the rise of Jim Crow laws enforcing racial segregation 
and limiting the African American vote.194 Of more concern to The State, Tillman 
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seemed to excuse the violence of white mobs that lynched blacks in South Carolina.195 
Affiliated with Bourbon conservatism, The State supported white supremacy, but 
despised “lawlessness” and disliked the nasty race baiting of the Tillman and Blease 
campaigns. For Bourbon conservatives, it was clear that blacks were inferior and thus it 
was unnecessary and uncivilized to treat them as a serious threat to white rule. It was this 
paternalistic view of African Americans in the South would eventually come to dominate 
white newspaper opinion in the state during the first half of the twentieth century. 
Narciso Gonzales’ long struggle with “Tillmanism” came to a violent end in 
January 1903. The previous year, N.G. had delivered a daily barrage of attacks on 
Tillman’s nephew James, who was running for governor that year. The State described 
Jim Tillman as a liar and a gambler who was “the worst and most indefensible man who 
ever sought the Democratic nomination.” Jim Tillman finished fourth in the Democratic 
primary. Five months later, on January 15, 1903, Gonzales left his office one evening and 
walked down Main Street, where he crossed paths with Jim Tillman, Cole Blease and two 
other men. Tillman pulled out a handgun, fired a shot into Gonzales, and calmly turned 
himself in to nearby police officer. The injured editor struggled to return to his office, 
where he dictated an account of the shooting. Four days later, he died in a Columbia 
hospital. Six months after that, a jury in nearby Lexington County acquitted Jim Tillman 
on murder charges on grounds of self-defense. Some jury members would call the 
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shooting justifiable revenge, given the nature of the newspaper’s accusations against 
Tillman.196 
The State would survive and prosper after its editor’s death, eventually surpassing 
the News and Courier as South Carolina’s largest newspaper. By the 1940s, the two 
newspapers – along with the Greenville News in the northern Upstate region – were the 
dominant news media voices in the state, and all three espoused the distinctly 
conservative and paternalistic worldview that could be traced back to the Bourbons. 
Tillman and Blease had once commanded newspapers that did battle with conservative 
editors at The State and the News and Courier.197 Gonzales had derided these political 
organs as “organettes” that were not built to last, and he was right.198 By the beginning of 
the Depression, economic woes had weeded out many weaker papers across the state. 
Fewer newspapers meant fewer editorial voices, and by the 1940s, the overwhelming 
majority of those that remained carried on the conservative tradition established by 
Dawson, Gonzales, and the Bourbon conservatives late in the nineteenth century.  
The strongest of these editorial voices belonged to William Watts Ball, the cranky 
editor of the Charleston News and Courier. In his 70s and nearing the end of a brilliant 
career, Ball had served as an editor at all three of the state’s largest newspapers. He had 
helped restore The State’s reputation after Gonzalez’ assassination. As editor from 1913 
to 1923, Ball had taken the lead in the fight against Blease, who had been elected 
governor in 1910 and 1912 and had his eye on the US Senate. He detested the way Blease 
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stoked class conflict by pushing while mill workers to challenge mill owners over wages 
and work conditions. His daily attacks have been credited with helping defeat Blease’s 
Senate bid in 1916.199  
In 1923, Ball left The State to become dean of the new journalism school at the 
University of South Carolina. But the career change did not stick. After four years in 
academia, Ball longed to return to daily journalism and get back into the political fray. “I 
long for a ‘scrap,’” he wrote to a friend. “I’m not content without a fight on my hands.” 
He got his chance when an old colleague offered him the editorship of the News and 
Courier.200 It was a good fit from the start. Ball had worked in Charleston before as editor 
of the competing Evening Post, and he was eager to return. He particularly liked the 
city’s rich aristocratic heritage. It is “one of the few communities retaining civilization,” 
Ball said. 201 His biographer, John D. Stark, described Ball’s return to Charleston as an 
“inevitable natural alliance” that had at last been consumated.202 
An acerbic writer, Ball was perhaps even more of a Bourbon conservative than 
Dawson or Gonzales ever had been. Born in Laurens, South Carolina, in 1868, Ball grew 
up watching his father battle the forces of Reconstruction following the Civil War. With 
the protection of federal troops, black residents used their newly acquired right to vote 
and turned out the white aristocrats like his father who had run all political affairs in 
Laurens County. As a young boy, Ball cheered Hampton’s so-called “red shirt” campaign 
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of 1876.203 Those childhood experiences helped forge a life-long commitment to white 
supremacy and states’ rights. As a true Bourbon conservative, however, Ball’s political 
views were shaped by two other deeply held convictions: his belief in the wisdom of the 
aristocracy and his deep distrust of democracy. He liked to say that he “was a Democrat, 
but not a democrat” – he supported the party, but opposed universal suffrage.204  
Ball embraced this brand of conservatism as a young boy and remained faithful to 
it throughout his long career. For him, race was less important than class. He railed 
against the populist politics of Tillman and Blease who rallied poor, working-class white 
voters to win elections in South Carolina. He deplored their appeal for government aid, 
which he equated with moral weakness. Ball championed individualism, self-reliance, 
and personal resourcefulness; he believed the worthy would find their way to the top. His 
1932 book, The State That Forgot: South Carolina’s Surrender to Democracy, was a 
paean to the aristocratic rule of the Old South, when educated landowners ran society and 
the poor – and black – seemed to know their “place.”205  
Ball’s virulent anti-government views gained national attention in the 1930s when 
he challenged Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal policies. They would lead to a “collectivist 
state” and “mob” rule.  And the “mob disposition,” he wrote, “is now as always to fill 
guts with food and drink (and) avoid exertion and responsibility.” A life-long Democrat 
who despised the Republican Party of Lincoln and Reconstruction, Ball nonetheless 
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declared after Roosevelt’s 1936 re-election, when Democrats actively sought black voters 
in the North, “I have no party.”206 He dreamed of a Southern revolt, but it would be 
another dozen years before his rebellion arrived. 
Ball’s arrival at the News and Courier came in the nick of time. The national 
prosperity of the Roaring 20s had not reached South Carolina, and the newspaper had 
suffered a steep economic decline.207 In 1925, editor Frank Lathan had won a Pulitzer 
Prize for his editorial decrying the South’s lack of influence on national politics.208 But 
by 1927 the “Old Lady of Broad Street” had slipped dramatically.  Once the state’s 
second-largest paper, the News and Courier now trailed even its upstart local competitor, 
the Evening Post, in daily circulation. By the 1940s, however, Ball’s provocative editorial 
voice had helped to revive the paper and support its motto as “South Carolina’s most 
outspoken newspaper.” His unsigned opinion pieces, often biting, acerbic and sarcastic, 
ran daily on the editorial page and occasionally on the front page. They were influential – 
“read, marked, learned and inwardly digested,” as one newspaper reported.209 Politicians 
scrambled to curry his favor.210  
Ball’s former newspaper, The State, had promoted long-time newsroom employee 
Samuel L. Latimer to the top editor’s job in late 1941 after the sudden death of McDavid 
Horton.  Latimer maintained the paper’s conservative editorial line, but without the 
passion or the bite that Ball delivered. An editorial in The State during the 1940s often 
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read like a bland summation of the facts rather than a full-throated expression of a deeply 
held point of view. For Ball, boring the readers was a cardinal sin, and he couldn’t help 
tweaking his old employer at times. Without mentioning The State by name, Ball said if 
“opinions broke loose” on a certain capital city editorial page in South Carolina, “they 
would cause more sensation among readers than would a story of a man biting a dog.”211 
 Perhaps Latimer’s prose was designed to remain understated and non-
controversial. The State’s economic fortunes had benefited from the growth of the capital 
city, and The State Company had become highly profitable. After purchasing its 
afternoon competitor, The Columbia Record, The State Company gained a monopoly in 
the daily newspaper business in the capital city and began to look like the prosperous 
chains that would grow to dominate the industry in post-World War II years. Though not 
as conservative as The State, and certainly not as Bourbon as Ball’s News and Courier, 
the Record, under editor George Buchanan, was nonetheless another predictably 
conservative editorial voice.  
In 1947, a new and slightly different editorial voice began to challenge the 
conservative editorial pages in the state. In Florence, about 130 miles northwest of 
Charleston, James A. Rogers took over as editor of the Morning News in the summer of 
1947. A tobacco market town in the heart of South Carolina’s rural Pee Dee region, 
Florence had benefitted from the nation’s post-war prosperity. Its population had reached 
16,000 – a 40% increase since the start of the decade.212 In his introductory editorial, 
published June 3, 1947, Rogers noted the growth of the Pee Dee in the post-war years and 
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promised his Morning News would be “in the vanguard of this progress.”213 Rogers also 
used that first editorial to establish his political point of view – and to issue a gentle 
warning to his readers. He aimed “to publish a liberal, progressive newspaper” that 
supported “forward strides throughout the Pee Dee,” he wrote. In doing so, “…we shall 
not hesitate to voice opinions which may be contrary to those held by some or even many 
of our readers. That is the traditional spirit of the press, and to that tradition this 
editorship shall scrupulously cling.”214 
In his opening editorial, Rogers revealed the two forces that would shape his 
political views during the turbulent years ahead: a deep connection to his community – 
Florence and the surrounding farmlands – and a commitment to building a progressive 
and just society. Born in 1905 in the tiny town of Blenheim, South Carolina, the son of a 
Baptist minister, Rogers fell in love with the rural Pee Dee. Fascinated by farm life, he 
earned the nickname the “agricultural evangelist” during his years as editor. “Rogers was 
as much a product of the rural South, particularly the Pee Dee, as cotton,” journalist and 
academic Don Stewart wrote in his obituary.215 Like his father, Rogers attended seminary 
and served as a “country preacher” at churches across the Pee Dee. He wrote a weekly 
inspirational column, “Hearts Aglow,” for the Morning News before joining the paper full 
time. In his first editorial, the new editor summed up his worldview with a quote from 
John W. Davis, the Democratic Party’s failed presidential nominee of 1924: “He deserves 
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to be called progressive who cannot see a wrong persist without an effort to redress it, or 
a right denied without an effort to protect it.”216  
Where Ball and the conservative editors tended to look back in anger, Rogers 
looked ahead with cautious optimism. He had grown up in a different South than Ball. 
Reconstruction had ended more than two decades before his birth. The new century 
ushered in the Progressive movement in American politics, which reached its peak with 
the election of Woodrow Wilson in 1912. The movement spawned a growing band of 
southern liberals – many of them newspaper editors – who emerged as a significant 
minority voice in the region pressing for economic, educational, and social reforms. They 
included George Fort Milton of the Chattanooga News; Harry Ashmore, a South 
Carolinian who won a Pulitzer Prize as editor of the Arkansas Gazette; Mark Etheridge of 
The Macon Telegraph and later The Courier-Journal of Louisville; Viginius Dabney of 
the Richmond Times Dispatch; and, most prominently, Ralph McGill of The Atlanta 
Constitution and Hodding Carter, Jr. of Greenville, Mississippi’s Delta Democrat-Times. 
These southern liberals embraced industrial development, more spending on education, 
and improved opportunities for African Americans. They envisioned a prosperous South 
with good government services and a diversified economy that provided a better life for 
whites and blacks.217  
Rogers counted himself proudly in this southern liberal tradition. He emphasized 
economic progress and improved education, and he frequently quoted McGill to support 
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his editorial point of view.218 As a southern liberal, however, it should be no surprise that 
Rogers’ introductory editorial failed to mention race. By 1947, race had become what one 
historian called “the underbelly of Southern liberalism.”219 Like their northern 
counterparts, Southern liberals pressed for reforms on a myriad of issues in the first half 
of the twentieth Century, but their liberalism stopped short on the question of racial 
integration. At that time, southern liberals like McGill believed in the necessity of social 
segregation; they wanted to reform Jim Crow laws, not abandon them. They fought on 
behalf of blacks in search of better housing, educational facilities, and job prospects. 
They argued white society should at least attempt to deliver on its promise of “separate 
but equal.” But integration, they said, would lead to “violence and bloodshed” – 
especially if forced on the South by federal intervention.220 
In the 1920s and 30s, black leaders embraced southern liberals as their allies. By 
the 40s, as African Americans grew more assertive politically, the relationship had 
changed. This was especially true in South Carolina, where McCray and his NAACP 
colleagues were committed to the fight for full citizenship and equality.221 This new 
aggressiveness angered and confused liberals across the South. Mark Etheridge criticized 
black leaders “who demand ‘all or nothing’” and “play into the hands of white 
demagogues.” No power in the world, he warned, “could now force the Southern white 
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people to the abandonment of social segregation.”222 Southern liberals wanted to go slow 
on race. But events would not cooperate. 
 The first undeniable evidence that African Americans had embraced protest 
politics in South Carolina came in the fall of 1946, when 861 black and white delegates 
from around the country gathered in Columbia to plan their ongoing campaign for 
African American rights. Organized by the Southern Negro Youth Conference, a branch 
of the National Negro Conference, the delegates met in Township Auditorium, the capitol 
city’s largest public meeting hall and performance space. Posters of black 
Reconstruction-era leaders lined the auditorium’s walls as the delegates heard from such 
prominent African Americans figures as Paul Robeson and W.E.B Du Bois. In his fiery 
keynote speech, Du Bois told his young audience to remain in the South and fight for 
their democratic rights. “Behold the beautiful land,” he said of the South. It would be an 
act of cowardice to surrender it to the “thugs and lynchers … who choke its soul and steal 
its resources.” To rally support and win allies, Du Bois said, the movement needed 
“blatant, pitiless publicity” of white acts of injustice and brutality.223 Since Du Bois 
launched The Crisis in 1910, the black press had been working to draw attention to white 
atrocities in the Jim Crow South. McCray’s newspaper had joined that effort in South 
Carolina. The Lighthouse and Informer used its page to criticize white oppression to rally 
local support, but McCray also shared his coverage with the Chicago Defender, the 
Pittsburgh Courier, and the Baltimore Afro-American in an effort to influence opinion in 
the larter, national civil sphere as well.  
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The city of Columbia had allowed the SNYC to rent Township Auditorium for its 
convention without complaint, and the white press paid no attention during the first two 
days of the gathering. The SNYC passed resolutions supporting federal anti-poll tax and 
anti-lynching laws, called for the creation of a permanent Federal Employment Practices 
Commission, and praised the AFL and CIO, saying their labor organizing drives had 
made “distinct contributions to the South.” Yet when the group criticized US Secretary of 
State James F. Byrnes, a South Carolina native, the white newspapers took notice. Byrnes 
had just returned from peace talks in Paris where he had criticized Soviet efforts to 
prevent free elections in Bulgaria and other eastern European nations. Du Bois and the 
SNYC pointed out the hypocrisy of Byrnes claiming to protect democracy abroad while 
helping deny it to African Americans at home.  
When Gov. Ransome J. Williams denounced the SNYC attacks on Byrnes, the 
Columbia Record ran his comments on the front page. Williams called it regrettable that 
“Communistic elements came boldly and brazenly” into South Carolina’s capital city to 
undermine the secretary of state. By linking the event to communism, Williams had 
resumed the “red scare” tactics that southern whites had used to taint supporters of civil 
rights since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. In an editorial, however, the Record 
downplayed the communist connection. Yet its arguments exemplified the white press’s 
dismissive and paternalistic approach to black activism at the time. The paper agreed that 
the SNYC’s resolutions were “following closely the Communistic line,” but it blamed 
that on a few outside agitators and said most participants were not communists “or fellow 
travelers.” The newspaper suggested the SNYC had underestimated the white community 
in Columbia and its general support for African Americans. It noted that Du Bois had 
	  114	  
also criticized Wade Hampton, even though “Hampton believed the Negro in South 
Carolina should be accorded the ballot.” The Record said the city granted the SNYC the 
right to use the auditorium because it believed “in free speech enough to allow the 
congress to attack South Carolina and South Carolinians without striking back.” The 
Record concluded by saying some SNYC leaders were disappointed that white South 
Carolinians had not given the group a propaganda victory by marching into the arena 
“hooded and robed” to break up the gathering.224  
For black leaders in South Carolina, the SNYC meeting was significant, both as a 
public display of a new and seemingly fearless black assertiveness in the state, but also as 
a flashpoint in an internal debate over future strategy. McCray was skeptical of the 
SNYC, which had grown out of the Popular Front movement of the New Deal era and 
strived to build a biracial coalition of blacks and working-class whites in the South. As 
such, the SNYC did have ties to both socialist labor organizations and the Communist 
Party. To McCray, the SNYC appeared vulnerable to attacks just like the one the 
governor had made. His chief allies, Modjeska Simkins and Osceola McKaine, embraced 
coalition building with labor and leftist groups and believed the civil rights movement 
should stand up to white leaders who employed red scare arguments. McCray had always 
said the state movement should remain in local hands, although critics claimed he was 
merely protecting his own leadership position. The debate over the SNYC and civil rights 
strategy opened a rift between McCray and his allies that would never entirely heal. As 
US-Soviet relations worsened and Cold War rhetoric grew dominant, white southerners 
would increase efforts to tie civil rights to a Communist plot to destabilize American 
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democracy. By 1949, the SYNC would be out of business, its leaders marginalized and 
facing legal harassment from the justice department and the House Un-American 
Activities Committee.225  
Though angered by criticism of Byrnes, the white press depicted the comments as 
the work of  “troublemakers” and “agitators” like Du Bois. Those could be controlled, 
they reasoned. Yet when a Democratic president decided to support civil rights 
legislation, white editorialists were forced on the defensive. They began to take black 
activism seriously, and their rhetoric grew harsher.   
Harry Truman assumed the presidency when Roosevelt died in 1945, and he was 
not expected to win a full term on his own in the election of 1948. A resurgent 
Republican Party had retaken Congress in a landslide in 1946 – in part due to increased 
black support in the North226 -- and the GOP appeared ready to move back into the White 
House after a 16-year absence. Truman also faced a rebellion on his left. Henry Wallace, 
the man he had displaced as FDR’s vice presidential running mate in 1944, planned to 
launch a liberal third-party candidacy for the presidency. Against this backdrop, a young 
Truman aide named Clark Clifford laid out the president’s political strategy in a memo  
titled “The Politics of 1948,”227 To win, Clifford wrote, Truman must appeal to the 
emerging urban black vote in four prominent states – California, New York, Illinois, and 
Ohio. To attract those voters, Clifford advised the president to support a wide-ranging 
package of civil rights legislation. Clifford knew the plan would enrage Southern 
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Democrats, but he thought the “solid South” would stick with the party in the end. “As 
always, the South can be considered safely Democratic, and in forming national policy 
can be safely ignored,” Clifford wrote.228 
White southerners were already on edge. They had been rattled by two 
developments in 1947. In October, the President’s Commission on Civil Rights released a 
report, “To Secure These Rights,” that called for an end to discrimination in employment 
and voting across the South. Truman created the commission partly in response to the 
string of violent acts against returning black servicemen in the South. One of the worst 
occurred in Batesburg, South Carolina. A white bus driver, with the help two police 
officers, beat a black soldier named Isaac Woodard after a dispute on the bus. Woodard 
was blinded by the attack. Woodard’s story – as well a moving picture of the blinded 
soldier – received widespread attention in the northern press, and northern liberals 
stepped up their pressure on Truman to take action.229 After the commission released its 
report, southern Democrats expressed alarm and warned Truman not to embrace the 
report’s recommendations.230 
 In South Carolina, meantime, white Democrats were more concerned about a 
sharply worded ruling delivered by one of their own. In July, US District Judge J. Waites 
Waring, a member of one of Charleston’s aristocratic families, had sided with the 
NAACP and rejected the state Democratic Party’s whites-only primary system.231 Like 
the rest of the Deep South, South Carolina was so overwhelmingly Democratic that it was 
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virtually a one-party state; victory in the party’s primary assured a candidate of winning 
the office. The state party argued it was a private association and not part of the state’s 
“statutory process of election” – thus blacks had no “constitutional right to vote in such 
primary.” The NAACP’s young lawyer, Thurgood Marshall, helped convince Waring 
otherwise. “It is time for South Carolina to rejoin the Union,” the judge wrote in his 
decision. “Racial discrimination cannot exist in the machinery that selects offices and 
lawmakers.”232  
The State offered no editorial opinion on Waring’s landmark ruling, saying it 
would rather wait until all appeals were concluded. The Columbia Record said Waring’s 
ruling “was not surprising,” given the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling knocking down the 
all-white primary in Smith v. Allwright, but it encouraged state lawmakers to draft new 
measures to “control how the ballot is exercised here.”233 
The ruling angered Ball, and he offered a more forceful response. Ball proposed 
that white Democrats “abandon completely the name of the Democratic Party” and create 
“an exclusive white man’s political club under a new title.”234 Ball turned the judge’s 
ruling into another exhibit in his case for a white southern revolt.  
For the liberal Rogers, just one month on the job, Waring’s order offered an early 
opportunity to deliver on the promise he made in that first editorial: he challenged his 
community. “The Florence Morning News does not share the alarm felt by many South 
Carolinians at this new development,” he wrote on July 13, 1947.  “On the contrary, we 
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believe the federal decision was a sober, thoughtful approach to a vexing problem and the 
opinion handed down was a fair statement of facts, of democracy and of morals.” His 
conclusion was even stronger: 
 
“… The Florence Morning News believes South Carolina has stayed out of the 
union long enough; that the time has come to make realistic decisions, to cease nurturing 
political prejudices born out of the distant past, to be able to practice in our own backyard 
the same principles of justice and democracy we claim are necessities in other parts of the 
world.”235 
 
Rogers was not far outside the mainstream of South Carolina’s white press. A 
handful of editors accepted the inevitability of Waring’s ruling,236 but Rogers offered the 
strongest endorsement, and he knew his editorial ruined a good many breakfasts across 
the Pee Dee region that Sunday morning.237 To ease some of those fears, Rogers 
acknowledged the paper’s position was “not a popular one,” and he reassured readers that 
he believed support for black voting rights would not significantly weaken white political 
rule. “There is no reason to suppose that the average Negro will be more interested in 
politics than the average white person,” he wrote, concluding that blacks would be 
unlikely to vote in “blocs” to overpower whites politically.238 With his first major 
editorial on race, Rogers displayed the pattern he would follow throughout the difficult 
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year head: He sought to lead his community to higher ground, but without marching too 
far ahead of it. 
Truman dropped his civil rights bombshell on February 2, 1948. The president 
proposed legislation that would abolish the poll tax239, end discrimination in interstate 
transportation, make lynching a federal crime,240 and create a permanent Federal 
Employment Practices Commission. The white South reacted virulently. In Jackson, 
Mississippi, The Clarion Ledger set the tone by denouncing the “cold-blooded and 
treacherous offer by the national leaders to swap destruction of the South for the votes … 
of Negroes who may hold the balance of power in a few states.”241 
Truman’s push for civil rights would eventually lead to a southern revolt at the 
Democratic Convention in July. Surprisingly, one of the key players in the drama turned 
out to be South Carolina’s young governor, J. Strom Thurmond. Elected in 1946, 
Thurmond had campaigned as a New Deal progressive eager to bring economic 
development to South Carolina. He had avoided blatant appeals to racism and had even 
argued in favor of more spending on higher education for blacks in the state.242 Yet over 
the next six months, Thurmond would step into a leadership role in the fight for states’ 
rights and white supremacy in the South. In July of 1948, he would bolt from the 
Democratic Party and run for president on the States’ Rights Party ticket. To Ball, 
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Thurmond would become a hero, a defender “of the South against its liberal enemies.”243 
To Rogers, the young governor was a great disappointment. His tone grew bitter as he 
watched Thurmond evolve from New Deal progressive to become one of the “hot heads” 
and “headline hunters” willing to play on racial fears in search of votes.244  
The state Democratic Party’s response to Judge Waring’s ruling angered Rogers 
as well. With primaries approaching in August, the party faced the prospect of blacks 
voting in large numbers in Democratic primaries for the first time since Reconstruction. 
Stunned by the judge’s ruling and by Truman’s proposals, the state party convened in 
Columbia in May 1948 and mapped out its response. With Thurmond taking command, 
the convention confronted Truman first. The party ordered its national convention 
delegates to support Thurmond as a favorite son candidate and to avoid voting for 
Truman or any other candidate who supported the civil rights program. To combat Judge 
Waring’s ruling and preserve white primaries, the party adopted a controversial oath of 
allegiance. To vote in a primary, Democrats would be required to pledge their support for 
segregation, their commitment to “the principles of states’ rights,” and their opposition to 
the proposed Fair Employment Practices Committee. Rogers mocked the oath as 
“contrary to every principle of democracy,” and he ridiculed the party’s decision to 
debate the oath behind closed doors in executive session. “Does it mean they are little 
men without the courage to grapple intelligently with a real problem?” he asked.245   
Ball encouraged the party’s efforts to fight the judge’s ruling. And he suggested a 
strategy that fit nicely with his belief in aristocratic rule. Abandon the primaries, he said, 
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and replace them with the nominating convention. Allow Democratic Party leaders to 
select the party’s candidates.  “Why have primaries?” Ball wrote. “No one, white or 
colored, appears capable of the conception that primaries are not sacred and 
indispensable devices for the nomination of public offices.” Under the convention 
system, white leaders would retain control over the party. They could even let in a few 
blacks, but only the right kind. “The negroes cooperating with white leaders in 
conventions would not be tools of the National Society for the Advancement of the 
Colored People,” he wrote. 
Ball clearly meant the NAACP, which he referred to often in his editorials, but 
rarely by its correct title.246 He claimed the organization and its leader, Walter White, 
would seize political power through “bloc voting.” Ball said the The News and Courier is 
“not condemning them” for voting as a group because, in his view, “their first, their 
absorbing aim is not to elect Democrats or Republicans. It is to gain power for 
negroes.”247 Perhaps Ball was “not condemning them,” but he certainly believes whites 
should be afraid of potential black political power. White politicians would be forced to 
court the black vote, he argued -- wasn’t that what Truman was doing this year? 
To accommodate the new medium of television, both national parties held their 
conventions in Philadelphia in 1948.248 The Republicans gathered in a festive mood in 
late June and nominated a strong presidential ticket: New York Gov. Thomas Dewey, 
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seeking to avenge his loss to Roosevelt four years earlier, and California Gov. Earl 
Warren.249 The fractured Democrats arrived in the city two weeks later with a sense of 
doom in the air. Wallace had already launched his third party on the left. Truman’s civil 
rights push had angered the conservative southerners.  And northern liberals led by a 
young mayor named Hubert H. Humphrey figured to exacerbate the rift by pushing for an 
even stronger civil rights plank in the party platform. The question before white southern 
Democrats was stark: should they desert the party of their fathers and grandfathers – or 
should they stay and fight from within? 
Ball knew what he wanted – and he argued his case forcefully throughout the 
month. Southern Democrats had been faithful to the Democratic Party “because it did not 
appeal to the negro voters,” he wrote on July 2. “The negro question was the basic, 
overwhelming cause … that held the Southern states in the national Democratic Party. 
That cause no longer exists. It has disappeared. … What is here said is fact: The sole 
reason that created and maintained the South solid is gone.”250  
Ball laced his editorials with anti-government rhetoric, his disdain for what he 
called “the office holding industry.” He claimed the state’s incumbent senators, Olin 
Johnston and Burnett Maybank, secretly supported the national Democratic Party because 
“the boys can more easily hold their jobs by keeping the machine well greased.” He often 
claimed the Democrats were no different than the Republicans on civil rights, and that 
neither party “is interested in the Southern white man. He is the forgotten man of 1948.”  
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Rogers also opposed Truman’s civil rights package. Like McGill and other 
southern liberals, Rogers argued against federal coercion, believing it would set back race 
relations in the region. He also thought the issue would drive white southerners to break 
with the national Democrats. “While political party lines are deep-seated in the South, it 
is, nevertheless, true that racial lines are more deeply rooted,” the Morning News said 
shortly after Truman’s February speech. But Rogers delivered a mixed message on party 
loyalty. The man who hired him, publisher John G. O’Dowd, was a committed 
Democratic Party member in 1948.251 And as the July convention drew closer, Rogers 
urged state Democrats to stay in the party. But he did so without much conviction. And 
while he never encouraged readers to vote for Dewey, he joined other southern liberals 
like McGill in repeatedly bemoaning the lack of a two-party system in the South. “The 
need for two strong political parties in South Carolina was never so apparent as it is 
now,” he wrote on July 16.252 The same day he published an editorial from The Savannah 
Morning News, “as Southern a newspaper as the South produces,” that actually endorsed 
the GOP ticket: “The challenge to Southerners this year is crystal clear. It is to put behind 
them the insufferable fetish that they must vote the Democratic ticket because they have 
always done so, and because their fathers and grandfathers voted that way.”253 
As the national convention got under way, Thurmond’s role in the southern 
rebellion increased. The South’s leading politicians – senators like Richard Russell of 
Georgia and Harry Byrd of Virginia – had established seniority in Congress that could be 
jeopardized if they walked away from the party. Some also feared a rabid defense of 
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racial segregation could deter investment and stall economic development in the South. 
They opposed Truman’s civil rights push, but treaded more cautiously. That opened the 
door for second-tier politicians like Thurmond, and the governor rushed through it. The 
first night of the convention, he took the lead in urging a caucus of southern delegations 
to abandon the president. “We have been betrayed,” he declared, “and the guilty should 
not go unpunished.”254 That stirred Rogers to attack: “Frankly, we are becoming tired of 
little men like Thurmond and {Sen. Olin} Johnston beating their drums to rabble-rouse 
Southern sentiment… Ostensibly, their fight is against Truman. But in reality, it is all too 
apparent that their fight is for Thurmond and Johnston.”255 Thurmond was expected to 
challenge Johnston in the 1950 Senate race, and Rogers believed both men pandered on 
the race issue to prepare for the political fight ahead. “There is one hope for South 
Carolina,” he wrote. “That hope is this: that the mounting political battle between 
Johnston and Thurmond will result in each killing the other off politically.”256 
Rogers wrote forcefully about what he opposed that summer. But what did he 
support, what path forward did he propose? There, he was less specific, more cautious. 
He condemned the state Democratic Party for ignoring the courts. But he rarely returned 
to the ethical and moral argument he had used the previous July to support Judge 
Waring’s order striking down whites-only primaries. Now he took a more pragmatic 
approach. He warned of the dangers of violating federal court orders and looked for ways 
to reach out to those who feared black political power. “It now appears certain that 
Negroes will be permitted to vote in the August primary,” Rogers wrote July 10. “This 
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newspaper has always feared the problem created by an antagonistic attitude toward the 
court’s decision.” But the state party still had time to correct the problem and “eliminate 
the causes of friction on the racial issue.” His solution: create intelligence and educational 
qualifications for South Carolina voters and apply them equally to both races. “We have 
frankly admitted, and do so again, that there are Negroes, many of them, who aren’t 
mentally or emotionally prepared to exercise the ballot intelligently. By the same token, 
we have argued that there are whites who are equally unqualified,” he wrote.257 Again, 
Rogers leads his community by pressing for black suffrage, but stops short of the more 
radical idea of universal suffrage. Like other Southern liberals at the time, he proposes 
gradual change with an eye on attracting more whites to his point of view. Critics would 
mock this approach as  “gradualism” and “Jim Crow liberalism.”258 But Rogers appeared 
less concerned about ideology than the well being of his community. The editor believed 
he had pushed hard enough. 
Rogers employed the same strategy in the debate over which state party 
delegation should be seated at the national convention. The state had three slates of 
delegates going to Philadelphia: the regular white Democrats led by Thurmond; the black 
Progressive Democrats, led by McCray; and a small group known as the True Democrats, 
which included several liberal whites angered by the proposed loyalty oath who joined 
with a handful of blacks to create a third slate. The Progressive Democrats had been 
battling the white Democratic Party since the early 1940s, when McCray launched the 
party in concert with the NAACP. In 1944, the Progressive Democrats sent their first 
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delegation to the national convention in Chicago to challenge the party’s voting rules. 
That fall, McCray’s colleague, Osceola McKaine, ran an aggressive Senate campaign that 
mobilized African American political engagement across the state. It was the Progressive 
Democrats who worked hand-in-hand with Thurgood Marshall and the national NAACP 
on the legal battle that led to Judge Waring’s 1947 ruling overturning the whites-only 
primary.259 Clearly, McCray’s party represented the overwhelming majority of African 
Americans in South Carolina; they had worked assiduously within the legal and political 
systems to earn the right to join the political process. Yet Rogers ignored McCray’s party. 
He argued “logic suggests” the True Democrats should be seated because they are the 
only ones “representing bi-racial support of Federal Court decisions.” 260 It is true that 
McCray’s party started as the South Carolina Colored Democratic Party and initially 
accepted black members only. But McCray and others claimed that was a necessity “to 
protect against exploitation and persecution” in early 1940s South Carolina. By April 
1944, the party had changed its name and exclusionary policy, and by 1948 the 
Progressive Democrats clearly embraced bi-racial politics.261 With his editorial, Rogers 
sidestepped the moral and legal issues at the heart of the debate and appeared to search 
for a “moderate” position that allowed him to chastise the regular Democrats but avoid 
supporting the activist black organization. Again, he challenged his readers, but stopped 
short of direct confrontation. 
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Ball, meanwhile, made it clear where he stood. He called McCray’s Progressive 
Democrats “a creature of the National Society for the Advancement of Colored People, a 
Northern organization of negroes. It is not a movement of South Carolina negroes.”262 He 
called for the white Democratic Party to reconvene and open its rolls to “every living 
organism … that could make a letter X,” and then “abandon the party to the Office 
Holding Industry and the Colored People.”263 White South Carolinians should form their 
own private association and select general election candidates at a nominating 
convention. White people can “take over the reins of white man’s government. They can 
give the state a fresh new leadership,” he wrote, challenging this “new leadership” to 
confront federal tyranny. “How far will the federal courts go in their decisions? To what 
extent would white people submit to compulsion upon them exerted by federal authority 
to wipe out distinctions, to outlaw separation between and of the white and Negro races 
in South Carolina.”264 
In Philadelphia, the convention moved toward its dramatic conclusion. On the 
final day, Humphrey’s strengthened civil rights plank passed narrowly 651 ½ to 582 ½, 
sending the hall into pandemonium. With Birmingham’s Commissioner of Public Safety, 
Eugene “Bull” Connor, leading the way, members of the Alabama delegation shouted for 
recognition to announce their departure in protest. One reporter described Connor’s 
roaring voice as sounding like “the devil’s own loudspeaker.”265 But convention 
chairman Sam Rayburn ignored their pleas and quickly adjourned the session. When the 
delegates reconvened that evening, Alabama’s chairperson, Handy Ellis, told the 
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assembly that his delegation “could not participate” in a convention that could adopt such 
a strong civil rights plank. “Without hatred and without anger and without fear, but with 
disillusionment and disappointment … we bid you good bye.” The sweltering convention 
hall once again erupted with hoots and jeers as a dozen of Alabama’s delegates trudged 
down the center aisle and out of the building266, followed by the entire Mississippi 
delegation.267  
Thurmond and the South Carolina delegates stayed in the hall and watched as 
Truman won the party’s presidential nomination on the first ballot. The next day, July 16, 
Judge Waring issued another blistering order. He rejected the state party’s final appeal 
and demanded the party open its enrollment books to blacks immediately. One day later, 
July 17, a group of rebellious Southern Democrats led by Gov. Fielding Wright of 
Mississippi and former Gov. Frank Dixon of Alabama convened in Birmingham. 
Initially, Thurmond had said he would not attend, a decision Rogers grudgingly 
applauded – “Let Governor Thurmond try now as hard to be a good governor as he has 
tried to plummet himself into the national spotlight.”268 
The editor would quickly be disappointed. Thurmond changed his mind and on 
the morning of the rebel convention he rearranged his schedule to include a visit to 
Birmingham. By that evening, he had accepted the presidential nomination of the States’ 
Rights Democratic Party – later nicknamed the Dixiecrats by a Charlotte News headline 
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writer.269 Decades later, Thurmond would claim he cared more about the constitutional 
question of states’ rights than about race. But his acceptance speech suggested otherwise: 
“I want to tell you that the progress of the Negro race has not been due to these so-called 
emancipators but to the kindness of the good Southern people … I want to tell you that 
there’s not enough troops in the army to force the Southern people to break down 
segregation and admit the Negro race into our theaters, into our swimming pools, into our 
homes and into our churches.”270 
Rogers dismissed the States’ Rights convention, calling it “the Birmingham 
circus” and declaring its leaders “men of small sectional stature whose political ambitions 
far exceed either their judgment or their ability.”271 The turn of events thrilled Ball, 
however. They gave him the “rebellion” that he so dearly wanted. He celebrated with a 
front-page editorial: “Thurmond for President.” The Democrats and Republicans “are 
making a play for negro votes, the former in the belief they have the white Southerners in 
the bag and the latter in the knowledge that they have no chance to carry the South 
anyway,” Ball said. “The solid South now can demonstrate that it is not in the bag, that it 
has a mind and a will of its own, and that it offers a tempting bloc of electoral votes for a 
candidate who will make an honest bid for them.” Ball contended the Dixiecrats could 
carry all eleven states of the old Confederacy and perhaps deny victory to either Truman 
or Dewey, forcing the election into the House of Representatives. “In the electoral 
college lies the only chance to save the South for Southerners,” he wrote.272  
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Rogers decried the “hot head” and “self-aggrandizing” politician who acted out of 
anger, and he urged his state to think carefully before embracing the new ticket. “The 
Birmingham convention was called in the heat of wrath over Philadelphia. It was held 
amid an atmosphere of hot tempers and high emotionalism,” Rogers wrote. “For South 
Carolina to swallow hook, line and sinker without following first a calm, deliberate, wait-
and-see policy would be a harum-scarum invitation to political disaster.”273 In the end, he 
suspected the Dixiecrats would carry South Carolina, but without “enthusiasm or 
unanimity.”274 It would be better for the state, however, if the political morass gave birth 
to a competitive Republican Party. Here he echoed his southern liberal counterparts who 
believed fervently in the need for a two-party system in the South: 
“The Florence Morning News is unfettered, untied, unpledged to any person or 
party. Its sole interest is in … encouraging good government by whatever party is in 
power. It has a wholesome faith in the Democratic Party but it would like to see in the 
South a strong Republican Party as well. It believes this would provide a system of 
‘checks and balances’ which would work to more efficient, more progressive 
government.”275 
Once again, Rogers leavened his argument with caution. He supported a strong 
GOP in the South, but failed to take the bold step of actually endorsing that year’s 
Republican ticket. 
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Where Rogers was cautious, Ball was provocative. He chastised the state’s 
“silent” political leaders for failing to support the Dixiecrats more aggressively. “What 
has happened to the upsurge of enthusiasm that should be greeting the nomination of 
Thurmond for president?” he asked. “The governor … has been a consistent, an able and 
eloquent supporter of the Southern cause.”276 At the same time, he delivered a warning to 
white politicians tempted to court black votes in the coming primaries. “Which of the 
candidates … is soliciting the votes of the newly admitted party members of the Negro 
race? … If they welcome the support of the colored Democrats, the white Democrats 
should know it.”277 Ball hammered away at Truman and the national Democrats as the 
enemies of white southerners and warned that federal courts would eventually force 
“amalgamation” of the races in South Carolina. He spoke the language of white 
supremacy, but claimed his cause was far larger than that. “Again The News and Courier 
declares that it is not concerned about ‘white supremacy.’ It is the advocate of supremacy 
of the worthy.”278 Most of all, Ball advocated rebellion – against the Democratic Party, 
the federal courts, the New Deal, democracy itself – against all the forces threatening to 
overwhelm his antiquated vision of South Carolina. “Talk of ‘White Supremacy’ is filling 
the minds of some people,” he wrote. “It doesn’t worry us, but we ARE for Rebel 
Supremacy, and we’ve got it! We’ve got it!” 
The Dixiecrats won South Carolina and three other Deep South states that 
November, but they failed to unify the larger South and they finished a distant third in the 
presidential race. More important, they failed to stop Harry Truman’s surprise re-election. 
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The results seemed to support Clark Clifford’s analysis: black voters in the North 
managed to offset the revolt in the South.279 In that sense, political analysts considered 
Thurmond’s Dixiecrat campaign an abject failure.280 Thurmond disagreed, of course. He 
argued the rebellion had helped the South declare its independence and prove it was “no 
longer in the bag” for the Democrats. 
For William Watts Ball, who had fought so long for his southern revolt, the 
Dixiecrat campaign was a dream come true.  Despite the electoral failure, he depicted it 
as a grand victory for the region. After the results were in, he summed up his feelings 
with three short words: “I am free.”281  Yet the Dixiecrat campaign – especially 
Thurmond’s nomination acceptance speech – had damaged the segregationist cause in the 
national civil sphere. Through the use of such loaded language as “mongrelization,” 
Thurmond’s campaign appealed to crass white supremacy in a way that would have 
pleased Cole Blease and Ben Tillman. The Dixiecrat’s rhetoric mimicked the shrill tribal 
cries of the revived Ku Klux Klan in the South, despite Thurmond’s attempts to 
disassociate his campaign from that group. The tone and substance of his campaign had 
fallen outside the accepted rhetoric of American democracy and had helped encourage 
civil rights supporters in the North, while further isolating the white South. The Dixiecrat 
campaign may have rallied white southerners who were eager to embrace the Lost Cause 
and reunite the Confederacy, but it pained those who were more serious about preserving 
the southern way of life. One of those serious men would emerge from South Carolina in 
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the wake of the Dixiecrat debacle and deliver a new message designed to unite the South, 
but also to ease concerns and win empathetic allies in the North. 
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CHAPTER 5 
JAMES F. BYRNES AND THE WHITE SOUTH’S NEW NARRATIVE 
South Carolina’s most respected political figure sat out the Dixiecrat campaign of 
1948.  James F. Byrnes had resigned as US secretary of state in 1947, and since then had 
been splitting time between a lucrative Washington law practice and his home in the 
rolling foothills near Spartanburg. Though a generation older than Strom Thurmond, 
Byrnes was friendly with the young governor from Edgefield, and they appeared to share 
a similar worldview. In 1946, Thurmond had avoided extreme race baiting in the 
governor’s race and had argued that economic progress eventually would end racial 
tensions in the South. Like Byrnes, Thurmond supported the basic thrust of the early New 
Deal reforms but chafed at what he considered its more liberal extremes later in FDR’s 
presidency. Neither doubted the correctness or morality of segregation. But both men 
detested mob violence and believed the presence of an active Ku Klux Klan in South 
Carolina would scare off business investment and prevent the state from participating in 
the postwar economic expansion.282 
 Yet when Thurmond jumped at the opportunity to lead the Dixiecrat revolt 
against Truman and the national Democratic Party, Byrnes refused to get on board. Ever 
the canny politician, Byrnes knew better than to oppose the Dixiecrat uprising publicly
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in South Carolina. Instead, he went into hiding. He spent the last six months of 1948 
avoiding reporters’ calls and “sincerely wishing to stay out of politics.”283 
Byrnes’ statement was slightly disingenuous. He wanted to stay out of the 1948 
presidential campaign, but he had every intention of getting back into politics. Like the 
Dixiecrats, Byrnes despised Truman’s push for civil rights reform as well as the 
president’s “Fair Deal” economic agenda. But Byrnes had told friends he doubted a third 
party effort had any chance at succeeding in national politics. Further, he suspected the 
States Rights Party – the Dixiecrats – carried too much racist baggage to be an effective 
representative of the new South that he envisioned. With their harsh rhetoric, many of the 
Dixiecrats reeked of the old days, when the Ku Klux Klan roamed the countryside freely 
and demagogues like Cole Blease could rally white voters by threatening to “lead the 
lynch mob” to keep blacks in their place.284 Brynes had been a national political figure 
for three decades. As a senator, he had been Roosevelt’s chief southern ally pushing New 
Deal legislation during the 1930s. Rewarded with an appointment to the US Supreme 
Court, Byrnes resigned in 1942 to take on the role of FDR’s “assistant president” during 
the war. Later, he helped negotiate the peace and usher in the Cold War as Truman’s 
secretary of state. He understood how public opinion had shifted in the North since that 
day in 1919, when he had stood in the well of the House of Representatives to denounce 
W.E.B Du Bois and his NAACP magazine, The Crisis, as an agent of the communist 
threat.285 Winning that argument had been relatively easy, given the paucity of national 
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support for civil rights at that time. Now, with black soldiers returning from the war 
against fascism and the United States presenting itself to the world as a beacon of 
democracy, Byrnes understood the need for white southerners to craft a new message to 
defend the racial status quo. 
In the years after the 1948 Dixiecrat campaign, Byrnes unveiled a new narrative 
in support of white rule in the South, one that replaced the rebel yell of “white 
supremacy” with a more modulated and sophisticated argument in favor of states’ rights 
and the “southern custom” of segregation. Under Byrnes’ leadership, the state of South 
Carolina would concede that it had not lived up to its responsibilities under the “separate 
but equal” doctrine that undergirded segregation in the South. But he said the state would 
rectify this failing. The overwhelming majority of white southerners wanted both races to 
prosper and to live in harmony, Byrnes contended, but they also remained deeply 
committed to segregation. If civil rights agitators and their liberal allies pushed too hard – 
if they challenged southern traditions too aggressively – they would empower the Ku 
Klux Klan and other white militants and trigger a race war in the South. Byrnes proposed 
the creation of a genuinely “separate but equal” social arrangement in the South. By 
raising taxes and spending the money necessary to “equalize” black schools, South 
Carolina would prove its commitment to the constitutional doctrine of “separate but 
equal.” The state would carry out a civil act intended to preserve the nation’s democratic 
heritage, protect individual liberties, and enhance race relations, Byrnes argued. Rather 
than defy the ideals of the founding fathers, such a system would uphold a firmly 
established American tradition and benefit all citizens, black and white. 
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Byrnes had hoped the carrot and the stick offered in his new approach would 
appease northern liberal opinion and put the brakes on local black activism. But he was 
mistaken on both counts. The elder statesman understood how to craft a new message on 
segregation that appealed to white southerners and some of his former colleagues on 
Capitol Hill. But he misjudged the shift in northern public opinion, and he misread the 
scope and tenacity of the black political movement in South Carolina. The state had 
changed since 1919, when Byrnes was a young congressman representing a strip of 
counties along the Savannah River. It had changed since his last statewide campaign, 
when he defeated Cole Blease in 1930 to claim a seat in the US Senate. Black South 
Carolinians had been politically invisible and easily intimidated back then. The state now 
had an engaged and mostly united African American community, with NAACP branches 
operating across the state and coordinating their efforts through the state conference of 
branches. It had a black political organization, the Progressive Democratic Party, which 
was registering and mobilizing black voters. And it had a weekly newspaper that was not 
about to heed the governor’s warning and let up the pressure on the white leadership. 
McCray’s Lighthouse and Informer was the public face of the new, politically 
active African American in South Carolina. McCray used its editorial page to mock and 
ridicule Byrnes’ new approach to white rule in the state. He called the equalization effort 
a frantic effort “undertaken in desperation” to fool Northerners. The state “has never 
done, is not now doing, and will never do justice to the Negro until and unless it is beaten 
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over the head with a federal court blackjack,” McCray wrote, adding, “the Negroes are 
rapidly putting the blackjack into the hands of the federal courts.”286 
Byrnes claimed that Truman and the northern liberals, not the segregationists in 
the South, presented the greatest threat to the American way of life. The growing federal 
government proposed under Truman’s “Fair Deal” policies would eventually overwhelm 
the states and clear the way for socialist and communist influences to destroy democracy. 
Such a system would enslave American citizens of both races. Like Thurmond, Byrnes 
wanted to downplay the issue of race and focus instead on the threat of government 
repression of individual and states’ rights. Unlike the Dixiecrats, however, Byrnes had 
the national stature required to sell this new frame in the North. At least many in the 
white press in the South thought so. The columnist John Temple Graves, a fixture on 
editorial pages across the region, said Byrnes gave the states’ rights message “the liberal 
touch it needs, the national prestige, the countrywide scope, the broader gauge, the 
victory sign.”287 
Byrnes signaled his break from Truman and his return to public life in June of 
1949 in a commencement address at Virginia’s Washington & Lee University. “Byrnes 
Hits Trend to ‘Welfare State,” declared The New York Times in its headline the next day. 
Without mentioning Truman by name, and with no references to racial issues, Byrnes 
declared the nation was “going down the road to statism.” He claimed the president’s 
economic policies would eventually transform American citizens into serfs: “If some of 
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the new programs seriously proposed should be adopted, there is danger that the 
individual – whether farmer, worker, manufacturer, lawyer, or doctor – will soon be an 
economic slave pulling an oar in the galley of the state.”288 Of course, Byrnes had been a 
champion of policies that expanded federal government power during the New Deal and 
in the early years of the war. But FDR had never firmly and unequivocally supported 
black civil rights in the South. Truman was different. With his continued push for civil 
rights legislation, including passage of anti-poll tax and anti-lynch laws, as well as the 
creation of a permanent Federal Employment Protection Commission, Truman had 
become the first US president since Reconstruction to place his administration squarely in 
support of civil rights reform. 
Throughout 1949, Byrnes had been dropping hints to friends and political allies 
that he might come out of retirement and run for governor of South Carolina the next 
year. By the time he addressed the Southern Governors Conference in Biloxi, 
Mississippi, that November, he had made his plans well known, and the state press paid 
close attention. In Columbia, the State showcased the speech with a triple-decker 
headline across three columns on the front page: “Byrnes Hits Truman’s Spending 
Policies, Asks Cuts in Taxes and Debt.” In a sidebar story running nearby, the newspaper 
highlighted a political scoop unearthed by Washington syndicated columnist Robert S. 
Allen: Bernard Baruch, the financier from South Carolina who had long been close to 
Byrnes, was working behind the scenes to put together an Eisenhower-Byrnes 
presidential ticket in 1952. Eisenhower would run as a Republican, Byrnes as a defecting 
conservative Democrat, and together, Allen reported, the two would form a winning 
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coalition against Truman and the Democrats.289 On Samuel Latimer’s editorial page, the  
State cheered the proposed coalition ticket, saying it would bring “a breath of fresh air to 
the political situation” and would have “tremendous appeal to patriotic citizens in every 
section of the country.”290 The News and Courier also reported Byrnes speech on the 
front page and later featured an Associated Press analysis under a three-column headline: 
“Byrnes Viewed as New States’ Rights Leader.” Lower in the news story, the AP reporter 
employed a familiar journalistic tactic – quoting an unnamed but ubiquitous source 
known as “some observers” – to explain Byrnes’ larger goal. The elder statesman wanted 
white southern conservatives to break with the “Truman liberals” in the Democratic Party 
and form a “solid and lasting coalition” with the Republican Party.291 In the same way 
that McCray and black leaders had helped lead blacks away from Republican loyalty in 
South Carolina a decade earlier, Byrnes now wanted white southerners to cut their long-
held ties to the Democratic Party.  
Byrnes was following the lead of his South Carolina forebear, John C. Calhoun, 
who one hundred years earlier had claimed that southern slave states had the power to 
control national politics if they could unite as one voice and avoid committing to one 
party. As political free agents, a unified southern vote could swing elections and win 
Congressional battles by forming ad hoc coalitions with conservative forces elsewhere in 
the country. In doing so, the South could dictate policy through its decisive role in 
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creating what Calhoun called “the concurrent majority.”292 The Dixiecrats may have been 
political amateurs, but Byrnes believed they had the correct political strategy. Southern 
states, voting as a bloc, could control the Electoral College and swing the presidential 
race toward either major political party. If the South could break its historic ties to the 
Democrats and “let the leaders of both parties know we are not in the bag of any political 
party,” Byrnes said, the South could rise again as the most powerful force in national 
politics. As governor, he planned to break up the “Solid South” and lead white 
southerners away from the Democrats, at least at the presidential level, but he knew this 
would not be easy. In early 1950s, many white South Carolinians still viewed the GOP as 
“the party of Lincoln,” the invading force that inflicted Reconstruction on the homeland.  
As he gradually unveiled his plan, Byrnes treaded carefully on the issue of race. 
He wanted to frame his break with the “Truman liberals” as an honorable difference of 
opinion about taxes, spending, and the constitutional question of states’ rights, not the 
rejectionist stance of a white supremacist who refused to accept change. Yet Byrnes’ 
decision to re-enter politics came at a time when Truman was pressing hard to keep civil 
rights in the spotlight. In the weeks leading up to Byrnes’ Biloxi speech, Truman had 
been out stumping in support of civil-rights reform legislation. “Truman to Stand for No 
Letup in Battle for Civil Rights Laws,” a front-page headline declared in The State on 
November 16. The story detailed Truman’s speech honoring civil rights pioneer Mary 
McLeod Bethune, who was retiring as head of the National Council of Negro Women. A 
native of South Carolina, Bethune had been a member of FDR’s informal “black cabinet” 
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during the 1930s, and her name was anathema to staunch white supremacists in the 
South. The president praised her work fighting “racial or religious discrimination” and 
vowed to push forward his civil rights legislation: “We are going to continue to advance 
in our program of bringing equal rights and equal opportunities to all citizens,” Truman 
said. “In that great cause, there is no retreat and no retirement.”293 
 Truman’s remarks came five days before Byrnes’ speech to the southern 
governors in Biloxi, yet in their initial coverage, South Carolina’s major white 
newspapers avoided linking Byrnes’ attacks on Truman to civil rights and racial issues. 
They focused instead on his criticism of Truman’s “Fair Deal” spending policies. And 
that is just how Byrnes wanted it. He hoped to succeed where the Dixiecrats had failed by 
elevating the discussion to center on economic policy and constitutional issues. The 
national press was not as cooperative as the state papers, however. An Associated Press 
reporter pointed out Byrnes’ strategy. The former senator wanted to expand the states’ 
rights debate and make it “broader than the racial issues” that prompted the southern split 
with the national party in 1948.294  
In his home state, Byrnes did face one criticism, and it came from William Watts 
Ball, the editor of the News and Courier. Deeply conservative, Ball had opposed New 
Deal spending programs going back to 1933, and he took pleasure in noting Brynes’ 
sudden reversal on the question of deficit spending. The former senator’s attacks on 
Truman’s policies “should be applauded,” Ball wrote, but Byrnes’ excuse for his support 
of New Deal spending policies during the Depression “is hollow.” Byrnes had claimed in 
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the speech to the governors that the Depression was a crisis that required emergency 
measures. That crisis was over, Byrnes said, and the need for deficit spending had long 
passed. Ball had been one of the few Southern editors to oppose federal intervention in 
the economy even during the darkest days of the Depression, and he reveled in the irony 
of Byrnes now stepping forward to lead the criticism of policies that he had once helped 
facilitate. The Roosevelt administration “treated the country as a silly mother spoils a 
whimpering child by giving it candy and making it sick,” Ball wrote. He concluded that 
“morally the country has been sick since 1933” and as FDR’s ally in the Senate, Byrnes 
deserved blame for “the sowing of the germs.”295 
Ball enjoyed tweaking Byrnes about his New deal connection and his about-face 
on taxes and spending, but the editor took a more serious tone on the issue of race. Ball 
had been arguing since 1933 that New Deal reforms would eventually undermine “the 
southern way of life” and empower both working-class whites and blacks. As Byrnes 
prepared to re-enter politics in South Carolina, Ball returned to the topic in an editorial 
headlined “Civil Rights and Socialism.” The editor claimed that increased federal 
involvement in state activities would inevitably bring an end to racial segregation in the 
South. In his typical bombastic style, Ball wrote that when the federal government “shall 
own and operate the public utilities; when it shall be the insurer of the people against 
illness, old age and penury; when it shall be the financial patron of schools and colleges; 
when it shall furnish the free lunches for the children and haul them to the schoolhouses; 
when it shall assume the medicinal and surgical care of all their health; when it shall be 
good Old Mother with a whip of nine lashes and millions of spoons in her hand, it will 
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and must certainly force the obliteration of distinctions of race.” Ball had disliked the 
spread of democracy when it brought poor, working-class whites into the political 
system. Now, he feared federal encroachment on state turf would further undermine the 
foundations of southern society and eventually end white rule in the region. The federal 
government already had more than two million employees, thanks in part to Byrnes’ 
work during the New Deal, the editor wrote, and under the Truman plan government 
would expand again and likely bring “many negroes to offices of high power and 
responsibility” in the South. Ball defined the term “civil rights” as “the wiping out of 
differences between the races in the United States,” and he claimed that Byrnes had 
contributed to the current crisis through his early support for the New Deal.296 Byrnes 
may have wanted to elevate the debate beyond race, but the feisty Charleston editor 
would not cooperate. 
Byrnes announced his candidacy for governor in January 1950, and he coasted to 
victory in the July Democratic primary. Ralph McGill, the liberal editor of the Atlanta 
Constitution, described the primary race as more a “coronation than a campaign.”297 By 
the time of his inaugural address the following January, United States forces were 
fighting on the Korean peninsula, and news about the hot war in Asia and the Cold War 
in Europe dominated the newspapers and benefited Byrnes’ effort to downplay the racial 
issue. On inauguration day, the late edition of the capital city’s afternoon newspaper, The 
Columbia Record, bannered an eight-column headline: “100,000 Hear Byrnes Warn 
Against Russia.” The former secretary of state’s comments about the Soviets and the 
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Chinese dominated statewide coverage of the event. But in his inaugural address, Byrnes 
also presented his fullest expression yet of how he intended to frame the white response 
to the black civil rights reform movement. Byrnes called for a dramatic increase in 
spending on black education in South Carolina -- $75 million for school-building 
projects, supported by the sale of state government bonds, plus a new 3% sales tax, with 
revenues to be split equally between black and white school systems. South Carolina had 
failed to deliver on the promise of “separate but equal” education, Byrnes told the crowd, 
and if southerners were going to demand states’ rights, they must carry out state 
responsibilities. “We should do it because it is right,” Byrnes said. “For me, that is 
sufficient reason. If any person wants an additional reason, I say it is wise.”298 
Byrnes’ decision to spend heavily to equalize school facilities drew some 
criticism in South Carolina but the governor was more concerned about the rising civil 
rights movement in the South, particularly its growing support in the North. Almost one 
month to the day before the inauguration, Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP had filed 
suit in federal court on behalf of black families in Clarendon County challenging the 
county’s segregated school system. During the New Deal, the Santee and Cooper rivers 
had been harnessed in a massive public works project to bring electricity to South 
Carolina’s rural Low Country. The resulting lakes became popular recreational areas, but 
during parts of the year the spider web of feeder streams crisscrossing the tenant 
farmlands around Santee-Cooper became impassable. One of those farmers, Harry 
Briggs, claimed that his son and other black children often had to row across a flooded 
creek and walk miles to reach their one-room school, while white children rode a school 
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bus. In 1947, Briggs and the other black families had merely requested a school bus of 
their own. When the state refused, the NAACP filed suit demanding equal facilities for 
the black schools in Clarendon’s school district 22. On December 22, 1950, however, the 
NAACP withdrew its earlier complaint and upped the ante by filing a new suit. Briggs v. 
Elliott would drop the request for equal facilities and demand an end to segregated 
schools entirely.299 
 Byrnes and his allies realized the school systems in Clarendon County and the 
rest of the state were far from equal. As Richard Kluger noted in his definitive study of 
the Brown v. Board of Education case, Clarendon County in the late 1940s and early 
1950s might have been the one place in America “where life among black folk had 
changed the least since the end of slavery.”300 Throughout rural South Carolina, many 
black schools were little more than wooden shacks lacking electricity, running water, and 
indoor toilets. But the governor wanted to persuade federal judges to give the state time 
to fix the problem. And he claimed black South Carolinians supported his efforts: “The 
overwhelming majority of colored people in this state do not want to force their children 
into white schools,” Byrnes argued. “Except for the professional agitators, what the 
colored people want and what they are entitled to is equal facilities in their schools. We 
must see that they get them.”301 The governor hoped to undermine northern liberals who 
supported civil rights by claiming that blacks in South Carolina supported his plan. Yet to 
the governor’s surprise and anger, McCray’s newspaper and his allies in the NAACP 
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would rally black support to continue the challenge against school segregation in the 
state. 
Byrnes’ promise to raise taxes and borrow money to support black education 
came with an associated threat: If federal courts refused to grant South Carolina time to 
reform its school system and insisted on immediate integration, the state would abandon 
public schools altogether. To back up his words, Byrnes proposed a referendum to amend 
the state constitution and remove the requirement that the state legislature fund public 
grade-school education. During Reconstruction, black and white legislators had first 
included the constitutional requirement that lawmakers fund public education in the state, 
and “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman and the white supremacist Democrats who rewrote the 
document in 1895 retained the commitment to free grade-school education.302 Under 
Byrnes’ plan a “yes” vote on the referendum would clear the way for white lawmakers to 
abolish the public schools in South Carolina if the federal courts demanded that black and 
white children attend school together. With his inaugural address, Byrnes inched closer to 
the view of southern white liberals who were eager for at least the appearance of gradual 
change, but he refused to rule out militant resistance as well. Byrnes conceded Jim Crow 
had failed black families in the state but warned that white southerners would go only so 
far in reforming the system: “Whatever is necessary to continue the separation of the 
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races in the schools of South Carolina is going to be done by the white people of the 
state.”303 
Byrnes walked a fine line between promising real reforms in the state and 
threatening a white backlash if civil rights supporters and their northern allies refused to 
accept his plan. For example, the new governor won praise in the North and the South for 
his tough stand against the Klan. Once a powerful force in state politics, the twentieth 
century version of the Ku Klux Klan had withered since its heyday in the 1920s, when 
Cole Blease signaled his support for the organization.304 In the late 1940s, Grand Dragon 
Thomas Hamilton relocated from Georgia and tried to build a new hooded empire in 
South Carolina. His group carried out cross-burnings and fiery attacks in several small 
towns that received widespread coverage in the press.305 Despite Thurmond’s objections, 
local Klan organizations had publicly supported the Dixiecrats in 1948. Determined to 
avoid such a connection, Byrnes joined with several other southern governors in 
proposing anti-mask and anti-cross burning laws. The measures made it illegal for an 
adult to obscure his face in public or to burn a cross on private property without the 
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owner’s consent.306 In proposing the laws, however, Byrnes again tried to depict the 
black community as divided, with a majority in support of “separate but equal” schools 
and only a tiny minority trying to stir up trouble. In this case, he linked the Klan and the 
NAACP and implied both posed a threat to public safety.  It was the governor’s job to 
keep order, Byrnes said, and “I do not need the assistance of the Ku Klux Klan, nor do I 
want interference by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People.”307 
For James Rogers, the white liberal editor of the Florence Morning News, Byrnes’ 
inaugural speech was nearly perfect. Rogers had detested the “rabble-rousing” of 
Thurmond and the Dixiecrats. But he disliked local black activists like editor John H. 
McCray and his Lighthouse and Informer newspaper as well. Like many of his southern 
liberal counterparts, Rogers believed in the existence of a “silent” southern majority that 
supported a safe middle path between Klan militants who called for violent resistance and 
the civil rights activists who demanded immediate equality. With his inaugural message, 
Byrnes appeared to speak to just such a silent majority, Rogers said. In his view, the 
governor represented “the assertion of common sense” and “moral conscience,” not 
southern racial prejudice. Rogers predicted that “every state in which the races are 
separate will follow Byrnes and South Carolina in their fight to preserve the segregated 
system.” But to win that battle, he wrote, southerners must keep the argument “on the 
high plane” established by Byrnes and avoid inflaming “the passions of the ignorant and 
the prejudiced who have brought and can continue to bring immeasurable damage to the 
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cause.” Like Byrnes, Rogers placed much of the blame for radical Klan activity on pushy 
black activists who were asking for too much, too quickly. The editor implied that the 
state’s civil rights movement held the future of public education in its hands: “When the 
Negro, by his insistence on the end of segregation, destroys tax-supported schools, he has 
destroyed his own best, if not only, chance of education.”308 
In explaining the Klan’s revival in South Carolina, Byrnes would return to an 
argument he had made early in his political career. As a young member of Congress, he 
had accused W.E.B Du Bois and The Crisis of aiding the Soviets and conspiring to bring 
down US democracy because of the magazine’s scathing editorials against lynching and 
white violence in the South in 1919. Byrnes seemed to be arguing that any criticism of 
the United States, even if well founded, was tantamount to treasonous support for Soviet 
communism. Now, thirty years later, he blamed McCray’s Lighthouse and Informer and 
its anti-Klan editorials for the reemergence of the racist organization in the state. He 
claimed the paper’s fiery rhetoric and its publication of photographs of “white women 
dancing with Negroes” had fueled resentment and provoked white militants to embrace 
mob violence. In a letter to a white minister who complained about the “fascist” Klan, 
Byrnes pinned the blame on the black newspaper: “The attitude of the Negro press has 
been of wonderful assistance to the Klan. It makes it easy for the Grand Dragon to arouse 
the prejudices of the people.”309 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 “Governor Byrnes has Sound and Sober Word for Southern Negroes and Their School 
Fight,” Florence Morning News, March 18, 1951. 
309 James F. Byrnes to R.C. Griffith, November 20, 1951, General Subjects File, Box 1, 
Folder “Ku Klux Klan,” JFB Gubernatorial Papers. 
	  151	  
The Lighthouse and Informer continued to attack Byrnes’ equalization proposal. 
McCray was especially irritated by the paternalism inherent in Byrnes’ call for blacks to 
step aside and keep quiet while whites correct the injustices of the state’s educational and 
political systems. “Let the politicians and white supremacists scream all they want,” 
McCray railed in an editorial headlined “Segregation Now in the Negro’s Hands.” The 
case against “jimcrowism” was now working its way through the courts, and the NAACP 
and its supporters believed both public and legal opinion had shifted in their favor. In his 
sarcastic style, McCray said white leaders needed to accept that Negros had taken control 
of their political fate: “The politician or white supremacist who has backed racial 
discrimination, especially segregation, suspects it, and the student of civil and legal 
events knows it: The Negro now can call the tune he wants the white fiddling South to 
play, and eventually the white South has no alternative but to play, though it may scream, 
rant and rave.” Even if the courts reject the Clarendon County case and refuse to outlaw 
segregation entirely, McCray argued, they had already ordered states to provide equal 
facilities, and South Carolina could never afford to fund two truly equal school systems. 
Such a policy would require massive tax increases and government borrowing and would 
likely bankrupt the state. If black South Carolinians demanded full equalization, McCray 
said, eventually “segregation is going to be wiped out.” The editor concluded with a 
zinger that captured in one short paragraph the remarkable change in African American 
attitudes since Byrnes had last run for statewide offices in the state: “So don’t go around 
asking a governor or a major or a police chief what’s going to happen and when on this 
issue. Ask the Negro, the little and big Negro, what he’s going to do, how, and when.”310 
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McCray would pay a serious price for his militant stance. In January 1950, just a 
week before Byrnes announced his gubernatorial campaign, both McCray and an 
Associated Press reporter, Deling Booth, were indicted on charges of libel. The case 
centered on their accounts of a rape case involving Willie Tolbert, a 25-year-old black 
man convicted of assaulting a white teenager near Greenwood, South Carolina. The 
young woman’s account of what happened that night was, as one historian has noted, 
“nothing less than fantastic.”311 She said she and her boyfriend were sitting in a parked 
car chatting when Tolbert forced his way into the vehicle. Like a scene from To Kill a 
Mockingbird, Harper Lee’s famous novel set in 1930s Alabama, the teenager claimed 
Tolbert understood the consequences of his actions but was so overcome with sexual 
desire for her that he proceeded anyway. She said he told her he wanted her to have his 
child. The young woman never explained how Tolbert, a 5’9”, 150-pound city worker 
who was unarmed, managed to commit the sexual act while holding the young woman’s 
boyfriend at bay. Tolbert claimed the sex had been consensual. He said he helped the 
teenagers buy liquor and, after a night of drinking, they had invited him to join in the 
sexual acts. Yet the court never heard Tolbert’s story. He was advised not to testify, and 
the all-white jury quickly convicted. He was electrocuted on October 28, 1949.312 
Before his execution, Tolbert had granted death-row interviews to both McCray 
and Booth, and both had published his claim that the sex was consensual but without 
using the teenage girl’s name. Nonetheless, county solicitor Hugh Beasley – who 
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happened to be the girl’s father – charged the two journalists with violating a South 
Carolina criminal statute prohibiting the media from defaming the victims of sexual 
assault. Backed by the resources of the AP, Booth had his case dismissed without a trial. 
When the prosecutors refused to drop the case against McCray, the national black press 
responded in anger. The Chicago Defender called the case “a challenge to freedom of the 
press, one of the fundamental principles of our democracy.”313 
Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP’s legal team helped prepare McCray’s case, 
but they wanted to find a local white lawyer to take the lead role in court. Few would 
consider it, given the rising racial tension in South Carolina and the political connections 
of the young woman’s family. Jack Greenberg, an NAACP lawyer, said the atmosphere 
was so hostile in Columbia that a white lawyer who covertly aided McCray asked the 
editor’s legal team “to enter his house through the back door.” Greenberg said the lawyer 
“would have been ruined if his involvement became known.”314 On the advice of his 
attorneys, McCray pleaded guilty to avoid going in front of an all-white jury. He received 
a $3000 fine and was placed on three years’ probation, but the outcome allowed him to 
continue publishing the Lighthouse and Informer.  
In August 1951, McCray was arrested and charged with violating the rules of his 
probation, which prohibited him from traveling outside South Carolina. The 
circumstances around his arrest remain a mystery. McCray claimed his parole officer told 
him he could make short business trips out of the state, and he had done so several times 
since his plea bargain. In October 1950, he had delivered the keynote address at an event 
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hosted by African American congressman William Dawson of Illinois. The following 
month, he traveled to Durham, North Carolina, to speak at the Omega Psi Phi fraternity’s 
Black Achievement Week function. Nine months later, McCray was arrested without 
warning and charged with disobeying his probation order. When the state Supreme Court 
rejected McCray’s final appeal, the editor was ordered to serve on a Newberry County 
chain gang from November 11 to December 18, 1952. McCray and his allies have 
suggested Byrnes had grown so frustrated by his editorials on the Clarendon County case 
that he looked for other means to silence the editor, although there is no hard evidence to 
support this claim. Marshall and Greenberg of the NAACP have said they suspected it 
was true. And so did the black press. The Pittsburgh Courier said McCray’s constant 
criticism of Byrnes’ school equalization program had made him “a marked man” in South 
Carolina.315  
Rather than derail black activism in the state, McCray’s indictment in January 
1950 helped mobilize African Americans. They resented what they perceived to be an 
obvious act of intimidation, and they rallied to support the editor. The National Negro 
Press Association had created the Lighthouse Defense Committee to raise money, but the 
campaign to defend McCray gained real momentum at the grassroots. Local NAACP 
branches and Progressive Democratic Party clubs led the effort across the state. They 
organized John H. McCray Days and held mass meetings and teach-ins to generate 
support – and to encourage voter registration. They gathered donations from small-
business owners, teachers’ associations, and fraternal organizations. A group of eighth 
graders from Florence raised $10 for the cause. The donor lists also show hundreds of 
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individuals digging deep to contribute a dollar or two, at what must have been a great 
sacrifice to black families in South Carolina in 1950. Along with their hard-earned 
money, black South Carolinians included poignant letters tying McCray’s fight with their 
own struggle to gain political equality in the state.316  
The Tolbert case and McCray’s indictment would become a hot topic in a bitter 
Senate race in 1950, and it would give African Americans a chance to flex their muscles 
at the polls and show just how far they had come in the past decade. The state’s junior 
senator, Olin Johnston, was up for re-election in 1950, and outgoing governor Strom 
Thurmond, who was prevented by law from seeking a second term, challenged him in the 
Democratic Party primary. Byrnes’ race for governor may have been a “coronation” that 
year, but the 1950 Senate contest was an old-fashioned South Carolina “cockfight.” The 
two men disliked each other, and Thurmond, coming off his disappointing Dixiecrat 
campaign, worried that another poor showing could end his political career. He stayed on 
the offensive, attacking Johnston daily. Both men supported segregation and white 
political rule in the state, but Thurmond thought he saw a way to undermine Johnston on 
the issue. 
In the final days of the campaign, Thurmond’s team created an ad that suggested 
Johnston had pressured the judge in Greenwood to grant McCray’s request for a change 
of venue in the case. The Dixiecrat campaign, with its harsh rhetoric and Klan support, 
had turned the black community against Thurmond, despite his firm stance against 
lynching in the Willie Earle case. Johnston was no better on the issue of segregation, and 
he adamantly opposed Truman’s civil rights reform efforts. But the senator was a staunch 
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supporter of the president’s “Fair Deal” economic policies. For those reasons, black 
South Carolinians were already leaning toward Johnston, but Thurmond’s ad vilifying 
McCray sealed the issue. Modjeska Monteith Simkins, the political activist who had 
helped found McCray’s Lighthouse and Informer, came out strongly in favor of Johnston 
as the lesser of the two evils, and she helped mobilize the local PDP clubs to get out the 
vote in the 1950 Senate race. Based on voter registration figures reported by William D. 
Workman, Jr., the capital correspondent for the Charleston News and Courier, an 
estimated that 70,000 blacks had qualified to vote in 1950, up from about 30,000 in 1948. 
From his perch at the state capitol, Workman noticed other examples of African 
Americans exhibiting a new engagement in state politics: more statehouse visits by 
“negro school groups and individual Negros”; more requests for publications and 
information and a greater interest in important state agencies; and more Negro letters to 
the editors of white newspapers. 317 A week before the July 11 primary vote, the 
Lighthouse and Informer sent a strong message to the newly registered black voters: it 
ran a sample ballot on the front page that encouraged blacks to vote for Johnston over 
Thurmond in the Senate race.318   
South Carolina’s white politicians and press had been eyeing the black vote 
warily since US District Judge Waites Waring’s 1947 ruling had opened the state’s 
Democratic Party primaries. Nonetheless, the results of the 1950 Senate primary were 
stunning. In what was expected to be a close race, Johnston won by nearly 30,000 votes. 
A former textile worker himself, the senator had strong support from labor in the Upstate 
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region he called home. Yet black voters gave him his margin of victory. An estimated 
40,000 African Americans voted in the Senate race and returns from predominantly black 
precincts in Charleston and Columbia revealed that most had voted for Johnston.319 
Thurmond’s advisers later admitted they underestimated the strength of the PDP and its 
ability to turn out African American voters, even in the rural Black Belt region of South 
Carolina. The results of the Johnston-Thurmond Senate race suggested the days of white 
politicians intimidating and dividing the black community appeared to be over. African 
Americans were “much wiser and better informed than yesteryear,” McCray would argue 
in the Lighthouse and Informer. The black voter of the 1950s could “see through the veil” 
cast by white politicians and discern “their real intent.” Now, McCray said, black South 
Carolinians know “what is actually possible.”320  
Byrnes had avoided endorsing a candidate in the 1950 Senate race, much to 
Thurmond’s disappointment. The incoming governor presented himself as an elder 
statesman who was above politics, a wise and thoughtful moderate who had no future 
ambition other than to help South Carolinians safely navigate dangerous times. He 
wanted to be seen as a friend and counsel to both races, a calm voice of reason who could 
stand up to white militant Klansmen and black agitators as well. The white press 
embraced and helped enhance this image. But blacks saw through the veil, as McCray 
called it. They had a different vision of Byrnes, not the avuncular elder statesman but the 
angry white supremacist who only wanted to protect the racial status quo. Byrnes wanted 
blacks to slow down, to temper their request for change. But as McCray had noted back 
in 1944, black South Carolinians had “beaten down the fear” that white supremacists had 
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once used so successfully to divide and crush black political aspirations.321 By leveraging 
their growing support from the federal courts, liberal allies in Congress, and northern 
public opinion, African Americans had gained access to the ballot box and finally re-
emerged as a force in southern electoral politics. 
Byrnes appeared to be a moderate voice in the battle over civil rights in the early 
1950s. Yet he had launched his political career as a protégé of “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman 
and been a staunch white supremacist. He regularly expressed his fear that black South 
Carolinians would one day regain the political power they had lost at the close of 
Reconstruction. As a young congressman in the summer of 1919, Byrnes had taken to the 
House floor to accuse the NAACP of communist ties and to encourage African 
Americans to leave the country “if they didn’t like it here.” At the time, Ball was the 
editor of The State newspaper in Columbia. To the aristocratic editor, Byrnes’ comments 
sounded more like the words of Cole Blease, not the more sophisticated and paternalistic 
conservative that Byrnes aspired to be. In a letter to Byrnes, Ball accused the 
congressmen of demagoguery. In his reply, Byrnes agreed that his language had been too 
harsh. But he also revealed a key motivation that would drive his political thinking over 
the years. Byrnes argued that whites in South Carolina must always remain vigilant 
against the threat of black political participation. Given the size of the black population, 
Byrnes wrote, “a fair registration” process would grant blacks great political power in the 
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state. For that reason, he said every issue in South Carolina “must include this 
consideration of the race question.”322 
The “race question” in South Carolina would take a significant turn in December 
1950, a few months before Byrnes took office as governor. The NAACP’s decision to file 
suit against school District 22 in Clarendon County was historic. The complaint in Briggs 
v. Elliott signaled a major shift in NAACP strategy – from fighting school inequality to 
confronting the act of segregation itself. The Clarendon County case would mark the first 
time in the twentieth century that school segregation would be challenged directly in a 
southern court. Although Columbia’s afternoon newspaper, The Columbia Record, placed 
the story of the suit’s filing on the bottom of the front page, the much larger morning 
paper, The State, did not. Instead, the newspaper ran a short Associated Press story on 
page B8, tucked under an item about an American Legion toy drive and next to the death 
and funeral notices.323 The paper did give prominent play to another story about black 
activism that day. It involved the bombing of the home of a black family that had 
challenged racial zoning laws in Birmingham, Alabama.324 The message was clear: black 
activists who pushed too hard would pay a price. African Americans in South Carolina 
understood this all too well. In Clarendon County, Harry Briggs and his wife would both 
lose their jobs during their legal battle with the county school system, and the man who 
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first brought the NAACP to Clarendon County, Rev. Joseph DeLaine, would have his 
house burned to the ground.325  
The State’s coverage of Briggs v. Elliott underwent a dramatic change in June, 
when the three-judge panel hearing the Clarendon case ruled in favor of the state. 
“School segregation sustained,” blared an eight-column headline stripped across the top 
of the front page, even above the latest news from the Korean War.326 Byrnes had 
surprised Marshall and the NAACP by conceding that South Carolina schools were in 
fact unequal and asking the court to focus on the state’s effort to remedy the problem. 
Marshall had planned to use witness testimony to emphasize the disparity between black 
and white schools in South Carolina and to raise doubts about whether a state that had 
done so little in the past could be trusted to achieve true equality in the future. With that 
option no longer available, Marshall proceeded with witnesses who testified that 
segregated schools were inherently unequal, no matter how similar their facilities. As The 
State’s reporter explained it: “Several high ranking educators, some of them white men, 
took the stand today and testified that segregated schools cannot train young people in a 
democracy right and are detrimental to the children, both of the minority, which is 
isolated, and the majority, which does the isolating.”327  
The three-judge panel voted 2-1 to reject the NAACP’s arguments. They upheld 
segregation as constitutionally legal but ordered Byrnes and his government to return in 
six months with a detailed plan to equalize schools across South Carolina. In their order, 
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the judges said federal courts “would be going far outside their constitutional function 
were they to attempt to prescribe educational policies” such as segregation, “however 
desirable such policies might be in the eyes of some sociologists and educators.” Chief 
Judge John J. Parker of Charlotte and Judge George Bell Timmerman Sr. of Columbia 
wrote the majority opinion. The lone holdout was Judge Waites Waring of Charleston, 
whose fiery dissent would foreshadow the Supreme Court’s final ruling in the case – and 
would further alienate Waring from white society in South Carolina. Waring called 
segregated schools “per se inequality,” and he said testimony in the case had shown 
“beyond a shadow of a doubt that the evils of segregation and color prejudices come from 
early training.” The place to stop it “is in the first grade not in graduate college.” To its 
credit, The State included a key excerpt from Waring’s dissent on its front page.328 
Byrnes had gotten exactly what he wanted from the US District Court, and though 
the NAACP promised to appeal, the confident governor would describe the court’s ruling 
as “unanswerable.”329 As a former US Supreme Court justice himself, he believed the law 
was clear. The court’s 1896 ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson gave states the right to operate 
“separate but equal” educational systems, and Byrnes saw no constitutional ground for 
the high court to overrule this precedent. His allies in the press helped the governor 
present the court’s ruling as “Victory of American Rights,” as the News and Courier 
called it in a front-page editorial. The majority opinion had “demolished” the NAACP 
claim that segregated schools violated the “equal protection” clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the paper argued. The editorial continued: “The court went beyond the 
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rights of the states, as set out in the Constitution. The court has upheld an older and an 
even more basic right, the right of parents to look after the welfare of their children.” The 
court had “reaffirmed” the rights of the individual, the editorial claimed.330 
Waring would later complain that his fellow judges, Parker and Timmerman, had 
accepted Byrnes’ arguments before the hearings began and, in their deliberations, “had 
been throwing aside all the testimony.” Waring said the judges urged him to join a 
unanimous decision to give Byrnes the support he needed to carry out his equalization 
plan. He claimed the judges backed their argument with a bit of political prophecy. “A 
Republican victory was assured” in the 1952 presidential election, Waring said he was 
told, and without the Truman liberals breathing down his neck, Byrnes could then 
negotiate a deal to bring about gradual change to the state.331 
Byrnes wanted not only to see “a Republican victory” in the presidential election 
of 1952 but also to be the kingmaker who engineered the GOP win. In November 1951, 
he returned to the annual Southern Governor’s Conference to make his plans clear. On 
the last day of the conference, Byrnes announced he would not support Truman’s 
renomination the next year. He said he had persuaded a majority of southern governors to 
form a unified bloc and support the best candidate with the best platform, regardless of 
political party. Byrnes claimed the southerners were prepared to “put loyalty to country 
above loyalty to party.”332 The Korean War and concerns about the economy had 
undermined Truman’s poll numbers, and the threat of another southern revolt further 
imperiled his chances in 1952. Three months after Byrnes’ comments, Truman 
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announced that he would not seek another term as president. The Democrats would 
nominate another liberal, Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson, while the Republicans 
would defy their party’s more conservative wing, led by Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, and 
turn instead to a war hero, Dwight D. Eisenhower.  
Both parties claimed to support civil rights in 1952, but the GOP platform 
included language bound to please white southerners: “We believe that it is the primary 
responsibility of each state to order and control its own domestic institutions, and this 
power, reserved to the states, is essential to the maintenance of our federal 
government.”333 Byrnes and his political operatives helped create an organization, 
Independents for Eisenhower, that allowed white southerners to leave the Democratic 
Party without actually embracing the “party of Lincoln” that their grandparents had so 
despised. During the fall campaign, Byrnes sat nearby as Eisenhower addressed a raucous 
crowd on the statehouse steps in Columbia. When the band played Dixie, the general rose 
and sang along. Afterward, when he said,  “I always stand up for that song,” the crowd let 
out a collective rebel yell.334  
In November, Eisenhower coasted to victory with strong southern support. 
Although he did not win South Carolina or any Deep South state, the Republican did 
carry four of the original eleven states of the Confederacy, the party’s best showing in the 
South since 1928, when southern voters abandoned Democratic nominee Al Smith, a 
Catholic who opposed Prohibition.335 The State had assured the “dissident Democrats of 
South Carolina” that a vote for Eisenhower would not be interpreted as a vote for a 
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Republican, but “a protest against the policies of the present Democratic 
Administration.”336 More than 154,000 dissident Democrats joined with about 9,000 
Republicans to vote for Eisenhower, who narrowly lost the state to Stevenson. In its 
editorials, The State never mentioned race or civil rights as the reason white Democrats 
were turning to the Republican candidate. But the News and Courier said race played a 
significant role in the vote tally. The “Negro bloc vote” had supported Stevenson and “he 
carried (South Carolina) with a MINORITY of traditional Democrats … Take away 
“Stevenson’s Negro vote, and it can be seen that most of the traditional Democrats voted 
for Eisenhower.”337 It was a theme the News and Courier would return to frequently over 
the coming years: If black voters were joining the Democratic Party, whites voters should 
look elsewhere for a new political home. 
By the end of 1952, Byrnes’ plans for reshaping the debate over civil rights 
appeared to be working. Truman and his liberal Democratic allies were out of the White 
House, and southern white voters had helped show them the door. The election would be 
remembered as “independence day” because the South was now  “out of the bag” and no 
longer committed to one party, Byrnes said in a victory statement that ran on the front 
pages of the state’s white newspapers.338 Truman’s civil rights legislation had died in 
Congress a full year before Eisenhower’s election, and the new administration coming to 
power in Washington appeared to support Byrnes’ argument in favor of states’ rights. A 
lower federal court had upheld the doctrine of separate but equal and refused to outlaw 
segregated schools in South Carolina. Although the NAACP had appealed that ruling, 
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Byrnes had served on the nation’s highest court with Chief Justice Fred Vinson and 
considered him an old friend. He believed the Vinson court would stand by precedent as 
well. And as a bit of insurance, he obtained the services of perhaps the country’s most 
distinguished jurist to argue the case for the state of South Carolina. John W. Davis, a 
former Democratic Party presidential candidate, had participated in at least 250 cases 
before the US Supreme Court. Even John McCray, usually an optimist, expressed 
concern over the Clarendon case. The lower court ruling “threatens to throw us back,” 
claimed the editorial in McCray’s Lighthouse and Informer. The newspaper said that if 
the Supreme Court upheld the district court ruling, it could allow segregation to spread 
beyond the South.339 
Briggs v. Elliott had been merged with four other cases challenging segregation in 
southern and border states. In his effort to shift the focus to the constitutional question of 
states’ rights and away from white supremacy and Jim Crow, Byrnes moved to 
nationalize the case even further. On the eve of the first Supreme Court hearing, in 
December 1952, Byrnes persuaded the governor of Kansas to file a brief in defense of its 
segregated school systems, which were also under NAACP attack. The Supreme Court 
accepted the Kansas case, merged it with other segregation suits, and renamed the case 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. 
 After the first hearing, in December 1952, the court announced it would not rule 
immediately but would carry the case over to the next term. Yet Byrnes and Davis 
remained confident. Byrnes had been talking with his former colleagues on the court, 
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particularly Justice Felix Frankfurter, and the liberal from Boston appeared to agree with 
Byrnes that “the whole thing was moving too fast” in the South.340 Harry Ashmore, the 
liberal editor from Little Rock, was hearing the same thing from his sources inside the 
court. Frankfurter was especially supportive of Byrnes’ argument concerning the Klan 
and other extremists. He feared that overturning Plessy v. Ferguson and outlawing 
segregation would mean “the guys who talk nigger would be in charge, there would be 
riots, and the Army would have to be called out.”341 Based on what he was hearing, 
Byrnes had every right to be confident. 
By late 1953, however, Byrnes began to receive news that, in his view, was more 
ominous. Three months before the second hearing, Chief Justice Vinson died suddenly, 
and Eisenhower replaced him with former California Governor Earl Warren, a liberal 
Republican who had no ties to Byrnes and whose sympathies on the question of 
segregation were unknown. If the Warren nomination had shaken Byrnes’ confidence in 
the Eisenhower administration, the next move shredded it altogether. Byrnes thought he 
had persuaded the president and his administration to remain neutral in the case, but in 
late 1953 Attorney General Herbert Brownell filed an amicus brief in support of Marshall 
and the NAACP.  The decision undermined Byrnes’ credibility. Less than a year ago, he 
had urged white southern voters to rally behind the former general because he believed 
the Republicans supported states’ rights. Yet in its first major test, the new administration 
had acted no differently than the Truman liberals had. The shift in northern opinion on 
civil rights had spread farther than Byrnes had realized, and the governor had 
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overestimated his ability to reverse it. The Republican Party had its conservative wing, 
but overall the party was not yet as hospitable to the white South as it would become in 
the next decade. 
 Byrnes also began to hear favorable chatter about the brief filed by Marshall and 
the NAACP. The justices had scheduled a second hearing in December 1953 to explore 
the NAACP’s claim that segregated schools violated the “equal protection” clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In response, Marshall had submitted a 235-page brief that made 
a persuasive case that the amendment did apply to public education.342 A lower-court 
ruling that Byrnes thought was “unanswerable” now seemed in jeopardy. 
The latest developments buoyed McCray’s spirits, and his writing in the 
Lighthouse and Informer regained its edge. He praised “the magnificence of the people of 
Clarendon County,” who had dug deep in their own pockets to help launch the case and 
endured economic and physical retribution to carry it through the appeals process. 
McCray pointed out an obvious but overlooked fact: Harry Briggs and the African 
American families in Clarendon County were helping foot the bill for both sides arguing 
the case – their own NAACP lawyers, and through tax payments, the man defending the 
state of South Carolina, the “top-priced lawyer who will work against them.”343 McCray 
claimed the Byrnes administration was conspiring with the white press to “censor” 
coverage of NAACP activities concerning the Clarendon appeal.344 Whether true or not, 
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the papers paid little attention to the case as it wound its way to the Supreme Court. 
Nonetheless, as 1954 began, the state’s governor, its press, and its people waited 
nervously for the justices to issue their ruling in the case of Brown v. Board of Education 
of Topeka, Kansas. 
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 CHAPTER 6 
THE NEWS AND COURIER AND INTERPOSITION 
On May 22, 1954, the Lighthouse and Informer celebrated the US Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Brown v. Board of Education with its usual feistiness. The paper’s lead 
editorial cheered the court’s rejection of “the lying, moth-eaten ‘separate but equal’ 
chicanery,” a system of education that had “persisted in the perennial stealing from Negro 
children.” The newspaper ridiculed John W. Davis, the “fabulously-priced” lawyer hired 
by Governor James F. Byrnes to defend segregation on behalf of the state. The 
“blubbering” Davis may have been famous, the newspaper claimed, but he was no match 
for the “the legal prowess” of Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP. Most of all, the black 
newspaper emphasized the connection between the Brown ruling and what it saw as the 
nation’s deep-seated desire to fulfill its democratic ideals. By rebuking Byrnes and the 
white South, the Lighthouse and Informer declared, the justices had restored faith in “the 
sense of American justice and fair play, and the ultimate triumph of right.”345  
The tone of the editorial may have been vintage Lighthouse and Informer, but 
South Carolina’s leading black newspaper had undergone a change. The name of its 
founder and long-time editor, John H. McCray, no longer graced the masthead. McCray 
had left two months earlier to take a job as South Carolina correspondent for the 
Baltimore Afro-American. Always teetering on the brink of financial collapse, the
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 Lighthouse and Informer had slipped into bankruptcy in 1954, and the economic 
struggle had opened a rift between McCray and the paper’s primary benefactor, civil 
rights activist Modjeska Simkins. Thirteen years earlier, the two had hatched a plan to 
move the paper to Columbia and create a “fighting organ” that would mobilize African 
Americans and jump-start the state’s civil rights movement. Now, just weeks after that 
movement’s greatest legal triumph, the paper fell silent for good. In the fall of 1954, the 
Lighthouse and Informer was shuttered and its press sold for $638 to cover back taxes.346  
The civil rights struggle in South Carolina suffered a major setback with the 
collapse of McCray’s newspaper. Its demise left only one other black newspaper in the 
state, the Palmetto Leader, a weekly founded in 1919 by Republican attorney Nathaniel 
Frederick. Once a strong voice for black rights, the newspaper cut back on political 
coverage during the Depression, and with Frederick’s death in 1938, the Palmetto Leader 
devolved into a religious and society paper that avoided civil rights issues altogether.347 
Despite the death of the Lighthouse and Informer, McCray hoped to continue serving as 
one of the movement’s chief public figures. He planned to write columns on South 
Carolina issues for the Afro-American, and the Progressive Democratic Party, the 
political organization he helped found, would continue to register black voters and speak 
out against attempts to deny African Americans the franchise. But those efforts could not 
replace the loss of a statewide newspaper devoted to black political activism. 
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McCray’s newspaper had been instrumental in uniting the black community in 
South Carolina. Each week for nearly thirteen years, the latest edition of the Lighthouse 
and Informer had served as part cheerleader and part commissar for a black community 
that was still uncertain about its place in civic life. Through the pages of the newspaper, 
McCray and his allies in the NAACP had challenged white claims about black inferiority 
and delivered their own interpretation of what white supremacist rule meant for American 
democracy. The newspaper had defined American citizenship as an act of self-assertion, a 
right earned by those who were willing to demand it. Through repeated appeals to the 
“American way,” “the American sense of justice,” and “the American tradition of fair 
play,” McCray and his colleagues linked the black community’s demand for equal rights 
to nation’s most cherished democratic ideals. In doing so, the Lighthouse and Informer 
helped develop a united black counterpublic in South Carolina that was capable of 
undermining white efforts to depict the “southern custom” of racial segregation as the 
“natural order” envisioned by the founding fathers. By joining the debate so aggressively, 
the newspaper helped the black freedom movement in South Carolina break down the 
barrier that white supremacy had erected to prevent their arguments from being heard in 
the South and the North. At the same time, McCray and his associates at the Lighthouse 
and Informer had prowled the black public sphere in search of backsliders who instilled 
fear in the community. They used the paper to ridicule and ostracize fellow African 
Americans who believed blacks were moving too quickly, or who hoped to win white 
favor by undermining the movement.   
In Charleston, the News and Courier appeared to represent everything the 
Lighthouse and Informer was fighting against. The paper believed that the “southern 
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custom” of racial separation was the “natural order,” and it described the Brown ruling as 
an attack on the American system of government. In a front-page editorial, the News and 
Courier said the US Supreme Court decision “had cut deep into the sinews of the 
Republic.” By “depriving the states of the right to administer public education,” the 
justices had redefined the Constitution and destroyed the “balance” in race relations that 
had prevailed in South Carolina since the end of Reconstruction. The News and Courier 
conceded that it was “too late to secede and start another War Between the States,” and it 
urged white southerners to remain calm and not overreact, but the paper said it had no 
intention of accepting racial integration in the South.348  
The competing interpretations of the Brown decision delivered by the News and 
Courier and the Lighthouse and Informer foreshadowed the interpretive battles to come 
in the state and national civil spheres. More than a legal victory, the Brown ruling 
represented a fundamental shift in the culture of the northern civil sphere. The unanimous 
opinion signaled how far the intellectual credibility of overt racism had fallen over the 
past decade. In declaring that segregated schools were inherently unequal and illegal, the 
justices had not only overturned the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 
they established institutional support for the notion that African Americans were full-
fledged members of the solidary that comprised the nation’s civil sphere. In this sense, 
Brown served as an act of civic repair intended to heal a wound that had been festering at 
the heart of American democracy. Yet the issue of black equality was far from settled. 
Racial conservatives like those at the News and Courier would move to resist 
implementation of the Brown ruling. More importantly, they took the lead in the effort to 
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delegitimize the ruling in the regional and national civil spheres before its egalitarian 
ethos could harden into an established and accepted reality as the cultural law of the land.  
Despite its harsh rhetoric on civil rights, the News and Courier had always 
maintained a surprisingly hospitable relationship with McCray and his newspaper. 
McCray had claimed that the News and Courier’s legendary editor, William Watts Ball, 
had inspired him to launch his first paper, the Charleston Lighthouse. McCray said he 
gone to the News and Courier offices in the mid-1930s to complain about some long-
forgotten editorial policy. Ball had refused to budge on the issue, but he had suggested 
the black community start its own newspaper.349 Over the years, Ball and McCray 
occasionally traded letters and phone calls, usually about some political issue involving 
African Americans.350 After the Lighthouse and Informer shut down, the News and 
Courier’s Columbia correspondent, William D. Workman, Jr., wrote a lengthy obituary. 
Although mostly objective in tone, the story appeared sympathetic at times. Workman 
noted McCray’s “blunt editorials” had made the Lighthouse and Informer a 
“controversial element in the state’s political life,” but he accurately reported on the 
paper’s role in fighting for “Negro participation in Democratic primaries, desegregation 
of public schools, and expansion of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People.” Workman’s story described the three goals McCray had set when he 
launched the newspaper: to provide a medium for Negro expression, to encourage Negro 
voting, and to enhance Negro education. Workman acknowledged that McCray “takes 
satisfaction in his conviction” that the newspaper helped South Carolina’s black 
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community move closer to achieving those goals.351 McCray was pleased with the way 
the News and Courier had treated his newspaper, and he wrote to Workman to thank him 
for his “excellent reporting and analysis.” The article may have been “just another routine 
piece of copy for you,” McCray said, but it had been “done up in a most interesting and 
conclusive way.”352  
Workman’s news report on the demise of the Lighthouse and Informer reflected 
the News and Courier’s complicated political views. Throughout its existence, the 
Charleston newspaper had often been as concerned about class as it was about race. The 
News and Courier had always claimed that it supported African American advancement, 
as long as that progress did not challenge white aristocratic rule. The newspaper believed 
the better class of whites should run the state in a way that retained political control over 
blacks and working-class whites, but allowed certain gifted members of both of those 
groups to lift themselves up if possible. In this sense, McCray’s goal of creating a 
newspaper that would “enhance Negro education” fit nicely within the News and 
Courier’s paternalistic worldview. In its reaction to the Brown decision, the News and 
Courier acknowledged that “Negroes have become more insistent on asserting 
themselves,” and said it “recognizes their rights and ambitions.” But like almost all of the 
southern white press, the Charleston newspaper remained unwilling to accept how 
widespread the black demand for true equality had become. Instead, it appeared to harken 
back to the days of Booker T. Washington and industrial education with its call for 
“advancement for the Negroes both as manpower for the fields and factories as well as 
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customers in the stores.” Such economic progress, the paper claimed, would restore racial 
harmony and “remove many of the social frictions which chafe both races.”353 
In its response to Brown, the News and Courier hit many of the same paternalistic 
notes that Ball had been singing since he arrived at the Charleston paper in 1927. But the 
News and Courier was not the same paper. Like the Lighthouse and Informer, it too had 
undergone a major change on its masthead. Ball had retired at the end of 1950 and passed 
away in 1952. He was replaced by his long-time managing editor, Thomas R. Waring, Jr., 
a familiar name in Charleston society. Waring’s father had been editor of the city’s 
afternoon newspaper, the Charleston Evening Post. And, in a particularly southern, 
small-town twist to the story, Waring’s uncle was J. Waites Waring, the federal judge 
whose rulings in favor of the NAACP had made him a despised man in white Charleston. 
Judge Waring had overturned the all-white Democratic Party primary system in the state 
of South Carolina in 1947, and he had filed a dissent in 1952 that had foreshadowed the 
eventual ruling against school segregation in Brown v. Board of Education. As a child, 
the editor had been fond of his uncle. But as an adult, Thomas Waring Jr. had embraced 
William Watts Ball as his intellectual and professional mentor. Like Ball, the editor 
believed the South’s custom of racial separation had evolved naturally as a means to 
protect civilization. Despite growing evidence to the contrary, he claimed the majority of 
both races supported segregation, and thus the federal effort to overturn it was an attack 
on the nation’s democratic values. Judge Waring, in his famous dissent in Briggs v. 
Elliott, the Clarendon County case that would eventually be rolled into Brown, had said 
just the opposite. He argued that racially segregated schools were inherently unequal – he 
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called them “evil” – and thus state-enforced segregation deprived black children of their 
constitutional right to equal protection under the law. When the US Supreme Court sided 
unanimously with his uncle, Thomas Waring did what News and Courier editors had 
always done – he led his newspaper deep into the political battle.  
In its report on the collapse of McCray’s Lighthouse and Informer, the News and 
Courier had noted that McCray, as editor of the black newspaper and founder of the 
Progressive Democratic Party, had “become embroiled in politics as well as journalism.” 
The Charleston newspaper could have been describing its own situation at the time. In 
much the same way that McCray had founded the Lighthouse and Informer to further the 
civil rights movement, Waring and Workman used the News and Courier to help push 
their political aims in the white community. McCray’s dual role as journalist and political 
activist had been a given. Black newspapers had always served as advocates for their 
race; their journalists were expected to engage directly in political activism.354 In the 
years after the Brown decision, Waring and Workman would play the same dual role at 
one of South Carolina’s leading white newspapers. In addition to covering the news, they 
would work behind the scenes to help shape the white community’s “massive resistance” 
to the Brown ruling and to the larger push for black equality. They would help craft the 
“interposition” strategy to block integration of state schools, help establish the white 
citizens’ council movement in South Carolina, and launch a campaign to break through 
the so-called “paper curtain” that they believed prevented northerners from hearing the 
white southern point of view. By the late 1950s, when those efforts appeared to be failing 
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to halt black progress toward full equality, they would play central roles in building a 
new political home for white southerners in a revamped Republican Party. 
Such direct political activism on the part of white southern journalists was hardly 
unprecedented. In 1954, for example, the liberal editor of the Little Rock Gazette, Harry 
Ashmore, had written a key speech late in the campaign to help gubernatorial candidate 
Orville Faubus win the Democratic Party primary. It was a bit of political engagement 
that Ashmore would come to regret. Three years later, Faubus surprised the liberal editor 
by blocking nine black students from integrating Little Rock’s Central High School, a 
stand that triggered a constitutional crisis and forced President Eisenhower to send 
federal troops to Arkansas to enforce the Brown ruling.355 At the same time, James J. 
Kilpatrick, the editor of the Richmond News Leader, had joined Virginia’s senior US 
senator, Harry Byrd, in leading the fight against the civil rights movement in that state.356 
In South Carolina, editors at the News and Courier had always engaged openly 
and directly in political activism. When Waring and Workman joined the paper as a 
young journalist in the 1930s, William Watts Ball supported political candidates in news 
stories and opinion pieces, and he often consulted with their campaigns on strategy.357 
Ball seemed to be a throwback to the nineteenth century, when powerful editors such as 
Horace Greely, Thurlow Weed and the News and Courier’s Francis Dawson frequently 
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used their newspapers to promote political ambitions.358 By the early 1950s, when 
Waring and Workman emerged as political figures, the News and Courier’s top 
journalists continued to pursue political goals. Yet unlike their predecessors, Waring and 
Workman began to struggle with the conflict created by their dual roles.  
Mainstream American journalism had shed its openly partisan roots and slowly 
embraced the concepts of independence and impartiality in the years between 1880 and 
the 1920s. Before the Civil War, most American newspapers depended on political 
parties for financial support; they delivered a partisan message in return for a party 
subsidy.359 In the postbellum years, however, journalism gradually grew into a business 
and a profession.360 With the rise of the industrial revolution, cities grew, the reading 
public expanded, and metropolitan newspapers prospered. New technology cut the cost of 
printing, and newspapers took advantage of an increased demand for advertising. At the 
same time, readers began demanding more facts and less partisan opinion. To meet that 
demand, newspapers hired more reporters to gather hard news.361 They no longer 
regarded themselves as political organs but as businesses that supplied the public with a 
broad range of information.362 
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By the 1880s, newspapers had begun cutting their ties to political parties. This 
move toward independence advanced in fits and starts. But after the divisive election of 
1896, when populist leader William Jennings Bryan split the Democrats and the party 
suffered a disastrous setback, newspapers turned sharply away from overt party 
connections.363 Michael McGerr contends that independent journalism grew naturally out 
of the progressive reform movement of the late 1800s. The reformers were educated 
elites who placed their faith in social science and empirical evidence. They were appalled 
by the corruption and the emotionalism of machine politics. The reformers believed 
voters should be educated with facts, not inundated with opinion.  The independent 
newspapers followed suit: They printed more straight news, exiled opinion journalism to 
the editorial page, and began to articulate the new norms of modern, independent 
journalism.364 An independent newspaper, one editor declared, should always put “fact 
before opinion, proof before inference, principle before partisanship.”365  
By the 1920s, the principles of independence and detachment were firmly 
established as the dominant paradigm in modern American journalism.366 Universities 
launched journalism schools to teach students the techniques of modern reporting, and 
journalists created professional associations such as the American Society of Newspaper 
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Editors (ASNE).367 In 1923, the ASNE established its “Canons of Journalism,” which 
maintained that news reporting should be impartial and newspapers should be free of all 
obligations except “fidelity to the public interest.”368 Historians and media scholars have 
analyzed the implications of the professionalization of the press.369 In Patricia Dooley’s 
view, journalists were assuming the task of “a different breed of political communicator, 
one who, unlike politicians, would not put political ambition and partisan creed above the 
needs of the more general public.”370 Mainstream American journalism began to adopt 
what media theorists have described as the “monitorial” role in the democratic process.371 
Journalists would provide neutral and objective reporting, and allow some interpretation, 
but their role prohibited partisan advocacy or direct involvement in political activism.372 
As Borden and Pritchard contend, society began to expect journalists to carry out their 
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“essential function” as purveyors of unbiased political information without violating the 
public trust or concealing any conflicts of interest.373  
Nudged along by intellectuals like Walter Lippmann, newspaper editors also 
began to articulate the concept of “objective” news reporting.374  Michael Schudson says 
that the notion of objectivity – the separation of “facts” from “values” – rested in part on 
the post-World War I belief that scientific inquiry was the only path to truth given the 
complexity of the modern world.375 But the rise of objectivity had a political component 
as well. Richard L. Kaplan maintains the claim of objectivity became a sort of cover that 
granted journalists a significant voice in political discourse without forcing them to 
embrace a partisan point of view. To justify their editorial decisions, journalists 
“elaborated an occupational ethic” that granted them sweeping authority to serve as 
arbiters in the public sphere.376 Newspapers that aspired to join the mainstream of 
American journalism embraced independence, detachment, and objectivity. But these 
standards did not halt political advocacy entirely. They merely pushed it into the 
shadows.  As Schudson put it, “political advocacy could increasingly be maintained only 
sub rosa and in tension with the norms of professionalism.”377  
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The new professional standards would spread unevenly across the country. And 
even where they were accepted, they were not always followed. 378 A few recent studies 
suggest that partisan activism survived in the twentieth-century press.379 Historians have 
offered different explanations for this contradiction. Kaplan argues journalists embraced 
the notion of impartiality to maintain public authority, but found that their “apolitical 
ethic” failed to enhance political discourse.380 Robert McChesney asserts that the 
professionalization of journalism merely created the appearance of neutrality to justify 
consolidation of the press.381 Hazel Dicken-Garcia maintains that journalists failed during 
the professionalization process to resolve clearly and definitively the issue of the proper 
role for the press to play in politics.382 Yet by the 1950s, most larger newspapers in the 
United States felt the need to articulate the new standards, even if they ignored them. The 
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ethical rules were especially murky for editorial writers and columnists, and some 
opinion journalists have claimed they should participate directly in politics, despite the 
spread of professional codes that denounced such activities.383 Opinion and 
interpretations did have acknowledged places in the press, Schudson observes, but 
journalists also helped politicians behind the scenes with advice, speech writing, and 
other forms of support. 384  
Journalism historians have generally accepted the view that a professionalized, 
independent, and nonpartisan daily press had emerged by the mid-twentieth century in 
the United States. This accepted narrative of journalism history contends that the 
overwhelming majority of mainstream news outlets embraced the “monitorial” role, 
which emphasized a strict separation between journalism and partisan political 
activism.385 Yet this study of South Carolina’s white press and its role in resisting black 
equality raises new questions about how this professionalization process unfolded. 
Specifically, this study reveals a deep and ongoing connection between press and partisan 
politics in the state, one that would have a significant impact on national political 
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“Comment: Where There’s a Will There’s a Way, Columbia Journalism Review, 1 
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development during and after the civil rights movement. Yet it also shows how partisan 
journalists had begun to hide their activism from the public to maintain their status as 
independent sources of information and interpretation. The evidence from South Carolina 
suggests the professionalization narrative that has grown so prominent in journalism 
history deserves closer scrutiny. 
 With few large cities to support robust journalism, the South was especially slow 
to embrace the new professionalized journalism and its norms of impartiality and 
objectivity. In the years after World War II, as the region grew more prosperous, more 
urban, and more connected to the rest of the nation, the region’s journalists began to 
accept these new rules of journalism – at least in public. Increasingly across the 1950s, 
Waring and Workman presented the News and Courier as a professional news operation 
that embodied the ethical standards articulated by organizations such as the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors.386 Despite their deep engagement in political causes, the 
two Charleston journalists proclaimed their newspaper’s commitment to independence, 
objectivity, and nonpartisanship in news coverage.  
Both Workman and Waring had apprenticed under Ball, the paper’s editor from 
1927 to 1951.387 After his death in 1952, the New York Times called Ball “the last of the 
great editor personalities.”388 Ball had no doubt about the role newspapers editors should 
play in their communities. He believed they had a civic obligation to lead their 
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South Carolina (hereafter cited as TRW Papers). 
388 Stark, Damned Upcountryman, 8. 
	  185	  
communities and engage fully in politics.389 Waring served Ball loyally as city editor and 
then as managing editor for two decades. Unlike his mentor, however, Waring had spent 
significant time working outside South Carolina. He graduated from the University of the 
South in Sewanee, Tennessee, and spent two years at the New York Herald-Tribune, 
where another southerner, the well-known city editor Stanley Walker of Texas, sharpened 
his reporting and writing skills.390 After taking over as editor of the News and Courier on 
New Year’s Day in 1951, Waring emerged as a respected member of the national 
journalistic community. The Charleston editor served on key editorial committees of both 
the Associated Press and the ASNE.391ASNE colleagues asked him to serve as co-
chairman of the Southern Education Reporting Service, an organization created to supply 
newspapers with impartial news coverage of southern schools in the wake of the Brown 
v. Board Education ruling.392 James Reston of the New York Times, perhaps the nation’s 
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best-known political reporter of the era, called Waring “the most talented newspaperman 
in South Carolina.”393 
Waring took steps to modernize the News and Courier and separate news 
reporting from editorial opinion. In one letter to the statehouse staff in 1951, for example, 
he warned his political reporters to “stick to the facts” and keep their stories impartial. He 
was especially pointed in his criticism of Workman, his star correspondent. Since 1947, 
Workman had been given the freedom to write occasional analytical pieces under the 
byline “editorial correspondent,” but Waring thought Workman was abusing this 
privilege. “Frankly, your copy has slipped,” Waring wrote. The new editor chastised his 
lead reporter for writing too many soft pieces filled with own opinion instead of “the 
hard-hitting, original stories from all over the state” that had made his reputation.394 
Unlike Ball, Waring wanted the respect of his peers in the national press, and by the mid-
1950s, that demanded at least superficial adherence to the professional norms of 
independence, impartiality and objectivity.  
 The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in the Brown case would test Waring’s 
commitment to the new norms of professional journalism. The initial ruling in May 1954 
had triggered a torrent of rhetoric from white southerners but a surprisingly timid 
political response, with little in the way of organized opposition. When the justices 
returned the following spring with their second Brown decision – the so-called Brown II 
ruling, which addressed the question of an integration timetable – white resistance 
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movements began to emerge. The court’s decision in Brown II had appeared to be a 
victory for the white South. The justices set no hard date by which integration had to 
occur, and the vague wording of their order – “with all deliberate speed” – appeared to 
give local school districts wide latitude to end school segregation at their own pace. By 
the summer of 1955, however, white segregationists were in no mood to be appeased.395  
In South Carolina, a group of whites citizens from around the state gathered in 
Columbia’s Roosevelt Hotel on July 20, 1955, to plot their response. Workman and 
Waring had helped organize the meeting, working closely with two businessmen, Robert 
Davis of Columbia and Farley Smith of Lynchburg.396 Smith was the son of former US 
Senator “Cotton” Ed Smith, the man who had famously walked out of the 1936 
Democratic Convention in Philadelphia to protest the presence of a black minister who 
was invited to deliver the benediction.397 On the editorial page, the News and Courier 
described the committee as “a cross-section of the better-class moderate white people” 
who were the state’s “leaders in law, clergy, farming, business, education and politics.”398 
The group eventually took its name from the number of those who participated. They 
called themselves the Committee of 52. 
During that first meeting, Workman was appointed to a steering committee that 
was assigned the job of writing a resolution that would be published statewide and 
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delivered to the legislature. Workman wrote several drafts that were distributed to other 
steering committee members for edits and comments.399 The final version would come to 
be known as the “interposition” resolution, and it would serve as a concise summary of 
the arguments that would dominate southern white rhetoric during the coming years of 
“massive resistance.” The document declared that a “clear and present danger” threatened 
the nation’s constitutional form of government. It claimed the US Supreme Court had 
trampled on the Tenth Amendment, which reserved to the states all rights not specifically 
delegated to the federal government. The justices had ignored established legal precedent, 
the resolution contended, and had based their Brown decision on the “dubious 
conclusions of sociologists and psychologists whose number includes persons tainted by 
Communism.” Workman’s resolution also noted the shift in northern public opinion, 
which it blamed on the “pressure and propaganda” applied by the NAACP and other 
“self-serving organizations.” Their efforts had sapped the will of politicians and the 
general public to “resist encroachments” upon the constitutional rights of the states. 
The Committee of 52 called on the South Carolina General Assembly to 
“maintain the sovereignty guaranteed to it by the constitution.” To accomplish that, state 
lawmakers must “interpose the sovereignty of the State of South Carolina between 
Federal Courts and local school officials” to halt school integration.400 Workman would 
later take pride in the fact that he had proposed use of the legal strategy of  
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“interposition” before Kilpatrick, the Richmond editor who made the concept famous 
during Virginia’s battle over school integration. In an exchange of letters, Kilpatrick 
conceded the point, noting Workman was “in the field three months” before Kilpatrick 
began using the term publicly.401  
On August 17, when the Committee of 52 published its resolution as an 
advertisement in white newspapers across the state, Workman’s name appeared as one of 
the document’s signatories.402 But his editor’s name did not. Waring had attended the 
initial meeting and commented on drafts of the resolution. But he said that, as a 
professional journalist, he could not sign it. In a letter to one of the committee’s 
organizers, Waring said he preferred to “leave the newspaper free to comment without 
ties of any kind.” Waring said he had told organizers that he would attend the 
committee’s meetings “as a newspaper editor,” not as a participant. The News and 
Courier “will continue to hammer in its editorials at the matters treated by the 
resolution,” Waring said, but will retain its independence and reserve the right to 
“suggest shadings, changes or different strategic approaches” if necessary.403 
Waring copied Workman on his letter, and not long after, Workman changed his 
official status on the committee as well. In a letter to a committee organizer, Workman 
asked to be “relieved of his assignment” and removed from the group’s steering 
committee. He said he based his request on “considerations which arise from my 
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profession.” Workman said he was “unwilling to be an active participant in an 
organization which engages in developments which I, as a newsman, must report.” By the 
time Workman wrote his letter of resignation, the News and Courier had already 
published two news reports on the Committee of 52, one under the byline: W.D. 
Workman, Jr., Capital Correspondent.404 Workman’s letter concluded by saying, “I do 
not consider it proper to be at once ‘inside’ an organization as a member and ‘outside’ as 
a reporter.”405  
As the decade wore on, Workman would frequently struggle with the 
contradiction between his verbal commitments to the standards of professionalized 
journalism and his deep desire to engage in the white resistance to the civil rights 
movement. As was the case with the Committee of 52, it appeared to be Waring who 
demanded News and Courier journalists follow the new professional standards, in word 
and appearance if not in deed. 
The Committee of 52 published its resolution in newspapers across the state under 
the headline “Put Yourself on Record.” Within a week, more than 7,000 readers had 
returned signed copies of the document, a show of support that Waring’s newspaper 
hailed as a major victory for the white resistance movement. “If enough of us stand with 
the 52 no South Carolina politician will ever weaken in the face of pressure from the 
NAACP,” the News and Courier said. “Neither the Supreme Court nor any other body 
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can jail us all, if we insist on retaining our constitutional rights.”406 White newspapers 
around the state and region agreed. The State said “the fight to maintain segregation has 
stiffened” with the committee’s emergence. The Savannah Morning News called the 
South Carolina group “non-political in its motives, non-partisan in make-up, and 
objective in its approach.” The Greenville News said the committee “put into 
unmistakable words” the state’s commitment to resist the Brown decision. The News also 
praised the quality of the men involved. They had no ties to the Ku Klux Klan, the 
newspaper said, and “they aren’t even in the same category as the so-called citizens’ 
councils, which are an unknown quantity.”407 
Yet the Committee of 52 would soon give way to the white citizens’ councils as 
the primary organizer of white resistance in South Carolina, and Waring and his 
newspaper would help expedite this transition. Waring had been in close communication 
with the founders of the Mississippi citizens’ council movement for the past year. Robert 
D. Patterson, a plantation manager in the Mississippi delta town of Indianola, had been 
worried about the future of segregation well before the Brown ruling. A World War II 
veteran and former Mississippi State football star, Patterson said he was driven to act 
after reading a pamphlet written by fellow Mississippian Tom P. Brady, a Yale-educated 
lawyer from the small town of Brookhaven. Like Workman’s Committee of 52 
resolution, Brady’s pamphlet ran the gamut of white southern legal arguments against the 
Brown ruling. But it also reached back to the 1948 Dixiecrat campaign to revive harsher 
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rhetoric concerning “amalgamation,” “mongrelization,” and white subjugation to a 
“mulatto” race in the South.408 
Brady expanded Black Monday into a book in late 1954, and its final chapter 
detailed several proposed white responses to Brown. Some were outlandish, such as the 
creation of a forty-ninth state to house all African Americans. But one of Brady’s 
suggestions would gain traction across the South: the creation of “law-abiding” white 
resistance organizations in every southern state. These groups would be coordinated by a 
“National Federation of Sovereign States,” which would orchestrate southern defiance of 
federal integration efforts. Brady believed the federation could take the lead in 
disseminating “correct information” about the “imminent danger” posed by the Brown 
ruling and the civil rights movement. The local organizations would be open and 
transparent, Brqady said. They would be composed of the best people and would eschew 
violence and intimidation. These organizations would be nothing “like those nefarious Ku 
Klux Klans.”409 
Following Brady’s advice, Patterson convened a group of leading white citizens 
in his small town and formed the Indianola Citizens’ Council in July 1954. By the 
following summer, Patterson claimed more than 60,000 Mississippians had joined 215 
white citizens’ councils across the state. As historian Neil McMillen has shown, the 
movement got a major boost from the Jackson newspapers, the Clarion-Ledger and 
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Jackson Daily News, which served as virtual propaganda arms for the citizens’ 
councils.410 Brady’s book and the newspapers in Jackson and Charleston were part of a 
communications network that circulated ideas and tactics that could be used in resisting 
Brown. In this sense, the white segregationists were creating their own counterpublic to 
gather resources for the fight against black equality. Considered part of the nation’s 
mainstream culture just a few years earlier, these segregationists were now an out group 
battling the growing cultural consensus in support of Brown decision in the national civil 
sphere. 
In South Carolina, Waring’s editorial page had been urging southern politicians to 
take the lead in organizing a response since the first Brown ruling. By the summer of 
1955, the editor had grown frustrated with their inaction. He feared the Ku Klux Klan, 
with its “terrible” reputation, would step into the vacuum and do the “white South 
immeasurable” harm in terms of public perception. “The Klan can hurt the aims of those 
of us who intend to stand up for states’ rights – to stand up for them in the daylight and 
without benefit of bed sheets or masks,” the News and Courier said.411 Waring and 
Workman had both been reading Brady’s Black Monday and following the rise of the 
citizens’ councils in Mississippi.412 Brady’s call for a resistance movement that was 
devoted to protecting the “southern custom” of racial separation, yet also shunned the 
Klan, appealed to he News and Courier journalists. 
Waring traveled to Mississippi in 1955 to meet with Patterson and other white 
citizens’ council leaders, and he returned to South Carolina determined to launch the 
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movement in his home state. On September 14, the News and Courier published a short 
editorial posing a question: How should the people of South Carolina respond to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling on segregation? “The people, white and colored, look to their 
political leaders for guidance,” the editorial declared.413 The next day, on the front page, 
Waring began answering that question. He launched a three-part series, datelined 
Jackson, Mississippi, that made the case for the white citizens’ council movement as the 
proper outlet for white resistance to the black push for equality in the South. The councils 
were mobilizing “to guard both whites and Negroes,” Waring argued. Their goal is to 
preserve segregation “from the assaults” of the NAACP and the federal government. Yet 
they are also “dedicated to protect the rank and file of Negroes from the wrath of ruffian 
white people who may resort to violence.”414 By the end of 1955, Waring had become a 
leading evangelist and recruiter for the white citizens’ council movement across the Deep 
South.415 Despite his public pronouncements in support of professionalized and 
independent journalism, he was becoming more engaged as a political organizer and 
activist. 
In South Carolina, a small-town attorney who had helped defend Clarendon 
County from the NAACP lawsuit on school segregation helped organize South Carolina’s 
first group of citizens’ councils. In the weeks after the second Brown ruling, the state 
NAACP had moved beyond the Clarendon case and had begun filing complaints 
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challenging school segregation in other counties in the state. In response, S. Emory 
Rogers convened a meeting of white citizens in the Orangeburg County town of Elloree. 
In September, he asked Farley Smith and several other members of the Committee of 52 
to meet to discuss strategy. By October, the Committee of 52 had been subsumed into the 
larger Association of Citizens’ Councils of South Carolina. Once again, Workman would 
cover a political story in which he was deeply engaged personally. In July 1956, the News 
and Courier correspondent reported that between 25,000 and 40,000 South Carolinians 
had joined local citizens’ councils.416 As in Mississippi and the rest of the Deep South, 
the council movement was most active in the Black Belt region along the coastal plain in 
the eastern and southern portions of the state, where African American populations were 
largest and whites were most concerned about black political power.417  
Waring used the News and Courier to polish the image of the white citizens’ 
councils. Since its inception, the council movement had struggled to present its members 
as upstanding and peaceful. Yet the specter of the Klan always lingered nearby. In 
Alabama, for example, Montgomery Advertiser editor Grover Hall Jr. described the 
citizens’ councils as nothing more than “manicured Kluxers.”418 Waring tried to 
overcome these negative images by framing the councils as “patriots” who represented 
the best in the American democratic tradition. They were “private citizens,” not 
politicians, and they had stepped forward only because their political leaders had failed to 
do so. They were “pillars of the community” – the sort of folks who run “the chamber of 
commerce and the community chest” and handle all the “civil chores in any town worthy 
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of the name.” The council members had a single goal, Waring maintained. They wanted 
to protect their communities from an unconstitutional intrusion that threatened to destroy 
their civilized way of life.  Waring said the citizens’ councils were committed to peaceful 
resistance, and he used the language of the nation’s democratic heritage to defend the 
white councils’ right to control the civil sphere. They “have no sympathy for the Ku Klux 
Klan or any order favoring violence,” Waring assured his readers. “They are in no sense 
architects of an American Fascist movement. Rather they are firm supporters of the 
Republican and Jeffersonian Democracy.” 419 
Yet the actions of the Klan and the citizens’ councils often complicated the News 
and Courier’s effort to burnish the image of the state’s segregationist movement. Under 
grand wizard Thomas Hamilton, Klan groups had been active in the state since 1947, and 
the Brown ruling triggered new violence. In Florence, for example, Klan members drew 
national attention when they attacked the paper’s editor. But it was a combination of 
threats – violence from the Klan and an economic boycott led by white businesses – that 
eventually forced the editor to leave town. The publisher of the moderately liberal 
Morning News, John G. O’Dowd, had hired his son Jack to replace outgoing editor James 
Rogers, who had left the paper in 1953 to take a job with an agricultural firm. A graduate 
of The Citadel who had fought in Korea and worked in newspapers in Texas, Jack 
O’Dowd was hardly a radical.420 He believed the US Supreme Court was the law of the 
land, however, and when the Brown ruling came down, he urged the readers of the 
Morning News to accept it. “Segregation is ended in southern schools. This change is law 
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if not fact,” the Morning News declared the day after the Brown decision. “The Supreme 
Court has ruled that this system of school segregation is a violation of the constitution of 
these United States, and only a matter of months separates this decision from executed 
fact.”421 The next day, O’Dowd emphasized that local opposition to Brown – no matter 
how widespread or emotional – would not alter the court’s decision. And the young 
editor concluded by actually praising the justices: “Since the court decided – without 
opposition – to end segregation, the court could just as well have included in its decision 
the date integration is to be completed.” Perhaps naively, he believed white southerners 
should appreciate the court’s restraint.422 
After publishing those two editorials, Jack O’Dowd became a marked man in 
Florence. Hamilton’s Klan denounced him, and one night a group of men the editor 
believed were Klansmen chased after him, forcing him to take refuge in a friend’s 
apartment. But the attacks on the Morning News were not only physical. Local businesses 
with ties to the white citizens’ council withheld advertising in an orchestrated boycott 
that lasted nearly two years. In a failed effort to appease the public, the Morning News 
announced in the spring of 1956 that it would no longer offer editorial comment on racial 
matters. When Time magazine reported on the paper’s struggle and depicted Jack 
O’Dowd as a courageous voice for reason in his community, Waring’s News and Courier 
struck back. Waring’s editorial ridiculed the Morning News’ vow of silence on 
segregation as “a grandstand play” delivered with “choking voice,” and it accused Time 
of trying to make a martyr out of a newspaper “that had allowed public opinion to stop it 
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from saying what it thinks – a newspaper which was fighting for what it said it believed 
was right, then quit in the face of pressure.”423  
Three months after Waring’s editorial, in June of 1956, Jack O’Dowd left his 
father’s newspaper. Frightened for his son’s life, and with the Morning News facing 
economic collapse, the publisher asked his son to resign. The young journalist left 
Florence and took a job with the Chicago Sun-Times. Before leaving, however, Jack 
O’Dowd wrote a final editorial headlined “Retreat from Reason.” He claimed he had 
never supported forced integration in South Carolina, but he denounced the tactics and 
rhetoric of a pro-segregationist movement that tried to shut down all debate.424 In South 
Carolina politics, O’Dowd said after leaving the state, denunciations of the Supreme 
Court and the NAACP had replaced “home, mother, God, and country.”425 
 In Charleston, Waring’s News and Courier reported the departure of the Florence 
editor in a short news story that was notable for what was left out. The three-paragraph 
item made no mention of the Brown decision, the Klan attacks, the economic boycott, or 
O’Dowd’s parting-shot editorial. It simply said O’Dowd had “resigned to take a job in 
Chicago.”426 To replace his son, Morning News publisher John G. O’Dowd persuaded 
Rogers to return as editor, and he put an end to the boycott by quickly proclaiming the 
paper’s clear opposition to Brown. Segregation was not “an evil scheme” to deny the 
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Negro his rights, Rogers wrote. Rather, it was a “high road” that would benefit both races 
“without tension or ill will.”427 
The campaign against the Florence Morning News after the Brown editorial 
illustrated how the white resistance operated in 1950s South Carolina and throughout the 
South.428 The Klan and other extremist groups intimidated black and white supporters of 
integration with the use of force, while citizens’ councils and so-called “respectable” 
groups often threatened economic retribution. The white press often played a key role in 
the process. African Americans citizens who signed petitions demanding integrated 
schools would find their names published in the local white newspaper. Thus identified as 
a “troublemaker,” the black citizen would suddenly lose his job, or have his rent raised 
beyond his ability to pay.429 Such tactics did not fit with Waring’s framing of the council 
members as “Jeffersonian Democrats” who cherished American values of freedom and 
liberty. Waring conceded that segregationists used “economic pressure” such as the 
boycott against the Morning News, but he maintained these efforts were the work of 
individuals acting alone, not the citizens’ councils “acting as a group.”430 For the News 
and Courier, it was imperative to separate the citizens’ council movement from such anti-
civil behavior.  
Workman used his position as a news reporter to support the citizens’ council as 
well. In the News and Courier, he frequently reported on the growth of the councils and 
communicated with group leaders to discuss public relations strategy. At one point, he 
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warned the organization to beware of Klansmen who were trying to “infiltrate” the 
councils in order to use them for their own “cowardly, secretive ends.” One citizens’ 
council leader assured Workman the groups were looking for only the “highest type of 
conservative leadership” for their local organizations.431 
Waring had embraced the citizens’ council movement in part because he believed 
the state’s political leadership had failed to develop an effective strategy for resisting the 
Brown ruling.432 By early 1956, a politician with close ties to the News and Courier 
would change Waring’s mind. Strom Thurmond returned to public life with a flourish in 
late 1954, and by 1956 the former governor and Dixiecrat presidential candidate had 
taken a leading role in the state’s massive resistance campaign. When the state’s senior 
senator, Burnett Maybank of Charleston, died suddenly two months before the 1954 
election, the state Democratic Party’s executive committee dispensed with a primary 
election and selected the long-time speaker of the state House of Representatives, Edgar 
Brown, to run in the November general election. Thurmond challenged the decision and 
mounted a successful write-in campaign, becoming the first US senator ever elected by 
write-in vote. When he entered the race, Thurmond had denounced the “backroom 
politics” that had denied South Carolina voters a primary election. And to show the depth 
of his commitment to the democratic process, he promised that, if he won in 1954, he 
would resign his seat two years later and face the voters again in 1956. With a re-election 
campaign looming so soon after arriving in Washington, Thurmond was eager to grab 
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headlines. The massive resistance effort provided the perfect opportunity, just as the 
Dixiecrat campaign had back in 1948.  
In March 1956, Southern members of Congress would join the debate within the 
civil sphere over the meaning of the Brown ruling. Thurmond would claim primary 
authorship of the so-called Southern Manifesto, a document signed by 101 members of 
Congress from the South.433 Officially called “The Declaration of Southern Principles,” 
the final version stopped short of using the term “interposition,” but it commended “the 
motives of those states which had declared their intention to resist integration by any 
lawful means.” Like Workman’s Committee of 52 resolution, the Southern Manifesto 
criticized “outside agitators” for destroying the “amicable” relations between the races in 
the South. In the News and Courier, Waring said it was “high time” that southern 
members of Congress organized “to protect the rights of the states they represent from 
attack by the federal government.” Their decision would benefit all southerners, “both 
white and colored,” the News and Courier concluded.434 
As southern congressmen delivered their manifesto in Washington, state 
lawmakers met in Columbia, and the two groups seemed to be competing to present the 
strongest pro-segregation message. As the News and Courier’s statehouse reporter, 
Workman covered the 1956 South Carolina General Assembly. It was the same body that 
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he had petitioned as author of the “interposition” resolution for the Committee of 52, and 
the state’s lawmakers did not disappoint him. In what Workman dubbed “the segregation 
session,” the General Assembly passed a resolution approving of the doctrine of 
interposition and vowing to fight federal efforts to enforce school integration. The 
lawmakers passed another resolution commending the work of the white citizens’ 
councils in South Carolina, and they ordered the closing of Edisto State Park, a facility 
that the NAACP had gone to court to integrate.435 
 More substantively, the South Carolina lawmakers joined other southern states in 
launching an effort to criminalize the NAACP. The General Assembly passed a bill that 
would make it illegal for city, county, and state employees in South Carolina to join the 
civil rights organization.436 Even some conservative white newspapers believed the 
measure was unconstitutional. The Columbia Record called the new law “ill-advised,” 
but contended the “litigious NAACP” had created the racial animosity in the South.437 
Governor George Bell Timmerman, Jr., signed the bill into law March 17.  
Having lost his platform in the Lighthouse and Informer, John McCray turned to 
other means to denounce these measures. McCray disseminated a flyer that included his 
open letter to Timmerman on behalf of the Progressive Democratic Party. He accused the 
lawmakers of plotting “a course of self-destruction, chaos and rebellion” against the 
nation’s democratic principles, and he compared their actions to the work of “Fascist 
Italy, storm-trooping Germany” and the “Communists.” The anti-NAACP bill, he said, 
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was an act of “punishment and persecution” against those who had been employing legal 
means to fight for their rights “in keeping with the American way.”438 With his letter, 
McCray hoped turn the white attack on the NAACP into a communications victory for 
the civil rights movement in the civil sphere. Appealing to the nation’s ideals, he depicted 
the white crackdown on the black civil rights organization as un-civil and anti-democratic 
effort to shut down free speech and free association. 
The law criminalizing the civil rights organization for public employees had given 
segregationists a powerful weapon in their effort to curb black political activism. Public 
school teachers were the backbone of the small but growing black middle class in the 
Deep South in the mid-1950s. Their organizational skills, as well as their dues, had been 
instrumental in the growth of the NAACP. Although the law was certain to be overturned 
in the courts, the appeals would take time. And until then, white leaders could use the 
measure to harass and intimidate the black community. Across South Carolina, local 
school boards immediately added a page to their annual review and job application forms 
asking teachers to list organizational affiliations.439 
 In Charleston, the board of education targeted Septima Clark, one of the black 
community’s foremost political activists. Clark had been active in the NAACP since 
World War I, when she began teaching on Johns Island in Charleston County. By 1956, 
she was a veteran activist who was coordinating efforts with regional and national civil 
rights organizations. She had led workshops at the Highlander Folk School, an institution 
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that had been founded in east Tennessee to train southern labor activists during the New 
Deal. It was now helping prepare southern blacks to lead civil rights efforts in their 
communities. In 1954, Clark had helped lead a workshop at Highlander that included a 
shy woman from Alabama named Rosa Parks, who would return to her home in 
Montgomery and play a leading role in the 1955 bus boycott.440 
 In June of 1956, Clark and four other Charleston County teachers received letters 
from the school board announcing their contracts would not be renewed the following 
year. The school board gave no explanation for its decision, but Clark said she knew the 
reason. She said she had been “completely outspoken” about civil rights in the past year.  
Clark had hoped to fight the school board’s decision, but she found only marginal support 
from a black community skittish in the face of the white crackdown. Clark had hoped to 
unite black teachers behind their dismissed colleagues, figuring the Charleston County 
school board could not afford to fire all of them at once. She sent more than 700 letters to 
her colleagues asking them to protest the anti-NAACP law and the local firings. Only 26 
responded. Eleven of those agreed to meet with school officials, but only five actually 
showed up. Clark would call the effort “one of the failures of my life” because she 
realized she had “tried to push them into something they were not ready for.”441 The fear 
of economic retribution from the white community had grown too strong. 
As 1956 came to close, Waring and Workman had reason to be pleased. They had 
used their dual roles as journalists and political activists to help shape the white response 
to the Brown decisions and the rising push for African American rights in South Carolina. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440 Ibid, 220-242. 
441 Ibid, 244. 
	  205	  
They had helped craft an  “interposition” doctrine that had been embraced as policy by 
state lawmakers, and they had midwifed the birth of a robust and politically active white 
citizens’ council movement. Through the pages of the News and Courier, they had 
framed the white response as a civil and appropriate rebuke to an unconstitutional federal 
intrusion into state sovereignty. By trying to force integration in the South, the newspaper 
repeatedly claimed, the federal government had ignored the will of both races in the 
region and assumed the role of dictator. Taking advantage of rising fears of Soviet 
aggression, Waring employed Cold War rhetoric to depict opponents of segregation as 
socialists and communists out to undermine American democracy. The NAACP was “a 
pawn of the Soviets,” Waring claimed. And the effort to end segregation in the South was 
an attempt “by the Communist Party” to create unrest and generate “anit-US 
propaganda.”442 
At the same time, the civil rights movement that had grown so quickly in the past 
decade had begun to falter. The loss of the Lighthouse and Informer had denied the 
movement a powerful communications tool at a decisive moment in the battle with 
segregationists. The aggressiveness of the white citizens’ councils, the continuing 
presence of the Klan and other extremists, and the signing of the anti-NAACP law 
combined to intimidate blacks and spread new fear throughout the state. McCray and 
other black leaders spoke out as best they could, but with no weekly newspaper dedicated 
to the task of carrying their interpretation of local events deep into South Carolina’s black 
community, the sense of unity began to fade. The overwhelming commitment that had 
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empowered African Americans to defeat the all-white primary and challenge segregation 
in Clarendon County had begun to dissipate.  
But if Waring and Workman had reason to cheer at the end of 1956, the 
celebration would be brief. They may have helped to staunch the momentum of the civil 
rights effort in South Carolina, but the movement’s focus would shift elsewhere in the 
Deep South, to Montgomery, Mississippi, and Little Rock. The national spotlight would 
grow brighter, and the two South Carolina journalists would find it more difficult to 
frame the debate over the struggle for African American civil rights in the South.
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CHAPTER 7 
THE RISE OF THE MODERN CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT 
In the summer of 1958, Charleston News and Courier editor Thomas Waring was 
furious. The white citizens’ council movement that he had helped launch in South 
Carolina had lost momentum. Hindered by weak leadership and internal squabbling, the 
white councils were “taking a siesta” when they should be girding for the battle to come, 
Waring complained. South Carolina needed a “vigorous” citizens’ council movement, he 
contended, because “it is clear that trouble won’t stay away from our door forever.” As 
evidence, he pointed toward the upper South, where states appeared to be backing away 
from the interposition strategy they had vowed to use to defend segregation of public 
schools. Even in Virginia, home to interposition’s strongest proponents – US Sen. Harry 
Byrd and Richmond editor James J. Kilpatrick – school officials discussed the merits of 
accepting “token” integration. For Waring, these were the words of “faint-hearted 
southerners” who were ”suffering from frustration and defeatism.” In Columbia, The 
State newspaper agreed. Token integration is still integration, Samuel Latimer’s editorial 
page argued. “When the blows begin to fall” in the southern “core” states of Mississippi, 
Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina, leaders must “steadfastly resist the region’s
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ruination by federal force.”443  To accept any breach in racial separation was an act of 
surrender that would destroy the southern way of life.  
Waring’s plea for southern unity and stepped-up citizens’ council activity came at 
a precarious time for the segregationists. The political landscape was shifting, and not in 
the white South’s favor. In the fall of 1957, Waring had watched in horror as President 
Eisenhower sent the 101st Airborne to Arkansas to protect nine African American 
students who were integrating Little Rock’s Central High School. Even before the 
showdown in Little Rock, Waring had described the president as “not the man we hoped 
he would be.”444 In the 1952 presidential election, white conservatives in the South had 
turned to Eisenhower as a possible political savior. Under his leadership, perhaps the 
Republican Party would reject its northern liberal wing and embrace states’ rights and 
local control over race relations in the South. That hope faded in 1954 when Eisenhower 
refused to denounce the Brown ruling, and it expired entirely during the president’s 
second term. Not only had Eisenhower deployed federal troops to enforce Brown, his 
administration had proposed ambitious civil rights legislation designed to protect African 
American voters in the South.445 In the eyes of Waring and other white southerners, the 
Republican Party under Eisenhower had turned out to be no different than the national 
Democrats. Both had abandoned the white South in favor of the growing number of white 
liberal and African American voters in the North.  
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Eisenhower’s civil rights bill, drafted by Attorney General Herbert Brownell, was 
especially troubling for Waring and his allies in South Carolina. The measure focused on 
African American voting rights and threatened to further undermine white control of the 
Democratic Party. Brownell’s bill called for the creation of a civil rights division within 
the Justice Department and an expansion of the agency’s power to prosecute voting rights 
violations. Eisenhower would later say that he focused on voting rights because the ballot 
was the tool “the American Negro could use to safeguard his other rights.”446 Waring’s 
News and Courier saw the administration’s civil rights push as another means of 
“chasing the Negro bloc vote in the North” at the expense of white southerners.447 
 When President Truman had proposed civil rights legislation a decade earlier, the 
South’s powerful Senate delegation had blocked the measure in committee and used the 
threat of filibuster to kill it.  When confronted with Eisenhower’s bill, the southern 
senators pursued a different strategy.  Led by Sen. Richard Russell of Georgia, the 
southerners negotiated with the White House and allowed a watered-down version of the 
voting rights measure to pass. The final bill had been stripped of its most potent 
enforcement mechanisms, but it still represented a major milestone in the nation’s 
history.448 Eisenhower’s voting rights bill was the first piece of civil rights legislation 
passed by Congress since Reconstruction. As historian Keith Findley has noted, Russell 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 Brownell quote as cited in Findley, Delaying the Dream, 153; Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 
1965), 156. 
447 “The Bloc Vote,” Charleston News and Courier, March 23, 1957, 12A. 
448 The original measure would have allowed the justice department to adjudicate voting 
rights violations, but southern senators persuaded Eisenhower to accept local jury trials, 
knowing full well that all-white juries in the South were unlikely to convict a white 
southerner of violating a voting-rights law. See: Findley, Delaying the Dream, 172-188, 
and Caro, Master of the Senate, 848-1004. 
	  210	  
and his colleagues relented because of growing national support for the civil rights 
movement. Like South Carolina’s James F. Byrnes – the former governor who had tried 
to soften the South’s national image with his school equalization plan earlier in the 
decade – Russell was a cagey politician who had been at the center of the nation’s 
political life since the early 1930s. He feared blatant southern obstructionism would 
accelerate the shift in northern political opinion and force even greater change in race 
relations in the South. Additionally, Russell hoped passage of the 1957 civil rights bill – 
even a weakened version – would help Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson of Texas 
eventually reach the White House. No southerner could win the Democratic presidential 
nomination without the support of the party’s northern liberals. Russell maintained that 
Johnson’s success in guiding the civil rights bill through the Senate would enhance his 
image in the North and clear the way for a 1960 presidential bid. Accepting a weak civil 
rights bill now, Russell argued, would help the South in the long run by placing a 
southerner in the White House.449 Russell’s strategy took it as a given that Johnson, as a 
southerner, would slow down the push for African American civil rights in the South, not 
speed them up. 
In headlines and news stories, Waring’s News and Courier referred to 
Eisenhower’s civil rights proposal as “the force bill” because of the alleged power it 
granted to the federal government in racial matters. “Passage of Force Bill Urged by 
Eisenhower,” declared a front-headline as the bill moved through Congress. The 
president’s initial proposal had called for federal judges to adjudicate charges of voting 
rights violations brought against white southern officials by the Justice Department. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449 Findley, Delaying the Dream, 172-188. 
	  211	  
Russell and the southern delegation demanded that suspected violators be allowed to 
request jury trials, since it was unlikely that all-white juries in the South would ever 
convict in such cases. When the White House agreed, Russell persuaded his southern 
colleagues not to filibuster the measure and to allow it to pass. The News and Courier 
was thrilled when one southern senator refused Russell’s command. The newspaper’s 
long-time friend and ally, Strom Thurmond, defied Russell and broke ranks with his 
fellow southerners. In a futile effort to derail the bill, Thurmond launched a one-man 
filibuster that began the evening of August 28.  The senator spoke nonstop for 24 hours 
and 18 minutes, a marathon performance that set a new record for uninterrupted speech 
on the Senate floor.  Thurmond’s grand gesture had no impact on the bill’s final 
disposition, but it solidified his reputation as a lone wolf who was more than happy to 
alienate his Democratic colleagues in the Senate. The day after Thurmond’s historic 
speech, the News and Courier headline read: “South’s Senators Desert Thurmond.”  In a 
front-page editorial, Waring acknowledged that Thurmond had lost the battle but said the 
southern segregationists would eventually win their war. “Custer’s Last Stand is one of 
the great American stories,” the editorial said. “Custer lost the battle with the Indians. He 
lost his own life. But his name is not forgotten. The Indians finally were defeated.”450  
Eisenhower was a man of conservative temperament who had been born in the 
South and had always said he wanted to go slow on civil rights. He had personally 
expressed his opposition to school integration, and even after the Brown ruling had told 
Byrnes that he believed segregation would remain in force for many decades to come in 
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the South.451  But the Republican president faced increasing political pressure to act. The 
black counterpublic that W.E.B Du Bois and the NAACP had helped launch at the turn of 
twentieth century had grown dramatically during World War II. In the post-war years, 
circulation of the black press boomed.452 Led by the Pittsburgh Courier, the Chicago 
Defender, and the magazines Ebony and Jet, the black media developed a national 
audience and prodded white editors to pay more attention to the African American 
community. It was a Pittsburgh Courier sportswriter, for example, who helped persuade 
the Brooklyn Dodgers to allow Jackie Robinson to break the color barrier and integrate 
major league baseball in 1947. 453 Robinson’s stoic resolve in the face of racial taunts and 
humiliating treatment by some fans, and even some teammates, only enhanced the 
growing white liberal support for black civil rights. By the mid-1950s, the northern white 
media had discovered the civil rights story, and their depictions of southern violence and 
intransigence fueled public outrage. 
Brownell’s civil rights proposal had been motivated in part by northern reaction to 
the 1955 murder of Emmett Louis Till, a Chicago teenager visiting relatives in 
Mississippi. Till was hardly the first black to be lynched in the South. But by the mid-
1950s, the black counterpublic that had grown across the twentieth century had begun to 
exert real influence on the surrounding white society. Highlighted first by the black press, 
Till’s abduction and killing eventually drew the nation’s white media to Mississippi. It 
was the first time in the twentieth century that the mainstream northern press had focused 
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so intently on a white act of violence against an African American in the South. As Gene 
Roberts and Hank Klibanoff have pointed out, public reaction to the coverage was just as 
Gunnar Myrdal had predicted in The American Dilemma.454 Northerners were appalled 
by the searing images emerging from the drama: the teenager’s mutilated body, the 
arrogant sneers of his killers, the quick and perfunctory verdicts delivered by the all-
white jury. In September 1955, the Till case cast into stark relief the gap that existed 
between the nation’s image of itself as fair and just and democratic, and the harsh reality 
of African American life in the South. The civic rupture at the heart of nation’s civil 
sphere was growing more difficult to ignore. 
In Charleston, the News and Courier had run Associated Press stories on the 
“Mississippi murder” on its front page for seven days running in September 1955.455 But 
the headline grew significantly larger and more prominent the morning after the white 
woman at the heart of the case testified in court. Carolyn Bryant claimed that Till had 
whistled at her suggestively and “asked her for a date” during an encounter at a small 
market in Money, Mississippi. 456 Three days later, Bryant’s husband and his half-brother 
abducted Till from this great-uncle’s house. The teenager’s disfigured and bloated body 
was later found floating on the surface of the Tallahatchie River.  
On the News and Courier’s editorial page, Waring called Till’s death a “tragedy” 
and said his killers should be punished, but he quickly moved on to the argument at the 
heart of his editorial. The murder had provided “race agitators” with “welcome 
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propaganda,” he said. Yet he contended the NAACP was partly responsible for the 
teenager’s death: “Had it not been for the constant dinning in the ears of colored people 
about denial of their ‘rights,’ the boy might never have made a remark that caused 
animosity in the rural community where he was visiting.” Waring urged “all decent 
people” to condemn the violence, but also to “sympathize with the good people of 
Mississippi” who will be unfairly blamed for it. The editor concluded with a thinly veiled 
threat for those pushing court-ordered integration in the South: “The death of this boy 
should remind all who tamper lightly with deep mass emotions that voluntary, friendly 
approaches are the only way the races can live together in peace.”457 
The jury in tiny Sumner, Mississippi, had deliberated for 67 minutes before 
acquitting Carolyn Bryant’s husband and his half-brother of Till’s murder. The quick 
decision in the courtroom helped fuel public anger. Henry Luce’s Life magazine claimed 
white southerners who refused to condemn the verdict “were in danger of losing their 
souls.”458 The Vatican newspaper, L’Osservatore Romano, deplored that “a crime against 
an adolescent victim remained unpunished” and said the jury’s decision had left a “stain” 
on the United States.459 The New York Post said images from the Till case, as well as 
other “fragments of the southern tragedy,” should move the White House to act: “How 
much more must happen to awaken the humanity and conscience of the president.”460 
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Waring dismissed the Post editorial as another example of a “biased” northern 
press that assumed all white southerners were “bigots.”461 The News and Courier editor 
had been fighting a public relations battle with the northern media since he took over as 
the paper’s editor in 1951. In the months after the Brown ruling, Waring had struggled 
through four revisions of an essay for Harper’s magazine before the manuscript was 
finally published in January 1956. Editor John Fischer had said he wanted to publish a 
pro-segregationist statement that could serve as “a starting point for rational discussion.” 
What he got was a manuscript that “troubled” his conscience.462 Waring’s essay depicted 
African Americans as immoral, unhealthy, prone to violence, and intellectually inferior. 
White southerners were decent people who were trying to help African Americans 
overcome these problems, Waring said. Yet white northerners never heard that side of the 
story because the northern press “has abandoned fair and objective reporting of the race 
story.” In Waring’s view, northern editors “almost without exception” have embraced the 
NAACP interpretation of events in the South and thus have replaced facts with 
“propaganda.”463  
Waring’s experience with Harper’s appeared to crystalize his thoughts on the 
media and the role that northern public opinion was playing in the battle over civil rights 
in the South. At the same time that he was exchanging revisions and caustic letters with 
the Harper’s editor, Waring wrote a piece for The Masthead, the journal of the National 
Conference of Editorial Writers, which he also published on the front page of the News 
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and Courier.  His lead sentence was short and simple: “A paper curtain shuts out the 
Southern side of the race relations story from the rest of the country.” Northern 
newspapers and magazines have abandoned objective reporting, Waring wrote, and “the 
deluge of daily and weekly gazettes with anti-Southern slant is molding public opinion.” 
Not since Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Waring said, has there been “so powerful a blast of 
propaganda as to becloud the issues with emotion.” The states that comprised the old 
Confederacy must confront this new public relations problem, the editor maintained, 
because in this battle between North and South “there will be no secession.” Instead, 
public opinion will determine the outcome.464 
Waring would turn his “paper curtain” analogy into a battle cry and launch a 
campaign to present the segregationist view in the national media. He lambasted northern 
editors who he contended would publish only liberal or moderate voices – Ralph McGill 
of the Atlanta Constitution, Pete McKnight of the Charlotte Observer, or Hodding Carter 
Jr. of Mississippi’s Delta Democrat Times – men who were willing to criticize the South. 
Like many of his segregationist allies, Waring accused northern newspapers of ignoring 
racial problems in their own communities. If more African Americans lived in the North, 
he said, white northerners would understand that “where large numbers of both races are 
put together, violence is the rule, not the exception.” To help prove his point, he and 
several other staunchly segregationist editors began pressing the Associated Press to 
report on racial conflicts across the North and Midwest. Their demands grew so frequent 
and disruptive that the AP president finally pleaded with Waring to back down. The 
editor agreed – he always wanted to maintain his good standing in the journalistic 
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community – but he continued his campaign to shred the “paper curtain.”465 When it 
came to race, white northerners were no different than white southerners, Waring 
maintained. Neither group supported forced integration in schools and in neighborhoods. 
It was hypocritical for northern editors and publishers, like Time and Life’s Luce, to call 
for school integration and social equality when so few African Americans lived in their 
neighborhoods. “It is time the North assumed its share of the white man’s burden and 
welcomed Negroes in their communities,” he said.466 
Despite his efforts, it was clear by 1960 that Waring and the southern 
segregationists had lost the battle over public perception – and thus were losing the fight 
within the nation’s civil sphere. Their efforts to maintain the racial status quo were 
increasingly depicted as uncivil and anti-democratic, not in keeping with the nation’s 
ideals. As the civil rights campaign moved from the courtroom to the streets, with 
freedom riders, student sit-ins, and Martin Luther King Jr.’s Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference challenging state segregation laws across the South, the northern 
media flooded the region with reporters and camera crews. As historians have noted, their 
interpretation of the ongoing confrontations between white police and African American 
protesters fueled northern outrage over southern intransigence. Using the relatively new 
and powerful medium of television, correspondents delivered clear and stark images of 
courageous African Americans peacefully asserting their democratic rights in the face of 
a violent and uncivil foe.467 In the wake of such coverage, Waring and his segregationist 
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allies appeared to be stock villains from an earlier age, their arguments defending racial 
separation woefully outdated in a nation that now appeared to embrace a racially 
democratic future. An important pivot had occurred in the nation’s civil sphere. The 
rupture that had allowed African Americans to be excluded from civic life was being 
repaired, and those who defended Jim Crow segregation were losing support within the 
civil sphere.   
Oddly enough, it was Waring’s friendship with a northern journalist during those 
difficult times that would help revive the fortunes of southern segregationists and point 
them toward a new and successful political strategy. William F. Buckley, Jr., began 
publishing the conservative journal National Review in 1955. Buckley’s family owned a 
home in South Carolina’s horse country near Camden, and Buckley and Waring had 
grown close during Buckley’s visits to the state. The two traded letters frequently, and 
their talk often turned to politics. Like Waring, Buckley despised Eisenhower’s “middle-
of-the-road” policies, calling them “politically, intellectually, and morally repugnant.”468 
Eisenhower Republicans wanted to manage the growth of the “welfare state,” Buckley 
charged. He envisioned a more radical conservative movement that would eradicate the 
vestiges of the New Deal altogether. At the News and Courier, Waring and his mentor, 
William Watts Ball, had been making the same argument for decades. Inevitably, 
Buckley’s conversations with Waring turned to the question of southern conservatives 
and the issue of race – how did committed economic conservatives like Waring, who was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
468 John B. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr. – Patron Saint of the Conservatives (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1988), 133. 
	  219	  
also a segregationist, fit into Buckley’s vision of a national conservative movement?469 
Their answer to this question would eventually reshape American politics, and it would 
transform southern white conservatives. No longer political pariahs, they would re-
emerge as a dominant force on the national stage. 
A small group of intellectual conservatives had been wandering in the political 
wilderness since the Franklin Roosevelt election in 1932. Like the News and Courier 
editors, they had opposed the New Deal on principle. They believed federal intervention 
in the economy, even during the darkest days of the Depression, had damaged the nation. 
It had led to a centralization of federal power at the expense of state and local 
governments. As Ball had argued so vehemently during the 1930s, the growth of the 
federal government and its prominent role in the economy amounted to socialism, even 
communism. The idea ran contrary to the nation’s founding principles, Ball had claimed. 
It would eventually destroy the capitalist spirit and commitment to freedom that had 
made the country great. Yet those conservative economic arguments had had little 
political impact, especially in the Deep South. During the 1930s and 40s, those who 
campaigned against the New Deal occupied the fringes of the two major political parties. 
The conservative wing of the Republican Party, led by Ohio Sen. Robert Taft, had been 
active since Roosevelt’s first election. Initially, southern conservative Democrats had 
supported the New Deal, but they had second thoughts when they realized that New Deal 
policies were helping to empower African Americans to fight for their rights.470 By 1948, 
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when President Truman’s “Fair Deal” proposals included civil rights legislation, even an 
old FDR ally like James F. Byrnes was ready to desert the Democratic Party.471 Byrnes 
had publicly framed his break with Truman as a disagreement over deficit spending and 
other economic policies. But it was clear from the timing that Truman’s civil rights push 
had been a primary motivator.472 
When he launched National Review, Buckley said the journal had one immediate 
goal: to “stand athwart history, yelling Stop!” Buckley and his allies at the journal were 
social as well as economic conservatives. National Review opposed government 
interference in free-market capitalism, but it also supported the concept of social 
traditionalism. Buckley sought to unite libertarians and traditionalists by arguing that 
enduring social order grew organically, not through central planning or what he 
derisively called “social engineering.” Communities were bound together by moral and 
philosophical traditions that had developed naturally over time, and they should not be 
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tampered with lightly. For example, egalitarianism may sound like an admirable goal to 
liberals, but societal hierarchies had evolved for a reason and their disruption would 
cause turmoil and dislocation. Critics argued that Buckley had linked two contradictory 
ideas. Unfettered capitalism and the constant change that it generated, they claimed, 
would inevitably clash with the desire to maintain social traditions. Nonetheless, National 
Review’s combination of social and economic conservatism was particularly appealing to 
Waring and the southern conservatives. Like their protégé, William Watts Ball, they 
claimed to be laissez-faire capitalists who also wanted to maintain the racial status quo in 
the South.  
Buckley had been hearing Waring’s side of the segregationist argument at dinners 
and social gatherings for several years, and he embraced the News and Courier editor as a 
kindred spirit. They shared a common devotion to the preservation of traditions in 
society, particularly hierarchical order. By 1956, Buckley had decided that southern 
segregationists were the natural allies of economic conservatives, and he set out to build 
an intellectual and political relationship. As political scientist Joseph E. Lowndes notes, 
National Review was the first conservative journal to try to link the southern opposition 
to enforced integration with the antistatist argument that was central to economic 
conservatism. In doing so, Buckley and his colleagues hoped to persuade southerners to 
renounce their previous support for New Deal policies that provided the South with 
federal aid, and convince economic conservatives that southern segregationists were their 
allies in the broader battle against a centralized and invasive government. Yet National 
Review wanted to do this without appealing to blatant racism. Like Charles Wallace 
Collins and his Dixiecrat blueprint a decade earlier, National Review tried to craft an 
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argument that supported segregationist arguments in principle, but did not appear to 
violate the foundational and constitutional ideals of the nation. It was a tricky 
proposition, and Buckley stumbled in his first attempt to make the connection.  
In its early efforts, National Review supported the interposition argument and the 
massive resistance campaign, claiming the Tenth Amendment granted states the right to 
challenge US Supreme Court decisions on constitutional grounds. The magazine had 
been arguing since its founding in 1955 that the Brown ruling and the threat of federal 
enforcement of school integration was the natural culmination of New Deal policies that 
increased federal aid to the states. If states took the federal money, they would eventually 
come under federal control, the editors contended. They urged states’ rights supporters to 
break out of their “opportunistic stupor” and protect their independence by rejecting the 
government’s blandishments.473 
  By 1957 – the year of Eisenhower’s civil rights bill – Buckley moved beyond 
school integration and addressed the issue of African American voting rights in the 
South.  Under the headline “Why the South Must Prevail,” Buckley delivered the most 
forthright overture to southern segregationists yet. In its tone and its argument, the 
editorial sounded strikingly similar to those that had been running for years in Waring’s 
News and Courier.  For Buckley, the central question was “whether the White 
community in the South is entitled to take such measures as necessary to prevail, 
politically and culturally, in areas in which it does not predominate numerically. The 
sobering answer is Yes … because, for the time being, it is the advanced race.” In 
Buckley’s view, “the claims of civilization supersede those of universal suffrage.” The 
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National Review “believed that the South’s premises are correct,” he concluded. “If the 
majority wills what is socially atavistic, then to thwart the majority may be, if 
undemocratic, enlightened.”474  
Thrilled by Buckley’s National Review editorial, Waring proclaimed his support 
in the News and Courier. “The right to vote is not more basic than civilization,” Waring 
declared in the newspaper shortly after Buckley’s editorial appeared. “Universal suffrage 
is not the beginning of wisdom or the beginning of freedom.” Waring was especially 
pleased to hear those ideas emanating from outside the South. Yet the News and Courier 
editor realized Buckley’s racist argument ran against the grain of the shifting public 
opinion within the national civil sphere. He described Buckley’s editorial as “brave 
words” and pointed out that they had been “uttered by a respected northern journal.”  
Buckley’s support for “undemocratic” measures to thwart African American 
voting rights in the South had in fact gone too far. Even his colleagues at National 
Review were appalled. Buckley’s argument had violated the nation’s democratic 
principles and undermined the constitutional arguments that had been used to link 
southern segregationists to the new conservative movement. The following week, 
Buckley’s brother-in-law, L. Brent Bozell, took the unusual step of attacking Buckley’s 
editorial in the pages of his own journal. Calling him “dead wrong,” Bozell said 
Buckley’s editorial threatened to do “grave hurt to the conservative movement.” The 
Fifteenth Amendment granting African Americans the right to vote was settled law, 
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Bozell said, and thus Buckley’s argument was unconstitutional.475 It was okay to 
challenge Brown through interposition, Bozell said, because the constitution remained 
vague on whether the US Supreme Court actually had the right to impose federal control 
over states concerning education. But no such vagueness existed concerning the right to 
vote. Challenging African American suffrage required National Review to reject the 
primacy of the constitution in establishing US law. And it asked its readers to accept the 
harsh and antiquated racial notions of white supremacy and black inferiority. For many, 
those arguments sounded un-American; they violated the nation’s ideals of a pluralistic 
society based on constitutional government and the rule of law. 
Bozell’s intervention served as an important course correction for the growing 
conservative movement as it sought to build a coalition that included southern 
segregationists. Going forward, conservatives would frame their arguments more 
carefully to avoid making the claim of white supremacy and thus drawing charges of 
blatant racism. Instead, they would develop more subtle interpretations that appealed to 
white southerners but also aligned more closely with the nation’s founding ideals. They 
would adopt a so-called color-blind ethos that emphasized personal freedom and 
opportunity, but retained the segregationists’ commitment to states’ rights. In doing so, 
the conservative movement would attempt to co-opt the language African African 
Americans had used successfully to demand inclusion in equal citizens in democratic 
civil sphere.  
It was Arizona Sen. Barry Goldwater who gave voice to this new conservative 
interpretation and spread it widely into the mainstream of American party politics. But it 
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was Waring and the emerging South Carolina Republican Party, working closely with the 
National Review, that helped launch Goldwater to national prominence. By 1959, a new 
breed of white conservative began to take control of the GOP in the state. Roger Milliken 
of Spartanburg and Greg Shorey of Greenville were industrialists who had moved to 
South Carolina to make their fortunes in manufacturing. Fiercely anti-government, they 
were primarily economic conservatives who opposed new taxes, government regulation, 
labor unions, and anything that appeared to support the so-called welfare state. They 
despised the Eisenhower White House and the liberal wing of the GOP led by New York 
Gov. Nelson Rockefeller.476 They were Goldwater Republicans.477 
Shorey and Milliken invited their hero to speak at the South Carolina Republican 
Convention in Greenville in 1959. The state GOP had few members, and the gathering 
was small, but Waring and the rest of the conservative press in the state ensured 
Goldwater’s speech would get wide coverage. The Arizona senator delivered the 
expected indictment of federal spending and intrusive government, but he also linked 
those concerns to the push for civil rights and school integration in the South. The Brown 
ruling should not be “enforced by arms,” Goldwater said, because it was “not based on 
law.” 478 
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 With the help of the National Review editors, Goldwater would refine his 
message over the next two years as he launched his battle against the Republican Party’s 
liberal wing. In his political autobiography – ghost written by Bozell – Goldwater 
explained why opponents of “civil rights” were actually fighting to preserve the 
American system of government. Goldwater said that civil rights, “defined as rights to 
desegregated education,” do not exist. Despite the Brown ruling, he said the constitution 
prohibits federal involvement in state education. In a nod to the new color-blind ethos of 
the conservative movement, Goldwater tempered his argument by noting that he did not 
personally oppose integration. In fact, he said he believed desegregated schools were a 
good idea. But he emphasized that local officials, not the federal government, should 
make the choice.479  
The new conservative movement shared many of the same concerns as the 
southerners, but they expressed their arguments using language that avoided the odor of 
racism and aligned more closely with acceptable American values. Waring, for example, 
had long contended that both major political parties had marginalized the white South in 
their desperate attempt to win the “Negro bloc vote” in the North. It was an argument that 
resonated with white southerners raised on the overheated mythology of carpetbaggers 
who manipulated credulous former slaves during Reconstruction. In 1956, he had 
charged that bribery of “minority blocs” in the form of “welfare” controlled the politics 
of the United States. He maintained Democratic politicians had been luring black voters 
with “baskets of food and leniency at the police station” since the New Deal began. “How 
long other white men will permit this disgrace to continue in the false name of ‘civil 
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rights’ and ‘democracy’ may determine the life expectancy of the American Republic,” 
Waring said.480 Four years later, one of Waring’s closest allies, News and Courier 
statehouse correspondent William D. Workman, Jr., again raised the issue of “minority 
bloc voting,” but using language that emphasized the color-blind nature of his appeal. All 
citizens who meet “the requirements set for by impersonal, impartial, and color-blind 
law” should have the right to vote, Workman said, adding that anyone who blocks 
African Americans from voting illegally is admitting his inability “to out-maneuver them 
in the give-and-take of political warfare.”481  
   Buckley and his colleagues at the National Review were teaching southern 
conservatives how to make their case more palatable in a northern civil sphere that had 
undergone significant changes in the previous decade. Goldwater tried to downplay the 
issue of race and focus on constitutional and economic issues, but some supporters would 
not go along, even in the North. One of those was William Loeb, the conservative editor 
of New Hampshire’s Manchester Union-Leader. In an exchange of letters with Workman 
and J. Edward Thornton, an attorney in Mobile, Alabama, Loeb praised Goldwater and 
his conservative allies for their efforts to reshape the Republican Party. But Loeb worried 
that liberal and African American members of the party would never relinquish control to 
the conservatives. His solution violated the new rule concerning politically correct 
language: Loeb proposed the Republican Party “become the white man’s party.” He said 
he was not “against the Negroes but just FOR the white race.” Loeb said his proposal 
would “leave Democrats with the Negro vote,” but give the Republicans the white vote 
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and “white people, thank God, are still in the majority.” Sounding much like Waring, the 
New Hampshire editor believed “Negro outrages” in Northern cities would turn voters 
against the “Northern Democrats’ coddling of the Negroes” and ensure Republican gains 
in the next election.482 
In Goldwater, Waring and Workman had found a national politician who was 
actively soliciting their support, and as 1960 approached they were hard at work building 
a conservative Republican Party in South Carolina. They would once again bring their 
newspaper into the middle of the state’s politics. As they had done earlier in helping 
launch the citizens’ council movement in South Carolina, the journalists publicly 
defended the new journalistic norms of independence, impartiality, and objectivity. But 
privately, the operated as political activists and played a central role in GOP party-
building efforts. They consulted with party leaders on story ideas, helped to rewrite news 
releases, withheld significant political news, and developed campaign strategies to help 
the Republicans compete with the Democrats.483 In 1961, Workman would resign from 
the paper and run for the US Senate as a Republican. While ultimately unsuccessful, his 
1962 campaign against Democratic Sen. Olin Johnston would garner more votes than any 
Republican since Reconstruction, and his vibrant campaign would lay the groundwork for 
the growth of the Republicans into the dominant political force in the state.   
  When Workman stepped down as statehouse reporter to run for the Senate, the 
decision may have raised eyebrows, but it did not violate the professional norms of 
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modern journalism. The revolving door between press and politics has always existed, 
and the transition from one to the other, if handled transparently and with no overlap, has 
been an accepted practice.484 It has been considered unethical, however, when the 
journalist secretly pursues partisan political goals while claiming to maintain impartiality 
and independence. As Borden and Pritchard maintain, journalists have a “protected social 
function” of gathering, interpreting, and disseminating information, and as professionals 
they are expected to carry out that function without allowing partisan interests to 
compromise their  “independent exercise of judgment.”485 As part of the 
professionalization of journalism across the twentieth century, news organizations 
incorporated rules governing partisanship and conflict of interest into both written and 
unwritten codes of ethics and standards.486 Workman and his editor violated this code of 
professional journalism and used their positions at the newspaper to help build a new, 
conservative version of the Republican Party in the state. Yet Workman felt the need to 
state when he announced his candidacy that it would be “inappropriate” and “unethical” 
to combine objective reporting with partisan politics.487 Workman’s decision to hide his 
political involvement indicates how problematic the issue had become for professional 
journalists who were tempted to engage in partisan activism. 
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By the late 1950s, Workman had grown restless with his role reporter. He was 
working on a book called The Case for the South that defended segregation. In June 
1958, he told Waring that his reporting job had become a “restricted cul-de-sac,” and that 
he wanted to write a Sunday opinion column in the News and Courier. A regular opinion 
column, he argued, would afford him “a sense of editorial release” and allow him to 
make a “more useful contribution” during this critical moment in South Carolina 
history.488 Waring, however, had complained frequently about the growing editorial 
comment included in the news stories coming out of his Columbia bureau.489 He told 
Workman that readers paid more attention to “hot news stories” than political columns.  
He feared Workman’s column would look like just another “$5-a-month syndicated 
product.”490 But the editor knew Workman had other professional options and did not 
want to lose his top political reporter.491 So Waring grudgingly granted Workman a 
Sunday opinion column in the News and Courier, but only if the correspondent agreed to 
continue his coverage of straight news as well.492 
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 Workman’s column gave him an outlet to express his support for the conservative 
Republicans,493 but the state party appeared to pose little threat to the Democrats. By 
1960, white voters in the South had grown comfortable supporting Republicans at the 
presidential level, but the party had little success in state elections. South Carolina 
Republican leaders like Milliken and Shorey supported segregation and states’ rights in 
1960, but, as economic conservatives, they talked more about government intrusion into 
private business than federal enforcement of civil rights laws.494 The Republican Party 
could not compete with South Carolina Democrats on the issue of segregation, but 
Workman helped to change that. In 1962, his Senate campaign would unite racial and 
economic conservatives and point the way toward Republican control in the state. For the 
next two years, however, Workman and his editor continue in their dual roles as activists 
and journalists as they worked behind the scenes to build the Republican Party in South 
Carolina. 
Workman’s evolution from working journalist to political leader took a critical 
leap forward in January of 1960 with the publication of his book, The Case for the South. 
Though deeply racist, it was by the standards of the time an intellectual effort to defend 
segregation, and its publication transformed Workman into a national spokesman for the 
white South. Along with James Jackson Kilpatrick’s The Southern Case for School 
Segregation, published in 1962, Workman’s book represented a move away from the 
cruder excesses of earlier Southern defenses. Historian George Lewis called it “one of the 
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more erudite” arguments in the defense of segregation. In the book, Workman claimed 
the Brown ruling and federal efforts to force integration had halted progress in race 
relations in the South. Black civil rights organizations like the NAACP cared more about 
political power than racial advancement, Workman said, and their efforts had empowered 
the Ku Klux Klan and its “unlovely cohorts who substitute muscle and meanness” for 
intellect in defending the South. The reasonable white southerner is “the man in the 
middle … whose voice needs to be heard,” Workman wrote. “He demands for his state 
the right to administer his own domestic affairs, and he demands for himself the right to 
rear his children in the school atmosphere most conducive to their learning – all without 
hurt or harm to his Negro neighbor or to the Negro’s children.”495  
Workman rested his case for segregation on one critical argument: Negroes, he 
said, remain inferior to whites, socially and intellectually, and “race-mixing” would lead 
to disaster for both races. Workman conceded that some black individuals had overcome 
remarkable odds to achieve success, “sometimes with direct white opposition.” But 
despite those gains, Workman argued the Negro race remained “a white man’s burden” – 
a “violent” and “indolent” people who needed guidance and leadership from their white 
superiors.496 Workman claimed most Southern blacks understood this point and had been 
content with the gradual pace of change in the South before outside forces got involved. 
He bemoaned what he saw as a rise in hostility between the races brought on by the civil 
rights movement. For example, he accused southern Negroes of growing “too sensitive” 
about the word “nigger.” Rather than an epithet, Workman considered the word a term of 
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endearment. He called it a harmless mispronunciation by white southerners struggling to 
say “Negro” in their distinctively slow drawl.497 
Workman’s book drew national attention. In a sympathetic review, the Wall Street 
Journal urged proponents of forced integration to read it. “The case for integrating the 
schools on moral, legal and political grounds is familiar,” the reviewer wrote. “Mr. 
Workman’s list of practical obstacles will be news to many non-Southern readers.”498  
Television host Dave Garroway interviewed Workman on the “Today” program, an 
appearance that received widespread publicity in South Carolina. In introducing him, 
Garroway said, “Strangely enough, this is a view not frequently heard on television, but 
whether you agree with the view, open-minded people should allow the opinion to be 
heard.” The morning of the interview, The State, South Carolina’s capital city newspaper, 
ran a front-page story encouraging its readers to tune in.499 In Washington, Thurmond 
sent every member of the US Senate a copy of The Case for the South.500  
In South Carolina, Workman’s book was a sensation, and the journalist became a 
hot commodity on the speaking circuit. Between February and June of 1960, he seemed 
to be on the agenda at every civic organization across the state: The Women’s Club in 
Columbia; the Kiwanis Club of Greenville; the Rotary Club in Florence; the Historical 
Society in Sumter; the Citadel Round Table in Charleston; the Sertoma Club in Beaufort; 
and the Kiwanis Club again, this time back in Columbia. In Lancaster, Workman 
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delivered a speech sponsored by the Chamber of Commerce’s Cultural Improvement 
Committee. In Aiken later that month, the journalist served as keynote speaker for a 
ceremony marking the “Battle of Aiken,” billed as the South’s last victory in The Civil 
War. Workman used the occasion to urge the white South to unite politically to restore 
the region’s political clout.501 In March, the News and Courier ran this front-page 
headline: “Newsman Himself in News.” The keynote speaker at the state Democratic 
Party Convention had urged every delegate to read Workman’s book “page for page.”502  
Workman’s book tour reached a crescendo in late June, when governor Ernest 
Hollings and 400 prominent South Carolinians gathered at the Wade Hampton Hotel in 
Columbia and honored the journalist at a testimonial dinner. The State, the capital city’s 
morning newspaper, ran a four-column headline at the top of the front page: “Workman 
Praised as Major Proponent for South’s Cause.”503 At the dinner, Waring playfully 
described his abstemious friend as “no liquor, no tie, no lie.” And another colleague from 
the Charleston paper announced with great fanfare that a New York newspaper 
syndication firm would begin syndicating Workman’s column, thus holding out the 
promise that his views would be circulated beyond the South and help stem the shift in 
public opinion in the northern civil sphere.   
For Workman, however, the highlight of the evening must have been the keynote 
address delivered by one his heroes – James Jackson Kilpatrick, editor of the Richmond 
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News Leader and an intellectual architect of the southern resistance to Brown and school 
integration. In a speech laced with more light humor than serious politics, Kilpatrick said 
the South believes “the least government is the best government,” but he said “society is 
determined to impose ‘a new order,’” on the region. Finally, after all the testimonials, 
Workman took the stage. In what the newspaper described as a “terse” speech, he made 
light of the event – “This is the closest a newspaper man ever gets to covering his own 
funeral” – but ended on a serious note, perhaps foreshadowing the significant role he 
would play in Southern politics: “What else can a man ask for than to be a Southerner 
during times like these?”  
Once a mere political journalist in a sleepy state capital, Workman had been 
transformed by into a national spokesman for the white southern cause. He had been 
making the same arguments in his political columns since before the Brown ruling. But 
with the book, he had gathered those arguments in one place, and with the support of his 
New York publisher, had gotten them into the hands of the national media and national 
book reviewers. The national television appearances and the reviews in national and 
regional newspapers spread Workman’s arguments far beyond the covers of the actual 
hard-back book.504 And they elevated his status, both nationally and at home, as a serious 
voice in the public sphere. As historian Priscilla Coit Murphy has written, “For a single 
voice seeking to communicate a message of public interest, publication of a book 
represented special access” to the media system, and thus wide dissemination of the 
author’s ideas, as well as a “special kind of opportunity for public discussion of an 
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issue.”505 Murphy was writing about a very different book published during the same 
time period, Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. But her point about the power of a published 
book applies to Workman as well. Publication of The Case for The South positioned 
Workman to play a new and more significant role in the coming transformation of 
southern politics. His 1962 Senate campaign would unite racial and economic 
conservatives to create a competitive Republican Party in South Carolina, but only after 
three years of political activism behind the scenes. While his support for segregation was 
well known, Workman and his newspaper concealed his political participation while he 
worked as a political reporter and a columnist. 
 In late February of 1960, state GOP official W.W. “Duck” Wannamaker, Jr. saw 
Workman outside the governor’s office in Columbia and told him that Goldwater had 
agreed to serve as keynote speaker at the South Carolina Republican Party’s state 
convention in March. Workman, however, was not interested in breaking the news. He 
agreed instead to help the Republicans maximize publicity for the senator’s appearance. 
Workman advised Wannamaker to wait until two weeks before the convention and send 
the release to the state Associated Press bureau on a Saturday so that the story would 
appear in Sunday newspapers across the state. Wannamaker later showed Workman a 
draft of the release and asked the journalist if he would “polish it up and put it in good 
newspaper form.”506 Workman wanted a number of changes. “Start off with Goldwater as 
the attention-getter,” Workman said. He proposed a first sentence: “U.S. Senator Barry 
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Goldwater of Arizona, outspoken leader of conservative elements in the Republican 
Party, will address the State Republican Convention in Columbia on March 26.” 
Workman recommended including a direct quotation from Greg Shorey “plugging 
Goldwater and the coincidence of his views with most southerners.” He also suggested 
pointing out that Goldwater “is another in a number of prominent Republicans who have 
appeared” in South Carolina since Shorey took over as party chairman.507 Wannamaker 
wrote back the next day thanking the journalist and telling him that the his ideas “are 
excellent and we shall certainly follow your advice.”508  
 Workman was not the only News and Courier journalist communicating behind 
the scenes with state Republicans in early 1960. Roger Milliken, the textile magnate who 
helped finance the state GOP, gave Waring confidential information about plans for 
South Carolina Republicans to embarrass the party’s presumptive presidential nominee, 
Vice President Richard Nixon, by nominating Goldwater for president at their state 
convention in March. Waring passed along the news to Workman, but warned him that 
even some top GOP figures in the state were unaware of the scheme. The idea, Waring 
wrote, is to alert “GOP bigwigs and Nixon personally to conservative sentiment in these 
parts.”509 Once again, Workman had a political scoop, but he and his colleagues at the 
News and Courier made no effort to break the story before the convention. Workman and 
Waring were apparently more interested in fomenting the Goldwater insurgency than 
reporting on it. 
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  On the day of Goldwater’s appearance at the GOP state convention, the News 
and Courier and the Greenville News published Workman’s review of Goldwater’s book, 
The Conscience of a Conservative. He called the senator “one of the most forthright 
citizens to appear on the national scene in many a year.”510 Later that day, Goldwater 
thrilled the state’s Republican convention delegates in Columbia with an attack on 
Democrats who were leading the nation “on the road to socialism.”511 As planned, the 
GOP delegates nominated their conservative hero for the Republican presidential 
nomination by acclamation, thus launching Goldwater’s long-shot bid to derail the Nixon 
nomination and put the newly energized conservative wing in charge of the national 
Republican Party. 512   
 Workman served as both political reporter and opinion columnist throughout the 
1960 presidential campaign. In July, Workman the reporter covered the debate over a 
civil rights plank approved at the Democratic national convention in Los Angeles. He 
described southern Democrats who were “sputtering and gagging over a bitter dose of 
civil rights medicine” embodied in the party’s platform.513  Disappointed with the 
nomination of Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts over the southern candidate, 
Senate majority leader Lyndon Johnson of Texas, Workman predicted the Democrats 
would struggle to win votes in the South. In one news story, he said “southern 
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independents” were waiting to see whom the GOP nominated before deciding where to 
place their support.514  
Workman the columnist wanted those independents to band together behind a 
reliably conservative candidate. His first choice would be Goldwater, but he knew the 
senator had no chance of wresting the nomination from Nixon, despite an all-out push by 
the South Carolina Republicans.515 On the eve of the Republican convention, when Nixon 
reached out to appease the liberal Rockefeller in the so-called “Compact of Fifth 
Avenue,” the South Carolina Republicans girded for war. With national television 
cameras rolling, state GOP chairman Greg Shorey stepped up to the convention podium 
and delivered a passionate plea on behalf of Goldwater. Nixon won the nomination, but 
Goldwater’s insurgency at the 1960 convention gave the nation its first up-close look at 
the new and surprisingly strong conservative wing of the Republican Party, a movement 
fueled by southern activists like Shorey, Milliken, and Wannamaker of South Carolina.516 
Faced with a choice between Kennedy and Nixon, a disappointed Workman used 
his column to bemoan the lack of a stronger conservative candidate. “The sleeping giant 
of American politics is a bumbling fellow named ‘conservative’ whose strength is held in 
check by Lilliputian liberals,” Workman wrote. “He is a stout fellow, this ‘conservative,’ 
yet placid. He dislikes much of what he sees about him … but he cannot guide his mind 
and his muscles in corrective action.” Workman wanted conservatives from both parties 
to band together to find a new political home. Northern liberals controlled the Democratic 
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Party, he said, and they were actively seeking black support. Despite Goldwater’s push, 
the Republicans remained the moderate and so-called “modern” GOP of Eisenhower’s 
presidency. Until conservative Democrats and conservative Republicans united in one 
party, Workman said, they would remain politically weak. 517 Greg Shorey read the 
column with pleasure. “I can’t tell you how grateful I am for the splendid article,” he 
wrote to Workman. “This is a significant contribution to not only our efforts but to a 
better understanding by the electorate of what we are trying to accomplish.”518  
Kennedy won South Carolina with just 51.2 percent of the vote. His South 
Carolina campaign exemplified the split within the party. The campaign white leadership 
in the state resorted to openly racist appeals. They accused Nixon of supporting 
integration, socializing with black celebrities, and being a member of the NAACP. They 
distributed pictures of federal troops enforcing integration in Arkansas in 1957. The 
headline read: “Remember Little Rock.”519  Nonetheless, black voters in South Carolina 
supported Kennedy and the Democrats in overwhelming numbers, a fact not lost on the 
conservative Republicans. Shortly after the election, Milliken sent Waring a letter with 
details of black voting patterns across the state. Waring thanked the GOP activist and 
assured him he would look into the story. “Loss of the state was surely not due to any 
failures on your part,” the editor wrote to Milliken. “I enjoyed working with you and look 
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forward to many more opportunities to strike a blow for freedom. We have plenty to 
do.”520  
Waring forwarded Milliken’s letter and voting analysis to Workman and asked: 
“Think this can be interpreted and possibly reproduced?”521 The same day, Workman 
wrote a letter to John H. McCray, the black journalist and leader of the Progressive 
Democrats, the mostly African American political organization. Workman asked about 
the large Democratic vote in three black precincts in Columbia and Darlington. “Do you 
think this reflects the general pattern of Negro voting throughout the state?” Workman 
inquired.522 No record of McCray’s response exists. Two weeks later, Workman’s 
analysis appeared as a front-page news story in the News and Courier and the Greenville 
News. “The pro-Democratic vote of South Carolina Negroes was a major, perhaps 
deciding factor,” he wrote, in winning the extremely close race for the Democratic 
Party.523  By reaching out to allies working with the News and Courier, Milliken had 
propelled the story of black-voter support for the Democrats to the front pages of the 
state’s newspapers. The message was clear: If new black voters had found a home in the 
Democratic Party, then it must not be the place for southern white conservatives.  
Workman’s Senate campaign grew out of a surprise Republican victory in South 
Carolina in August 1961. A well-known Columbia businessman named Charles Boineau, 
who had joined the party the year before, ran for an open state House seat in a special 
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election in Richland County.524 The race drew a small turnout, and Boineau won a narrow 
victory. He became the first Republican elected to the South Carolina House since the 
1890s.525  
Buoyed by Boineau’s victory, state Republicans set their sights on the US Senate 
seat held by Olin D. Johnston, a former textile worker who had held public office since 
the Depression.  The man who ran Boineau’s improbable campaign, Republican activist 
J. Drake Edens, hatched a plan to draft Workman into the 1962 race against Johnston. He 
organized a committee of Richland County Republicans who called publicly for 
Workman to run for the GOP nomination.526 Workman claimed he had no formal ties to 
the Republican Party and no involvement with the draft effort. Workman told Edens, 
however, that if the Republicans nominated him he would accept the bid and enter the 
race.527 The statement was, in effect, an admission that he hoped to enter electoral 
politics. For the next three months, however, Workman continued to serve as a news 
reporter and opinion columnist while his allies in the GOP ran a de facto campaign for 
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the Senate nomination. The question of the journalistic ethics of such a dual role received 
no mention in the state’s largest newspapers.528 
Readers of the News and Courier could notice Workman’s multiple roles.  They 
could pick up the newspaper on November 14, 1961, and see his byline over a column on 
the editorial page that discussed the new “respectability” of the Republican Party in 
South Carolina.529 Deeper in that day’s newspaper they would find Workman’s byline 
over a hard news piece on the arguments in a state Supreme Court case involving civil 
rights demonstrators.530 The next day, readers would see a brief story from the Associated 
Press about Edens’ effort to draft Workman into the Senate race. Headlined “GOP in 
Richland County Backs Workman,” the story identified the journalist as simply a 
“political columnist” and did not mention his position at the News and Courier.531  
Workman the straight-news reporter appeared again on November 23 with a story on a 
statehouse hearing about stevedore rates at the Port of Charleston.532 A week later, 
Workman the columnist had a piece on the editorial page posing the question: Why is 
Goldwater so popular? “To this reporter,” Workman wrote, “the answer seems to be that 
Goldwater sticks forthrightly to a relatively simple set of government principles.”533 
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Finally, on December 2, a front-page story from the Associated Press announced that 
Workman was officially entering the race for the GOP Senate nomination.534  
At his campaign’s kick-off rally, Workman addressed the ethical questions of 
what he called “his evolution” from journalist to candidate. Until recently, he said, “my 
field” had been journalism, and he considered it “highly improper (and) unethical for an 
individual to seek to combine objective reporting with partisan politics.” When Edens 
proposed the draft movement, Workman said he agreed to push ahead and “see what 
happens.” Workman also said that he wanted to retain his freedom “to go about my 
business – let me continue in my newspapering.” For the past three months, Workman 
told the crowd, he had been a “passive” candidate and thus could still operate as an 
impartial and independent journalist. When it became clear that he would have to 
campaign to win the nomination, Workman said, he decided to end his “passive 
campaign” and formally enter the race.535 
At that first rally, Workman could not help bragging to his partisan audience that 
his “passive” campaign had actually been a lot more active than advertised. He had 
delivered 18 speeches to more than 2,500 people in the past two months, he said, “and if 
it gets any more passive I can’t stand it.”536  Workman had been employed in a 
professional environment at the News and Courier where top editors had always been 
engaged in political activism. By the 1950s, however, the newspaper saw the need to 
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acknowledge expectations of unbiased reporting and journalistic independence. But 
Workman failed to discuss openly the contradiction of encouraging the efforts of a 
campaign draft movement while being a news reporter  
Workman had been a journalist in South Carolina since 1936 and a political 
correspondent in the capital city for 16 years. He had close ties with the state’s daily 
newspapers, and none raised ethical concerns about his dual role as journalist and 
politician. In fact, the press seemed disappointed that he would no longer be reporting 
from Columbia. The day after Workman launched his campaign, the Greenville News ran 
an editorial under the headline, “An Able Correspondent Resigns.” The piece read more 
like a salute to a retiring employee than an editorial confronting tricky questions of 
journalism and politics. “Bill Workman is his own man,” the editorial said. “He is 
making sure that he will neither embarrass his former newspaper employers nor be 
embarrassed by them during the campaign.  In his usual forthright fashion, he resigned 
rather than ask for a leave of absence.” The newspaper’s editors said they would continue 
running Workman’s political columns, which “of course will deal with regional, national 
and international matters,” not state politics.537  
The News and Courier also announced plans to continue running Workman’s 
column and defended the decision with a pointed example: “Ample precedent exists for 
people actively engaged in politics to write newspaper columns,” the paper said. “For 
example, Sen. Barry Goldwater, who actually holds office, syndicates a column to 
newspapers.”538  Workman’s columns immediately following his campaign 
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announcement did not deal directly with South Carolina politics. They focused instead on 
the Cold War and criticism of the Kennedy administration.539 
With Edens at the helm, Workman ran a vigorous campaign and helped boost the 
GOP in South Carolina by establishing volunteer organizations in every county in the 
state.540 In Sumter, Workman played up his journalistic background, especially his 
reputation as a dogged news reporter: “Some of you know me as a columnist you may – 
or may not – read three times a week. But many know me without coat and tie – as a 
shirt-sleeved, shoe-leather reporter, with pencil in hand and question on tongue, inquiring 
into the problems of the people of South Carolina.”541 
By October, the polls showed the Senate race surprisingly tight, and the national 
media took interest.  James Reston of the New York Times came to South Carolina to 
investigate the rising Republican phenomenon in the South. He called Workman a 
“journalistic Goldwater Republican,” and he described an editorial that Waring had 
published in the News and Courier: “His theme is a vote for (Democrat Olin) Johnston is 
a vote of confidence for the Kennedys … while a vote against Johnston is a vote against 
‘the Kennedy master-state.’”542 Reston said he had been hearing the same refrain across 
the state from Democrats as well as Republicans. The political reporter had spotted a 
trend that was well under way in South Carolina and across the Deep South. The “great 
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white switch” had begun.543 Southern conservatives were fleeing the Democratic Party 
and finding a new political home in the Goldwater wing of the Republican Party. Over 
the next four decades, the conservative movement that Workman and Waring helped 
launch would develop into the dominant political force in both the Deep South and the 
nation.544 
Workman had always believed that his newspaper job existed at the intersection 
of journalism and politics. As a young man, he said he decided to pursue newspaper work 
because he eventually wanted to be “involved in government and politics in some 
way.”545 By the late 1950s, Workman realized the role of journalist – even opinion 
journalist – would not satisfy his desire to engage fully in the public sphere. At the same 
time, he knew that the standards of his profession prevented him from informing his 
readers of his political activism. So for the three years before he announced his Senate 
campaign, Workman left his readers in the dark. He presented his news reports and his 
columns as the detached and independent observations of a journalist trying to get at the 
truth. In reality, they were the work of a partisan deeply engaged in the battle between the 
two major political parties.  
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In public, Workman and Waring seemed to embrace the “monitorial” role of 
modern American journalism.546 Under this model, journalists are considered to be 
unbiased seekers of truth who use their constitutionally protected positions to serve the 
democratic process by providing impartial and trustworthy political information to the 
public. Journalists are allowed some leeway to interpret events, but they are supposed to 
draw the line at advocacy; otherwise, they could be accused of a conflict of interest. 
Across the twentieth century, mainstream American journalists embraced such standards 
in theory, but in practice they often found their roles too limited and restricted. Workman 
and Waring, who had been mentored by a powerful editor who believed he had an 
obligation to engage in advocacy, adopted the contemporary standards of impartiality. 
Yet, their personal commitment to segregation, combined with white community 
consensus on the issue, led them to openly oppose the civil rights movement. When the 
conservative wing of the Republican Party embraced states rights and emerged as a 
viable alternative to the Democrats in the South, Workman and Waring joined that cause, 
but they hid their party-building activities to avoid violating the norms of their 
profession. Unlike their mentor, they carried out their political activism underground, out 
of sight of their readers. 
After his election loss in 1962, Workman returned to what he described as his 
“life’s calling” – the newspaper business.547 The largest paper in South Carolina, The 
State, immediately hired him as an assistant editor, and in 1966 he became the 
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newspaper’s executive editor, overseeing the news and editorial operations.548 His detour 
into electoral politics appeared to do no harm to his career as a newsman.
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CHAPTER 8 
EPILOGUE: COLOR-BLIND RHETORIC AND THE CIVIL SPHERE 
On the evening of September 15, 1964, the CBS Evening News broadcast a 
political scoop: Strom Thurmond, the Democratic senator from South Carolina, planned 
to switch political parties and become a Republican.549 The next day, Thurmond flew 
from Washington to South Carolina and confirmed the stunning news in a statewide 
television address. Angered by President Lyndon Johnson’s support for Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, which had been signed into law two months earlier, Thurmond denounced the 
national Democrats as the “party of minority groups” and “power-hungry union leaders.”  
Under Johnson’s leadership, Thurmond said, the Democrats had embraced liberal policies 
that “encourage lawlessness, civil unrest, and mob action.” Declaring that “the party of 
our fathers is dead,” Thurmond pledged to do “everything in my power” to support the 
Republican Party and its conservative presidential nominee, Senator Barry Goldwater of 
Arizona.550  
The day after his party switch, Thurmond greeted Goldwater on the tarmac at the 
Greenville-Spartanburg Airport and the two raised their clasped hands in triumph before 
a delirious crowd of twenty thousand southern Republicans. For the next six weeks, 
Thurmond crisscrossed the South on behalf of the GOP nominee, emphasizing
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 Goldwater’s support for states’ rights and his vote against Johnson’s civil rights 
legislation. The Republican candidate would halt the spread of communism, defend 
individual rights, and “protect law-abiding citizens against riots, looting, and assaults in 
the streets,” the South Carolina senator proclaimed.551 Some Republican political posters 
made the racial link more explicit. One depicted a white woman in a torn party dress 
aided by white police officers. The woman had been had been “seized and beaten by a 
negro mob” while stopped at a traffic light, the caption read. In bold letters along the 
bottom, the poster asked southerners to vote for “Barry Goldwater. For States’ Rights! 
For the South!”552 
  Thurmond’s energetic campaigning helped Goldwater win South Carolina and 
four other Deep South states in the 1964 presidential election. But the Republican 
nominee’s appeal to racial conservatives in the South appeared to be out of step with the 
consensus building in the rest of the nation. Four months after signing the Civil Rights 
Act, Johnson and his liberal running mate, Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey, won 
more than 61 percent of the popular vote, the greatest margin of victory in US history. 
Goldwater captured only one state other than those five he carried in the Deep South, and 
that one was his native Arizona, which he won by less than one-half percent of the vote. 
The morning after the election, the New York Times said “the white backlash, on which 
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Mr. Goldwater had counted so strongly, failed to materialize in most parts of the 
North.”553  
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act, which outlawed segregation in public 
accommodations, the federal government launched the most comprehensive reforms on 
behalf of African Americans since Reconstruction. President Kennedy had proposed the 
measure partly in response to the televised images emanating from Birmingham, 
Alabama, during the spring of 1963, when the city’s police had used fire hoses and attack 
dogs to suppress peaceful black marchers. After Kennedy’s assassination, Johnson and 
Humphrey led the campaign to overcome a filibuster by southern Senators that had 
stalled the historic bill for nearly a year. On August 6, 1964, as the president signed the 
measure into law, Johnson linked the battle against legalized segregation in the South to 
the highest ideals of the American nation. “Our Constitution, the foundation of our 
republic, forbids it. The principles of our freedom forbid it. Morality forbids it. And the 
law I sign tonight forbids it,” the president declared.”554  
A year later, the nation would recoil in horror at more televised images from 
Alabama, these showing state troopers beating and gassing non-violent black marchers as 
they crossed the Edmund Pettus Bridge outside Selma. The protesters had been marching 
from Selma to the state capital in Montgomery to demand new laws to protect black 
voting rights in the South. Although legally obligated to allow blacks to vote by the 
Fifteenth Amendment, white authorities often erected barriers that prevented African 
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Americans from doing so. After the confrontation near Selma, the national television 
networks interrupted Sunday night primetime programming to broadcast the violent 
images into the homes of millions of American families. Infuriated by what he saw that 
night, the president responded a week later in a televised address to Congress that 
appealed to what he called “the secret heart of America itself.”  Echoing Myrdal’s idea of 
a widely held “American Creed” embracing equality and democracy, Johnson said the 
founding fathers had established the nation with a special purpose in mind. “The great 
phrases of that purpose still sound in every American heart, North and South: ‘All men 
are created equal,’ – ‘government by consent of the governed’ – ‘give me liberty or give 
me death,’” the president said. To fulfill the nation’s historic mission, Johnson said, 
Americans must embrace black citizenship and welcome African Americans into the 
nation’s democratic family. “Their cause must be our cause, too,” he proclaimed. 
“Because it is not just Negroes, but really it is all of us who must overcome the crippling 
legacy of bigotry and injustice.” Raising his arms in the air, the president stunned even 
some of his supporters by evoking the spiritual anthem of the civil rights movement. 
“And we shall overcome,” he said, stretching out each word for effect.555 
Passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
signaled a turning point in the narrative of American democratic life. The federal 
government’s intervention on behalf of African Americans in the South effectively ended 
the Jim Crow era that South Carolina’s “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman had helped usher in 
more than seventy years earlier.  In his various speeches supporting the measures – 
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particularly the 1965 address on voting rights – Johnson had used the communicative 
power of the presidency to integrate the African American quest for equality seamlessly 
into the larger American story of democracy and freedom. The signing of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had institutionalized social and political 
equality for African Americans. Yet it was the president’s powerful declarations of 
support, delivered by a former segregationist from the South, that resonated within the 
culture at the heart of the nation’s democratic life and etched the moment deeply into the 
nation’s historical narrative.   
The African American struggle for freedom across the twentieth century 
demonstrates how the civil sphere’s ever-present potential to produce solidarity and  
justice by generating “social criticism and democratic integration at the same time.”556 
Members of an out group that had been denied citizenship rights had launched a protest 
movement that appealed to the nation’s most sacred ideals of justice, liberty, and 
equality. Using mass media to highlight their commitment to freedom against the uncivil 
and anti-democratic acts of their oppressors, the movement gradually built a coalition of 
empathetic allies within the larger society. The effort had started slowly, and it required 
the growth of black communicative institutions before the movement could gain traction 
within white society. Eventually – as the voices of protest spread and their interpretations 
of public events burrowed deeper into the cultural mainstream – the discrepancy between 
the ideals of the “American creed” and the reality of the nation’s civic life became 
impossible to ignore. Support for the out-group expanded, and public opinion reached a 
tipping point. Whether for reasons of morality or ambition, those at the highest levels of 
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the nation’s political and economic structure felt compelled to support the cause. In 
March 1965 – almost exactly one hundred years after the end of Lincoln’s war against the 
slave-holding South – Johnson’s speech before both houses of Congress welcomed all 
African Americans as full-fledged members of the national civil sphere.  
While that last sentence is true, it is also far too simple and triumphant to capture 
the complexity at the heart of modern democratic life. The civil sphere is a contested 
space, where outcomes are often contradictory and ambiguous. Just as it offers a means 
for civic repair, the civil sphere also offers opportunities for civic rupture. In the United 
States, one group’s victory may appear to settle old arguments for good, but inevitably 
new battle lines emerge, with fresh interpretations used to generate another round of 
debate over the meaning of citizenship and the boundaries of the American democracy.  
By late summer of 1965, that debate over the meaning of the civil rights 
movement and African American citizenship had resumed in earnest. In June, in a 
commencement address at Howard University, a flagship institution of African American 
higher education, Johnson expanded the government’s commitment to civil rights beyond 
the strictly legal issues of segregation and voting rights. Declaring that “freedom is not 
enough,” the president said blacks deserved economic help as well. “You do not wipe 
away the scars of centuries by saying: Now you are free to go where you want and do as 
you desire and choose the leaders you please,” the president told the Howard graduates. 
“You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, 
bring him to the starting line of a race, and then say, ‘you are free to compete with all the 
others,’ and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.” The president said his 
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administration would seek “not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact 
and equality as a result.” 557 
 Johnson promised a new government push to aid black economic advancement as 
part of what he called “the next and more profound stage of the battle for civil rights.”558 
Yet his Howard speech rallied critics who believed Johnson’s commitment to “equality of 
result,” rather than “equality of opportunity,” amounted to special treatment for African 
Americans. The effort to achieve social, legal, and political equality for blacks had 
resonated with the sense of fairness associated with the “American way.” Conservative 
critics would interpret Johnson’s commitment to “equality of results” to mean just the 
opposite – an un-American effort to stack the deck in favor of one group of citizens over 
others. The early criticism of the Howard speech laid the groundwork for the 
conservative assault on affirmative action programs the following decade. The issue 
would play a significant role in attracting new white supporters to the conservative 
movement across the 1970s and 1980s. 
On August 11, 1965, just one week after Johnson signed the historic Voting 
Rights Act, the Los Angeles community of Watts erupted in flames. During four days of 
violence, thirty-four people died and property valued in the millions of dollars was 
destroyed. The tension between the black residents of Watts and the white law 
enforcement officers of Los Angeles had been building for years. But for most American 
television viewers, the violent images were shocking and discordant. Five months earlier, 
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they had seen white state troopers in Alabama beat and gas peaceful black marchers near 
Selma. Since then, Congress had answered the protesters’ pleas with sweeping voting 
rights reforms in the South, and the nation’s president, a white southerner, had aligned 
himself closely with the black struggle for equality. Yet in Watts, African Americans 
appeared to be burning down a city neighborhood and threatening to kill those who got in 
their way. Los Angeles television station KTLA pioneered the use of a helicopter in local 
news coverage during the early 1960s, and the station delivered stunning live images of 
the mayhem that were seen across the nation. As one historian noted: “After Watts, the 
legions of moderate whites who had been so recently demanding justice for the meek, 
Christ-like demonstrators at Selma began melting away.”559 
The unraveling of the nation’s liberal consensus during the traumatic events of the 
1960s has been well documented.560 Johnson’s Howard speech would mark the pinnacle 
of his administration’s public commitment to civil rights. During his final three years in 
office, the escalation of the war in Vietnam would dominate news coverage and spawn an 
increasingly aggressive anti-war movement. At the same time, the fracturing of the civil 
rights movement, the rise of black power leaders, and the violence that followed the King 
assassination would alter white perceptions of the African American freedom struggle. 
As historian David C. Carter notes, television furthered the goals of the civil rights 
movement in the South through the Selma campaign in 1965, but in the three years that 
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followed the images of blacks rioting in northern cities angered white viewers.561 This so-
called white backlash set the stage for political realignment, with moderate and 
conservative whites in the North and the former segregationists in the South abandoning 
the Democrats to join the conservative Republican Party. Riding the crest of the backlash, 
the GOP bounced back from the Goldwater rout in 1964 to gain Congressional seats in 
the 1966 mid-term elections and to win the White House in 1968. By the late 1970s, the 
conservative counterrevolution that William F. Buckley envisioned back in the late 1950s 
– and that South Carolina’s leading white journalists helped him build – would take firm 
control of the GOP under Ronald Reagan’s leadership and would come to dominate 
American politics over the next three decades. 
Historians have debated the role of race in the rise of the modern conservative 
movement, particularly its role in the “great white switch” – the decision by white 
southerners to leave the Democratic Party and join the GOP. In 1995, Dan T. Carter 
produced an influential interpretation of the backlash thesis in his book The Politics of 
Rage, a biography of former Alabama governor and presidential candidate George 
Wallace. Carter maintained that Wallace’s brand of ultra-conservatism had tapped into 
the fears of whites in the North and the South who saw their world undergoing rapid 
change. In the mid-1960s, Wallace had catered primarily to their racial fears, Carter 
maintains, but by the late 1960s he had begun to avoid overt racism and attack a wider 
range of targets – anti-war protesters, welfare recipients, government bureaucrats.  The 
decision to downplay race was a cosmetic one, Carter contends. Wallace continued to 
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scapegoat African Americans to fuel white resentment, but he delivered his message 
indirectly, often using a type of code that intertwined race with other issues. Blatantly 
racist rhetoric was no longer acceptable, but Wallace found that his message of 
resentment was more popular than ever. As Carter put it, “The politics of rage that 
George Wallace made his own had moved from the fringes of our society to center 
stage.”562 
In the past decade, a new group of historians has emerged to question whether 
race was the dominant issue driving the rise of the conservative Republican Party in the 
South. Joseph Crespino, author of a book about political change in his native Mississippi, 
says placing too much emphasis on the backlash thesis attributes to white racism “a 
mystical, ahistorical quality that explains everything and, thus, explains nothing very 
well.” He maintains that economic and religious issues were at least as important as race 
in pushing white southerners away from the Democratic Party.563 In his study of suburban 
and urban whites in Atlanta, Richmond and Charlotte, Matthew D. Lassiter argues that 
members of the  “silent majority” in the South opposed “massive resistance” leaders who 
wanted to close public schools to avoid integration in the late 1950s and early 60s.564 Yet 
they also rejected the bi-racial Democratic coalition that emerged in the early 1970s 
because they did not trust it to protect their economic prosperity. Two political scientists, 
Byron E. Shafer and Richard Johnston, take the argument against the backlash thesis 
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even further. Their analysis of voting data maintains that race had little to do with 
partisan realignment in the South in the years after the civil rights movement. White 
southern voters had embraced the low-tax, small-government arguments of Republican 
conservatives, they argue.565 
During the 1970s, economic, religious, and cultural issues clearly played 
significant roles in attracting white southerners to the conservative movement. In 1974, 
the US Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion nationwide politicized 
white evangelicals in the South, and their growing cultural antipathy to the rising 
women’s movement led them into the conservative wing of the Republican Party. 
Moreover, the economic trauma created by the oil shortages of the mid-1970s and the 
escalating interest rates during the Carter administration angered white voters in the 
prosperous and growing suburbs of the Sunbelt. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 
the Iranian hostage crisis added to their concerns about the Democratic Party’s 
leadership. 
Yet political change is driven as much by rhetoric as by events on the ground. It is 
the interpretation of those public events that alter perceptions and help citizens make 
sense of their world. A close look at the role of leading segregationists in South Carolina 
reveals the centrality of the racial issue in transforming the Republican Party into what 
New Hampshire editor William Loeb called the “white man’s party.”566 The conservative 
voices in the state’s major white newspapers had been complaining about the growth of 
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the federal government since the early days of the New Deal. Yet their argument never 
gained broad public support in the state until the late 1940s, when President Truman 
came out strongly in favor of civil rights reform in the South.  After the Brown ruling in 
1954, the state’s white political leaders, working closely with key journalists, developed a 
rhetoric of “massive resistance” that linked the call for racial equality to the growth of a 
tyrannical and oppressive federal government. As one editor had written, “civil rights” 
would inevitably lead to “socialism.”567 By the early 1960s, when it was clear that 
massive resistance would fail and that blacks were gaining strength within the 
Democratic Party, key segregationist leaders embraced a new strategy. The state’s best-
known journalists – Thomas R. Waring and William D. Workman of the Charleston 
News and Courier – joined forces with a small group of economic conservatives to build 
a viable Republican Party in the state. It was this union of segregationists and small-
government conservatism that laid the foundation for the party’s dramatic growth in the 
South Carolina and the nation over the next two decades. As Dan T. Carter contends,  
“even though the streams of racial and economic conservatism have sometimes flowed in 
separate channels, they ultimately joined in the political coalition that reshaped American 
politics.”568  
After his failed Senate race in 1962, Workman returned to journalism, this time as 
editorial page editor at The State in Columbia. He and Waring now controlled two of the 
three largest newspapers in South Carolina, and they would use their positions to help 
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develop a new rhetorical strategy to maintain white political control through the 
Republican Party. This new strategy would accept a certain measure of black equality as 
inevitable. Yet it would develop a political language of what historians have termed  
“color-blind conservatism” as a means of delegitimizing black political activism and 
preserving white political power.569 
Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere helps explain the power of this new 
Republican rhetoric. Alexander contends that successful political communication 
eventually links public issues back to the core democratic ideals embedded in the nation’s 
historical memory. These “deep cultural codes” convey the nation’s democratic values 
across society and help citizens distinguish civil from uncivil acts.570 By the early 1960s, 
the African American civil rights movement had successfully linked its call for social and 
political equality with the nation’s sense of democratic fairness and civility. 
Segregationists who used overtly racist arguments found themselves on the wrong side of 
history. William F. Buckley had discovered this with his 1957 editorial, “Why the South 
Must Prevail,” which opposed black voting rights in the South and drew harsh criticism, 
even from fellow conservatives.571 In the mid-1960s, Waring, Workman, and the rising 
conservative movement in South Carolina moved away from strictly racial arguments and 
employed more subtle language that intertwined race with issues of law and order, 
electoral integrity, and economic fairness. The color-blind strategy accepted black 
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success in joining the nation’s civil sphere, but suggested that any future consideration of 
the nation’s racial history was an uncivil act that violated the core values of the 
democracy. 
Waring’s tone on the editorial page of the Charleston News and Courier reflected 
this shift in strategy. In 1957, in a front-page editorial, he denounced Eisenhower’s civil 
rights bill as a “force bill” that would require “race-mixing” and initiate an era of 
bloodshed across the South. But in 1964, when Johnson signed a much stronger bill, the 
editor made no direct prediction of racial violence. He merely urged its readers to remain 
calm, avoid confrontation, and accept the law. But he suggested that the battle over 
public opinion was not over. Yes, “the Negro leaders and their allies have won enactment 
of the law they strove so hard to get,” Waring said, but no one should celebrate until “the 
effects of the Civil Rights Act become clear, and until the mood of the entire country – 
not just the Southern states – begins to jell.”572 
Since becoming editor in 1951, Waring had been arguing that “race mixing” would 
inevitably lead to violence, and that the civil rights movements, particularly the acts of 
civil disobedience led by Martin Luther King, Jr., would somehow encourage black 
lawlessness in the North. Once that happened, he contended, northern public opinion 
would turn in favor of white southerners. As he explained his strategy to a white citizens’ 
council leader, Waring said he believed the “explosions now making up in Northern 
ghettos will take the liberal’s mind off the South.”573 
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Former segregations such as Waring, Workman, and Richmond editor James J. 
Kilpatrick would play leading roles in interpreting the racial disturbances in Watts and 
other northern cities as uncivil acts by African Americans who were unwilling to play by 
the rules of democratic life. After passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, they would 
express support for African American voting rights. But they would claim that efforts to 
abolish educational and other requirements that had been used to restrict black voting in 
the past were anti-democratic and would encourage fraud. As Workman would note in 
The State, African Americans who wanted to remove voting restrictions “were seeking 
preferential treatment.” If successful, they would “damage the entire fabric” of the 
nation’s democratic system of governance, he said.574  
By the late 1970s, the conservative movement would take firm control of the GOP 
under Ronald Reagan’s leadership. Reagan’s conservative coalition would unite southern 
segregationists who had supported Goldwater’s 1964 bid with the growing legions of 
white northerners who were repelled by the chaos they saw on their television screens to 
create a political movement that would come to dominant American politics over the next 
three decades. Reagan would prove to be a master of coded rhetoric that referred to race 
without mentioning the term. In 1980, he launched his general election campaign at the 
Neshoba County Fair in Philadelphia, Mississippi.  Sixteen years earlier, during the 
Mississippi Freedom Summer, when black and white civil rights workers poured into the 
state, three activists had been murdered in Neshoba County and buried in an earthen dam. 
In September 1980, Reagan came to Neshoba County to declare that his support for 
“states’ rights.” Thirty two years earlier, in 1948, Strom Thurmond had headed the 
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presidential campaign of the States’ Rights Democratic Party – the Dixiecrats. Thurmond 
maintained that he ran to protect the constitutional rights of the states against federal 
intrusion, not to protest Truman’s civil rights proposals. Yet his claim that “no army is 
large enough” to force racial mixing in the South suggested otherwise.  
It was a political strategist from South Carolina who helped pioneer the use of 
coded language to inject race into political debate. Lee Atwater served as White House 
political director under Reagan and as chief strategist for President George H.W. Bush’s 
1988 campaign. In a 1981 interview with political scientist Alexander Lamis, Atwater 
explained the evolution of coded language in Republican political campaigns in the 
South. “You start out in 1954 by saying, ‘nigger, nigger, nigger.’ By 1968 you can’t say 
‘nigger’ – that hurts you, backfires,” Atwater said. “So you say stuff like forced busing, 
states’ rights, and all that stuff.”575  
Consider the coded language that Reagan and conservatives used to describe 
federal assistance programs for the poor. Although Reagan never actually used the term 
“welfare queen,” he delivered frequent rants against “a woman on the south side of 
Chicago” who received government aid but drove around town in a Cadillac.576 It was a 
rhetorical flourish that overstated the problem of welfare fraud and was used to depict 
urban blacks as lazy, shiftless, and unwilling to carry their proper burden as US citizens. 
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It was a trope that would be repeated frequently by conservatives. A version could be 
heard in 1994, when US Representative Newt Gingrich contrasted “the pristine work 
ethic” of his overwhelmingly white suburban district with what he called the “welfare 
values” of the mostly black city of Atlanta.577 Later that year, Gingrich led a sweeping 
Republican victory that won control of the House of Representatives for the first time 
since 1954 – and completed the South’s transformation into a stronghold of the new 
GOP. 
Republicans dispute the centrality of race in the party’s rise to prominence over 
the past four decades. They note correctly that economic and social issues have played a 
significant role. What gets obscured, however, is the way those issues have been 
“racialized” in the discourse of American politics. The debate over government spending 
often focuses on welfare and social programs – which are inaccurately assumed to be 
primarily “black” initiatives – and ignore mortgage and health-care insurance tax 
deductions and other more expensive entitlements that benefit middle and upper-class 
families. Even marginal efforts to offset a history of inequality through race-based 
affirmative action programs are depicted as uncivil, and those who support such efforts in 
public discourse are labeled as anti-democratic and un-American. Civil sphere theory 
offers a framework to better understand how such cultural interpretations shape political 
outcomes. 
Alexander’s theory is not without its critics. His view of political change in 
democratic societies emphasizes persuasion over power – an argument that some scholars 
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find naïve and simplistic. Aldon Morris, for example, argues that the civil rights 
movement won concessions from dominant white society only after it was clear the 
movement had the power to disrupt society. Civil rights groups in the North and the 
South threatened the economic interests of white capitalists, Morris argues, and these 
powerful business leaders forced the dominant white society to accept change. “The 
black masses generated real economic and political leverage, and that power served as the 
primary direct force of social change,” Morris contends.578 He disputes Alexander’s 
claim that Northern white journalists provided sympathetic interpretations of the civil 
rights movement. Morris claims white journalists ignored the black movement’s non-
violent strategy and focused instead on conflict and disruption. It was the threat of more 
disruption that eventually forced the federal government to intervene. 
Morris contends that Alexander’s civil sphere theory overstates the ability of 
cultural “soft” power to defeat material “hard” power, and downplays the role of African 
Americans in their own liberation by granting so much power to the interpretive function 
of the white Northern press. Morris believes there was little difference between the North 
and South on the racial issue, and that it is naïve to argue that a white Northern civil 
sphere actually embraced the black freedom movement. White northerners accepted 
change in the South because the alternative appeared to be endless and perhaps escalating 
disruptions, and because elimination of Jim Crow laws in the South would have little 
impact on daily life in the North. 
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Alexander argues that Morris misunderstands the roles of cultural and 
instrumental power in furthering social movements within a democratic nation. The 
“power of the masses,” he contends, can succeed only if the power is deemed to be civil 
and thus “to represent the common good.”579 If not, society will determine the social 
movement to be anticivil and will allow the use of force to deny the group’s demands for 
inclusion. Alexander refers to the urban riots and black liberation rhetoric of the 1960s as 
examples of failed attempts to use disruption to gain concessions from society. In a 
democratic nation, he argues, the use of disruption must be “staged, framed, and 
interpreted” in a way that allows the out-group to make an emotional and empathetic 
connection with allies among the dominant group. If members of the in-group see the 
disruption as a threat and nothing more, they will close ranks and use their superior 
numbers and greater instrumental power to enforce the status quo.  
Morris joins Elizabeth S. Clemens and Robert J. Antonio in casting doubt on a 
tenant at the heart of civil sphere theory: that is it possible for influential members of a 
dominant group to empathize with an out-group.580 Can those in a dominant position in 
society connect emotionally and empathetically with members of an out-group? Are 
dominant group members susceptible to cultural persuasion? Or do they cede power and 
exclusivity only by force? Alexander argues that nations with autonomous civil spheres 
are open to civil persuasion. In his view, dominant groups in these societies maintain a 
“paradoxical adherence to the civil code.”581 The elites who hold power and the members 
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of their group work to “purify” and “civilize” their status by creating narratives that 
defend their dominance. Through these interpretations, they begin to sincerely believe 
that those who are outside their group deserve their lower status. They are uncivil, and 
thus not worthy of inclusion in the solidarity of the civil sphere. These conflicts over 
hierarchy and status in society are ones of interpretation, Alexander argues, and cultural 
persuasion can alter how members of a dominant group interpret their position. When an 
out-group delivers a powerful message that identifies the dominant group as uncivil, 
connections can be made, and minds within the dominant group can be changed, 
Alexander argues.582 During the civil right movement, the white Northern press delivered 
such a message on behalf of black Southerners. Alexander maintains it was this 
interpretation of events, disseminated by the Northern press, that connected with 
members of the white dominant group in the northern civil sphere and forced the white 
South to accept change. 
By focusing so intently on the power of the white Northern press to produce 
empathy among white northerners, critics contend Alexander dismisses the agency of the 
black protesters. Shouldn’t black civil rights activists in the South get the credit for 
forcing the white South to change? Alexander dismisses this criticism. During the civil 
rights movement, he argues, the white Southern press tried to portray black protests as 
anticivil disruptions that threatened the nation. But the white northern press interpreted 
the protests as civil acts in the best tradition of American democracy, and depicted the 
white southerners as the anti-democratic forces in the civic morality play. Alexander 
believes the symbolic power of the binary cultural codes helped African American win 
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key allies within the civil sphere and thus force the white segregations to concede. Yet he 
argues that his theory is not minimizing the work of heroic civil rights leaders and the 
black communities that challenged white hegemony in the South at the risk of death. It 
was their brilliant and dangerous work, he claims, that persuaded white citizens in the 
North to join the cause and demand political change. He also points out that he 
documents the development of a vibrant black counterpublic as a key necessity that 
precludes the rise of a functioning social movement. It was the courageous work of black 
activists who organized their communities and staged dramatic displays of civil action 
that won support in the national civil sphere, Alexander contends. The white press 
interpreted these protest acts as civil actors confronting uncivil, undemocratic forces in 
the South, he says, but they did so in response to the courageous black leaders who 
scripted these morality plays and risked their lives to carry them out.  
Finally, critics raise doubts about the binary codes that Alexander considers 
central to civil sphere. Where do these codes come from, and, as Clemens asks, is it 
“necessarily the case that societies are organized” around such symbolic codes? 
Alexander contends the binary codes – civil vs. uncivil – are part of the cultural structure 
of the civil sphere. He notes that scholars have no trouble accepting the existence of 
structures in other aspects of society – capitalist markets, for example, or religious 
organizations. But Alexander believes they are unwilling to find similar structures in 
cultural life. The codes, he argues, are autonomous structures that developed with the 
emergence of modern democratic nation-states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The “binary discourse” that grows out of the symbolic codes helps “inform and organize 
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the patterned conflicts and understandings of civil sphers.”583 The simple binaries of civil 
vs. uncivil and good vs. evil are deployed, Alexander maintains, whenever the 
“aspirations” of civil society come into play. They have been used repeatedly by 
independent and self-regulating societies when they fear the forces of irrationality, 
dependence, and despotism, he says. The codes are derived from “out there… in the real 
world,” Alexander claims, not from the works of scholars and philosophers. In the United 
States, they can be found throughout history, from the fights between Jefferson and the 
Federalists in 1800 through the Obama-McCain debates over the future of the nation in 
2008.584 
 In the 1930s, John Henry McCray and William D. Workman longed to join just 
such a debate in their home state of South Carolina. In 1935, when McCray returned to 
Charleston from college, he confronted a culture of nearly unquestioned white supremacy 
in his home state. To fight back, he launched a newspaper and began to deliver his own 
interpretation of public events. One year later, in 1936, Workman dropped out of law 
school in Washington, D.C., and also returned home. Workman said he knew he wanted 
to work in “government and politics” in some way, but not as a lawyer.585  Instead, he 
sought a job at a newspaper. Both McCray and Workman seemed to understand just how 
closely the press was intertwined with the nation’s political life. Newspapers delivered 
more than mere facts; they sorted and interpreted those facts, and in doing so they helped 
their readers make meaning of the world around them. Over the next three decades, 
McCray, Workman, and their colleagues in the black and white press would join the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
583 Ibid, 644. 
584 Jeffrey C. Alexander, The Performance of Politics: Obama’s Victory and the 
Democratic Struggle for Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
585 Unpublished essay. WDW Papers: Personal. 
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debate within the civil sphere over the meaning of citizenship and the boundaries of 
American democracy. As much as any politician, their newspapers would operate at the 
heart of the nation’s civic life.
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